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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation I argue that, since the 1980s, French airports have been 
designed to exclude people from legal, human and refugee rights. The particular space 
where this happens has been successively called “international zone”, “transit zone” 
and “waiting zone” and its scope has been significantly extended overtime. I contend 
that French authorities have used the concept of extra-territoriality in concert with the 
material design of the airport to sustain exclusion. While this research focuses on 
France, findings bear relevance to the global governance of migrants and refugees. 
The French case epitomizes how states creatively use the law (or absence thereof) and 
geography to keep undesirable non-citizens, including asylum claimants, away from 
their territories.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the government established Paris airports’ 
international zones as non-French, extra-territorial spaces to circumvent domestic and 
international laws. I use the term “extra-territoriality” with a hyphen to refer to this 
deliberate excision of territory. When the Law on the Waiting Zone came into 
existence in 1992, exclusion was reinvented through another form of extra-
territoriality, premised on the non-citizen’s legal status at the border. Since then, the 
term “waiting zone” has assigned both legal and geographical dimensions to this 
place.  
This research topic matters as this law established a parallel, less protective 
legal framework for foreign nationals arriving at the border compared to the one 
applicable to their counterparts already deemed on French soil - who are either 
applying for asylum or are to be removed after being caught for staying illegally in 
the country -. Yet France is a liberal democracy bound by obligations under human 
rights and refugee conventions at the regional and international levels. Is a less 
	   ii	  
protective system of rights based on the distinction between physical and legal entry 
necessary? 
I was drawn to the waiting zone for my research because it is an understudied 
area; the waiting zone is physically difficult to access, yet important to understand. I 
chose to focus on Paris Roissy-Charles de Gaulle (CDG) airport’s waiting zone, 
which detains the greatest number of individuals in France. I sought to answer several 
research questions. First, how did the Law on the Waiting Zone come to existence? 
Second, does the Law on the Waiting Zone constitute a break from the initial phase of 
extra-territoriality? In other words, is the term “extra-territoriality” inappropriate to 
describe the current situation of non-citizens placed under the waiting zone regime? 
Third, how do actors working in and on the waiting zone perceive this legal regime 
and their role therein? Finally, how are foreign nationals being treated in CDG 
airport’s waiting zone? Do they have access to rights, or do they face barriers?  
Different research methods were used to answer these questions. I engaged in 
discourse analysis of a variety of sources and carried out 35 semi-structured expert 
interviews. Participants were asked to answer questions regarding their perception of 
the legal framework applying to the border zone, their role and actions therein. 
Finally, I used the participant observation method at CDG airport.  
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Introduction  
In this dissertation I argue that, since the 1980s, French airports have been 
designed to exclude people from legal, human and refugee rights. The particular space 
where this happens has been successively called “international zone”, “transit zone” 
and “waiting zone” and its scope has been significantly extended overtime. I contend 
that French authorities have used the concept of extra-territoriality in concert with the 
material design of the airport to sustain exclusion. While this research focuses on 
France, findings bear relevance to the global governance of migrants and refugees. 
The French case epitomizes how states creatively use the law (or absence thereof) and 
geography to keep undesirable non-citizens, including asylum claimants, away from 
their territories.  
In the 1980s and early 1990s, the French government argued that the 
international zone of Paris airports was not French territory, refusing to provide those 
confined there with domestic and international rights. When the Law on the Waiting 
Zone came into existence in 1992, non-citizens at the border ceased to be detained in 
a legal void premised on extra-territoriality. Since this time, designation of the term 
“waiting zone” has assigned both legal and geographical dimensions to this place. The 
Law on the Waiting Zone establishes a particular legal regime for non-citizens 
(French: ‘étranger’) denied entry into French or Schengen territory or claiming 
asylum at a French border arriving by train, boat or airplane (CESEDA, 2016 articles 
L221-1 to L224-41). Individuals located in the waiting zone are not governed by 
ordinary laws, but instead subjected to its particular legal regime. The regular refugee 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The French legal document “CESEDA” (Code de l’entrée et du séjour des étrangers et du droit 
d’asile) gathers all laws and policies applicable to the entry and residency of non-citizens (including 
asylum-seekers) in the country. It is available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070158. The original Law 
on the Waiting zone and its subsequent updates and extensions can all be found in this online 
document.  
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determination procedures do not apply to asylum-seekers at the border. 
Unaccompanied minors are denied due process rights that children in France enjoy 
(Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2014).  
This parallel – and less protective – legal framework builds on the premise 
that rejected non-citizens and asylum-seekers at the border find themselves at the 
threshold of, but not having yet entered French sovereign territory. They find 
themselves, instead, in territorial border zones where the state establishes the 
distinction between physical and legal entry: physical presence proves insufficient 
and only lawful admission amounts to entry into the territory (Basaran, 2011). 
Individuals falling under the purview of the waiting zone framework are detained 
during the time necessary for them to be returned or, if they are claiming asylum, to 
determine whether or not their claim is inadmissible or “manifestly unfounded”. As a 
general rule, only asylum-seekers passing this initial screening will be entitled to enter 
French territory where claims will be examined on their merits. Since the new law 
that passed on July 29, 2015, asylum-seekers may also be admitted to the territory 
when deemed particularly vulnerable by the refugee agency. When not considered as 
such, unaccompanied minors seeking asylum still have to pass the “manifestly 
unfounded test”, save in a very few cases.  
At international airports, legal and cartographic borders do not map onto one 
another (Lochak, 1992). There, borders are artificially created at the heart of states’ 
territories, without a territorial delimitation between states. This artificial creation of 
borders, or what Del Valle Galvez (2005) refers to as the “legal fiction of the internal 
border,” is permissible under international law, as there is no human right to enter a 
country, except one’s own. The admission of an individual to a country is a state’s 
discretionary act. However, as Del Valle Galvez (2005) explains, this “legal fiction of 
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the interior border” can easily lead to an “extra-territorial legal fiction” (hyphen 
added). France implemented this extra-territorial legal fiction in the 1980s and early 
1990s.  
The French government considered individuals in international zones to be not 
on French territory for they had not gone through police control and customs. Thus, 
France transformed the legal distinction between de facto entry and formal entry (that 
characterizes the “legal fiction of the interior border”) into the dichotomy formal 
entry/no formal entry. This maneuver allowed the French government to circumvent 
domestic and international laws. When these events unfolded, France, like other 
Council of Europe states, was witnessing a surge in the number of asylum-seekers 
arriving at its gates (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1988). France 
used the international zone as a buffer zone to keep undesirable migrants, and asylum 
seekers in their midst, at bay.  
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereafter “Chicago 
Convention”) came into being on December 7, 1944 so that “international civil 
aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner” (Chicago Convention, 1944, 
preamble). Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention uses the term “direct transit zone”. 
This international legal instrument (July 2005, Twelfth Edition, Chapter 1.A2) defines 
such space as “a special area established in an international airport approved by the 
public authorities concerned and under their direct supervision or control, where 
passengers can stay during transit or transfer without applying for entry to the State”. 
However, Annex 9 does not specify the perimeter of the “direct transit area”. 
Kpatinde (1995) explains that the transit area “usually stretches from the runway to 
the first police checkpoint”. The international zone in airports is also called “sterile 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The first page of Annex 9 reads: “This edition incorporates all amendments adopted by the Council 
prior to 8 March 2005 and supersedes, on November 2005, all previous editions of Annex 9”. 	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zone” or “transit zone” in other countries. Under international law, international zones 
are not extra-territorial spaces. As soon as international legal scholars, international 
human rights courts and treaty monitoring bodies turned to the matter of the 
international or transit zone, they clearly stated that this space was integrally part of 
the state’s territory.  
In my dissertation, I use the term “extra-territoriality” with a hyphen to refer 
to the deliberate excision of territory that occurred in the 1980s and early 1990s in 
France. There is an important literature demonstrating that states’ obligations under 
international human rights law do not stop at their borders (see Langford et al 2013; 
Gibney and Skogly, 2002; De Schutter et al, 2012). Such obligations extending 
beyond geographical boundaries have been called “extraterritorial obligations”. 
Specifically, Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011) has demonstrated that states retain some 
responsibilities under refugee and international human rights law when they exercise 
migration controls well outside of their borders, as for example in international waters 
or in areas under foreign territorial jurisdiction. The case of the French international 
zone is slightly different: the state refused to acknowledge its obligations over a part 
of its territory, deliberately establishing this space as extra-territorial3.  
I was drawn to the waiting zone for my dissertation research because it is an 
understudied area; the waiting zone is physically difficult to access, yet important to 
understand. In this dissertation, I seek to answer several research questions. First, how 
did the Law on the Waiting Zone come to existence? Second, does the Law on the 
Waiting Zone constitute a break from the initial extra-territorial legal fiction? In other 
words, is the term “extra-territoriality” inappropriate to describe the current situation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I am aware that some scholars use the term “extraterritoriality” more broadly. For example, Weizman 
(2005) also uses the term to refer to “sites that are within the body of the state but over which it has lost 
control”. He observes that such extraterritorial sites can become “quasi-utopian spaces”.  
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of non-citizens placed under the waiting zone regime? Third, how do actors working 
in and on the waiting zone perceive this legal regime and their role therein? Finally, 
how are foreign nationals being treated in Paris Roissy-Charles de Gaulle (CDG) 
airport’s waiting zone? Are their rights being respected? Do they have access to 
rights, or do they face barriers?  
I chose to focus on CDG’s waiting zone. CDG is France’s main and Europe’s 
second largest airport (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The airport serves more than 60 
million passengers every year, and CDG’s waiting zone detains the greatest number 
of individuals in France; in 2011, 6013 individuals were denied entry (Paris Airports 
2012, 7; Anafé January 2013, 18) and more than 88 percent of asylum applications at 
French borders were made there (OFPRA April 11, 2012, 34). CDG is also the only 
waiting zone to feature a built-in detention center (called ‘ZAPI 3’).  
 This research topic matters as the Law on the Waiting Zone established a 
parallel, less protective legal framework. Since the implementation of this law, 
foreign nationals arriving at the border have been subjected to a watered-down legal 
framework compared to the one applicable to their counterparts already deemed on 
French soil - who are either applying for asylum or are to be removed after being 
caught for residing illegally in the country. Yet France is a liberal democracy bound 
by obligations under human rights and refugee conventions at the regional and 
international levels. Is a less protective system of rights based on the distinction 
between physical and legal entry necessary?  
Research methods 
This work called for several research methods. Firstly, I engaged in discourse 
analysis of a variety of sources. I studied minutes of parliamentary debates, domestic 
administrative documents, reports written by parliamentarians, documents produced 
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by activists, court judgments at the domestic and European level, government’s 
response to reports by the Council of Europe and by Human Rights Treaty-based 
bodies (such as the Committee against torture or the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child).  This analysis shed light on how some ideas become common sense and set 
aside different interpretations (Waitt, 2010). 
Secondly, I carried out 35 semi-structured expert interviews. Participants were 
asked to answer questions regarding their perception of the legal framework applying 
to the border zone, their role and actions therein. I interviewed many different actors 
who were interacting with or governing foreign nationals placed in CDG’s waiting 
zone: civil servants; volunteers and employees of domestic civil society 
organizations; employees of regional and international organizations; legal and 
religious practitioners; interpreters; members of parliament. Interviews showed the 
gaps between how policies and laws are written and how they are put into daily 
practice (Mountz, 2010). Unless otherwise specified, interviews were carried out in 
person between August 2013 and August 2014. Interviewees were identified through 
the snowball method described by Babbie and Benaquisto (2009), participant-
observation at courts and information publicly available on the Internet. I did not 
interview those confined in the waiting zone.  
 Thirdly, I used the participant observation method. As Coutin and Fortin 
(2015) note, ethnographies  
provide insight into the workings of law on the ground, the consciousnesses of 
legal actors, the routine practices of legal institutions, the impacts of law in the 
lives of marginalized groups, the nature of legal advocacy and the differences 
between law’s claims and its realities, all of which have been key to seeing 
law as a social phenomenon rather than merely as doctrine.  
 
I observed court proceedings before the court of first instance, the appeals court and 
the administrative court. Those placed under the waiting zone regime are presented to 
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a liberty and custody judge at the court of first instance after four and 12 days of 
detention. The role of this judge is to assess whether authorities treated the foreign 
national according to the law. Should this not be the case, the liberty and custody 
judge has the power to release the non-citizen from the waiting zone, de facto 
admitting the person to the territory. A judge at the appeals court hears appeals 
against the liberty and custody judges’ rulings. Finally, the administrative judge 
adjudicates appeals launched by asylum claimants against the Ministry of the 
Interior’s decision refusing them entry to the country on asylum grounds (cf figures 1 
and 2). Court hearings are public and I did not need to seek permission to observe 
them. I had the opportunity of observing the work of a state-paid lawyer at the court 
of first instance at Bobigny.  
I also engaged in participant observation at CDG. I visited the places where 
rejected travelers and asylum-seekers are detained: small cells -that can be found in 
almost every terminal- and CDG’s administrative detention center. I had sought the 
permission from the Ministry of the Interior to visit these places with the NGO 
Human Rights Watch (HRW). Permission was granted at the end of January 2014. I 
carried out eight visits from the end of January to the end of March 2014. I also 
visited Paris-Orly’s waiting zone (two visits) within this time frame: I visited the 
room at the airport where people are confined during the day and the rooms at the 
hotel Ibis where they are housed at night. Visiting Orly was interesting as it enabled 
me to compare the situation at the two Paris’ airports. This observational research was 
invaluable to study the interactions of non-governmental workers and civil servants 
with persons placed in the waiting zone. As Herbert (2000) observes, participant 
observation is a method that allows one to observe not only how people narrate their 
work, but how they actually go about doing it. All data on detainees were collected 
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through participant observation. I engaged in this method mindful of the fact that the 
researcher is not an omniscient observer but part of the social relations under study 
(Herbert, 2000; Hyndman, 2001). Paradoxically, my gender and age helped me during 
fieldwork. As a young woman, many authorities did not take me seriously and felt 
that they could talk to me.  
Many years of antagonism between authorities and activists rendered the 
concurrent use of interviews and participant-observation at CDG impossible. 
Makaremi, who had researched CDG’s waiting zone as an anthropologist, had warned 
me of the dangers of being associated with an NGO: her volunteer position with the 
activist organization Anafé had precluded interviews with government officials and 
border police (Makaremi, personal communication, 2013). Yet, volunteering with an 
NGO was the only way of entering the waiting zone, as members of the general 
public and journalists are banned from this space. Sites that are difficult to access 
force researchers to take a role in the social interactions they study (Makaremi, 2008). 
I therefore attempted to interview as many officials as possible before visiting the 
airport’s spaces of confinement with HRW. Wilfrid Laurier University’s Research 
Ethics Board approved all research methods. Most participants were assigned 
pseudonyms in order to protect their identities. Real names were only used in four 
instances, when consent was explicitly given to disclose identity and when it could 
not be foreseen that such disclosure would be detrimental to the interviewee.  
I collected data in French. This proved to be challenging, as I had to translate 
highly technical and specific terms into English. But it was also an opportunity, 
forcing me to reflect on vocabulary and to seek conceptual precision. I chose to 
translate the French term “étranger” by “non-citizen” or “foreign national”, as I 
found that these terms triggered a less negative emotional response than “foreigner” 
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or “alien”.  I stopped collecting data from research participants in August 2014. 
Analysis ended in September 2016.  
Chapter outline 
 The dissertation is structured to develop the argument that international zones 
and waiting zones in French airports have served to curtail access to domestic legal 
rights as well as access to human and refugee rights granted by international law. In 
chapter 1, I will demonstrate how the French government established Paris airports’ 
international zones in the 1980s and early 1990s as non-French, extra-territorial 
spaces to circumvent domestic and international laws. I will show how the 
international zone was an “abject space” (Isin and Rygiel, 2007) where people, 
deprived of the ability to enact rights, were rendered nonexistent. This chapter will 
illustrate how governments create extra-territorial legal fictions and the danger they 
pose to individuals who find themselves in these spaces. It will show that the 
international zone functioned as a “non-entrée” mechanism (Hathaway, 1992), 
designed to reduce the number of asylum seekers reaching sovereign territory.  
 Chapter 2 will trace how the Law on the Waiting Zone, a parallel and less 
protective legal framework premised on extra-territoriality, was established through 
regular democratic processes. Before the Law on the Waiting Zone came into 
existence, the same legislative provisions applied to all foreign nationals detained for 
immigration control purposes: the law did not establish any distinction between those 
at French borders and those already deemed to be on French territory. Non-citizens all 
benefited from the same rights. This equality before the law ended in 1992, with the 
Law on the Waiting Zone. As I will demonstrate, this less advantageous legal regime 
was premised precisely on the idea that international zones, renamed “transit zones” 
and then “waiting zones”, were somehow extra-territorial spaces. 
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 Chapters 3 and 4 will further explore the notion of extra-territoriality. In 
chapter 3, I will argue that the initial construction of the international zone as an 
extra-territorial space has endured in both mindsets and practices. Amongst 
individuals working in or on the waiting zone can be found the deeply ingrained idea 
that the waiting zone is not French territory (at least) for non-citizen populations. This 
argument, just like in the 1980s and early 1990s, has been used to exclude non-
citizens from rights. In other words, some individuals have been denied the protection 
of international law based on their presence in excised, non-French territory.  
In chapter 4, I will contend that the Law on the Waiting Zone has reinvented 
exclusion through another form of extra-territoriality, premised on the non-citizen’s 
legal status at the border. Although physically in France, rejected non-citizens and 
asylum-seekers at the border are not present from a legal standpoint, for they have not 
crossed yet “law’s admission gate” (Shachar, 2007). In this chapter, I will show that 
the Law on the Waiting Zone excludes particularly vulnerable groups from the 
protection they are entitled to under international law. I will also situate the Law on 
the Waiting Zone within the global landscape of legal maneuvers deployed to control 
migrants and asylum-seekers’ arrivals. Finally, I will unveil stakeholders’ perspective 
on the waiting zone framework, demonstrating that to most actors working in or on 
CDG’s waiting zone, border control takes precedence over rights. 
In chapters 5 and 6, I will share ethnographic findings, unveiling practices and 
mental landscapes in spaces inaccessible to the general public or journalists. Chapter 
5 will focus on airport terminals while the next one will turn to the detention center, 
“ZAPI 3”. ZAPI 3 stands for zone d’attente pour personnes en instance, which can be 
roughly translated as “waiting zone for persons in process” in English. In chapter 5, I 
will argue that airport terminals are truly the border police’s realms. Third parties 
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rarely venture into these spaces. There, asymmetrical power relations prevail and both 
detainees and researcher experience arbitrariness. Airport terminals constitute the less 
visible part of CDG’s waiting zone. Some passengers may have difficulties reaching 
the waiting zone status, deprived of the “right to have rights” (Arendt, 1968) in the 
international zone. I will also show that some authorities’ mindsets towards non-
citizens and their border enforcement jobs may be conducive to ill treatment.  
In chapter 6, I will study the other part of CDG’s waiting zone: “ZAPI 3”. 
ZAPI 3 is the detention center located in CDG’s waiting zone. NGO presence in ZAPI 
3 is unique: Anafé and the Red Cross are on site respectively two (or three) days a 
week and seven days a week, twenty four hours a day. I observed that liberty and 
custody judges at Bobigny often told non-citizens that they could find these 
organizations at ZAPI 3, as if NGO presence made confinement acceptable and 
guaranteed the respect of rights. Yet, as I will demonstrate, the presence of visitors or 
third parties does not guarantee satisfactory access to rights in ZAPI 3. In this space, 
the issues are not so much material conditions of detention but rather confinement per 
se as well as access to rights. ZAPI 3 very much remains a place of deprivation of 
liberty characterized by limited visibility and police omnipresence. It is a place where 
abuse and tension transpire, in contradiction with euphemistic discourses presenting it 
as a hotel or a place of recreation.  
In chapter 7 I will study a “non-entrée” mechanism (Hathaway, 1992) that 
may come into play thousands of kilometers away from French and Schengen 
territory: carrier sanctions. In this chapter, I will unveil the symbiotic relations 
between carrier sanctions and the institution of the waiting zone, showing how the 
former finance the latter, making its very existence possible. Finally, in chapter 8, I 
will present evidence supporting the claim that the waiting zone in itself constitutes 
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the ultimate gate that asylum-seekers need to pass before finally reaching the regular 
refugee status determination system. These findings will buttress the argument 
developed throughout the dissertation: the waiting zone serves the same purpose as its 
predecessor, the international zone. It is one of many devices crafted by states to keep 
asylum claimants away from their territory. The waiting zone constitutes the last 
“non-entrée” mechanism when all the upstream ones have failed.  
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Figure 1. Current proceedings before the judicial judge after placement in the 
waiting zone at Charles de Gaulle (based on Anafé, August 2015)  
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Figure 2. Current proceedings before the administrative judge applicable to 
asylum-seekers at French borders (based on Anafé, August 2015)  
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Chapter 1. The establishment of the international zone as an abject 
space through extra-territoriality  	  
Introduction  
In the early 1980s, Council of Europe member states began to witness a 
tremendous increase in the number of asylum-seekers arriving at their gates 
(Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 1988). For example, the number 
of individuals seeking international protection in France rose significantly over the 
1980s, from 20,000 applications per year in the early 1980s, to 61,000 in 1989 (IGC, 
December 2012, 183). As Agier (2010) observes, the image of the refugee underwent 
a profound transformation over the course of this decade and the following. In the 
1930s, 1940s or 1950s political exiles from Spain, Poland or Hungary were welcomed 
with open arms. They embodied strong personal honor and ideological meaning: the 
refugee was then a noble figure. Agier (2010) notes that the shift in the public 
perception of refugees occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, when massive population 
displacement took place in Africa and where ethnicized and de-personalized crowds 
received refugee status collectively as they crossed borders under the prima facie 
procedure. This is how Dr Felix Schnyder, a former United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, explained the difference between individual and prima 
facie group determination:  
In the case of group determination we are confronted with a mass of people 
who flee the consequences of political events in which they have not 
necessarily participated. In the case of individual determination a person 
claims to have been individually the victim of, or threatened personally by, 
persecution (quoted in Jackson, 1999, 3).  
 
As refugees came to be seen as undesirable and vulnerable victims, political and 
intellectual solidarity gave way to fears. Tending to the biological needs of these 
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populations became the priority, relegating moral and ontological questioning aside. 
Personal stories became obscured; exiles lost their singularity (Agier, 2010). Johnson 
(2011, 1016) concurs with Agier’s analysis. As she explains, “over the past 60 years, 
the image of the refugee has been reframed: from the heroic, political individual to a 
nameless flood of poverty-stricken women and children”. As the Cold War ended, 
public perception viewed refugees’ testimonies as suspicious. The refugee figure was 
transformed into that of a migrant (Agier, 2010). The refugee was no longer useful to 
the West in its ideological war and became depoliticized, stripped of political agency 
(Johnson, 2011). Crépeau (1995) and Johnson (2011) also note that by the 1980s, the 
image of the refugee from the global South had replaced that of the European refugee 
in public imagination. Barnett (2002, 254) shares this analysis: “Alleged differences 
in race and culture have made refugees a source of suspicion and hostility since the 
developing world became the source of significant refugee flows to the West in the 
1970s.”  
International and European law and policies reflected this shift: on November 
30, 1992, member states of the European Union adopted the London resolutions. One 
of these three resolutions was concerned with “manifestly unfounded applications for 
asylum”. It rested on the premise that a significant number of asylum-claimants were 
not genuine applicants. The resolution opened with the following words:  
Aware that a rising number of applicants for asylum in the Member States are 
not in genuine need of protection within the Member States within the terms of 
the Geneva Convention, and concerned that such manifestly unfounded 
applications overload asylum determination procedures, delay the recognition 
of refugees in genuine need of protection and jeopardize the integrity of the 
institution of asylum […].  
 
The resolution identified unfounded applications and agreed to treat them under 
accelerated procedures. Article 1 of the resolution defined manifestly unfounded 
applications:  
	   17	  
An application for asylum shall be regarded as manifestly unfounded if it is 
clear that it meets none of the substantive criteria under the Geneva 
Convention and New York Protocol for one of the following reasons: 
-there is clearly no substance to the applicant's claim to fear persecution in his 
own country; or 
-the claim is based on deliberate deception or is an abuse of asylum 
procedures.  
 
The two other London resolutions laid down the concepts of “host third countries” 
and of “countries in which there is in general terms no serious risk of persecution”. 
Under the former, Member States of the European Communities agreed to send 
asylum claimants to countries that were not member states, when claimants had been 
granted protection or could have sought protection in such states. Under the latter, 
Member States agreed to treat applicants coming from countries deemed safe 
according to accelerated procedures. In short, EU countries found ways of delegating 
the responsibilities for claimants to other countries and of expediting asylum claims. 
At the international level, the facilitation division of the Chicago Convention 
introduced the possibility of fining carriers at the 1988 meeting. The Schengen 
Convention transformed this possibility into a legal requirement, imposing penalties 
on carriers transporting third country nationals lacking appropriate travel documents 
(article 26)4. While article 26 explicitly stated that signatories had to honor their 
obligations under the Refugee Convention (1951) and its Optional Protocol (1967), in 
practice it forced companies to refuse passengers inappropriately documented, 
refugees or not (cf chapter 7).  
Wealthy countries began to erect fences between refugees and themselves in 
the hope of curtailing the number of claimants reaching their territory. Hathaway 
(1992) first referred to such fences as “non-entrée” practices in 1992. In this chapter, I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The official name of the Schengen Convention is “Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, 
the Federal Republic of	  Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their 
common borders, 19 June 1990”. Hereafter the term “Schengen Convention” will be used.	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will trace how the French government used the international zone in airports as a 
“non-entrée” mechanism, by establishing this space as extra-territorial. In order to 
situate these developments, I will begin with a brief description of the political and 
economic context in the country at the time. I will then describe the conditions of 
confinement in the international zone before demonstrating that such detention 
occurred in a legal vacuum; most non-citizens denied admission or waiting on an 
admission decision at French airport borders were deprived of liberty in a legal limbo. 
To justify these practices, the French government contended that the international 
zone had extra-territorial status. I will explain how activism inside and outside of the 
international zone coalesced to challenge the practices of border authorities. As I will 
demonstrate, the “legal fiction” argument was central to debunking the government’s 
extra-territoriality thesis. Finally, I will offer some explanations as to how the 
international zone could be established as an abject space.  
 
I. Political and economic context in France in the 1980s: the rise of xenophobia 
and restrictive migration laws in the midst of economic difficulties  
A clear correlation can be established between the rise of economic troubles 
and the development of laws restricting the entry and residency of foreign nationals in 
France. Like those of other industrialized and capitalist countries, France’s economic 
struggles began in 1973-1974, the date of the first oil shock. The two oil shocks 
(1973-1974 and 1979-1980) fueled the country’s economic difficulties: they put a 
sudden end to low prices on raw materials and hampered growth (Eck, 2004). 
Fernandez (2001, 107) explains that when the first oil shock took place, more than 70 
percent of French energy resources relied on oil imports. A weak internal demand in 
France is also believed to have played a significant part in the economic crisis, as 
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households stopped consuming as much as during the 1960s (Eck, 2004). As a result, 
unemployment rose dramatically: while 2.6 percent of the working population was 
unemployed in 1973 (Eck, 2004, 45), this number rose to 8.9 percent in 1991 and 9.9 
percent in February 1992 (Duhamel and Forcade, 2005, 114).   
Prior to the crisis, France, whose prosperity was largely due to foreign 
workers, was a relatively open country (Gueslin, 1992). This changed with the first oil 
shock. While criteria for granting French citizenship were broadened in 1973, an 
array of restrictive measures appeared as early as 1974. France decided to stop 
recruiting foreign workers, issuing an administrative document (on July 5, 1974) 
putting “temporarily” an end to immigration (Gueslin, 1992, 226). As the 1970s drew 
to a close, the state developed a policy of assisted voluntary returns. The government 
even tried to force return by not renewing work and residence permits (Gueslin, 
1992); in 1978 the government attempted to forcibly return 500,000 non-nationals 
over five years but encountered resistance from the States of origin, particularly 
Algeria and Morocco (Colombani and Portelli, 1995, 133).  
Eck (2004) clearly rejects any causal link between the presence of foreign 
workers and the rise of unemployment. French workers were not interested in foreign 
workers’ jobs. Furthermore, foreign workers and their families positively impacted 
economic activity through consumption. Besides, assisted voluntary returns and the 
curtailment of migration did not curb unemployment. Yet, as Guiraudon (2006 a) 
explains, since the 1970s, hostility towards non-French citizens has grown in all the 
electorate, from the Right to the Left.  Eurobarometer polls show that French public 
opinion disapproved of reforms bringing benefits to migrants. In 1989, 24 percent of 
the French population polled considered that rights granted to migrants should be 
curtailed (Guiraudon, 2006 a, 274). Another poll, organized by SOFRES, asked the 
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following question: “Would you prefer, over the next years, to prioritize the 
integration of migrants currently living in France or the departure of a significant 
number of migrants currently living in France?” Public opinion in the 1990s favored 
the departure of migrants rather than their integration (Balme, 2006, 400-401).  
The National Front appeared on the French political scene in 1983 when it 
made inroads in local elections. Since this date the far-right, anti-migrant party has 
influenced the debate on migration at the local, regional and national levels 
(Guiraudon, 2006 a). The National Front was chosen by 11 percent of voters in the 
1984 European elections (Grunberg, 2006, 461). It became gradually known as the 
authoritarian, nationalistic, xenophobic and “anti-establishment” party (Grunberg, 
2006). During the first round of the 1988 presidential election Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
leader of the National Front, made a significant score, gathering 14.39 percent of the 
votes (Duhamel et Forcade, 2005, 107). Guiraudon (2006 a) explains how 
immigrants’ place in French society has been constructed as a “public issue”. 
Immigrants from former colonies have been chosen as the scapegoats of the far right 
political parties.  
Public opinion is hostile or, at best, indifferent when it comes to immigrants. 
The latter tend not to vote and, in general, enjoy limited access to decision-making 
centers.5 Ruling parties therefore refrain from taking measures benefiting immigrants 
(Guiraudon, 2006 a). For example, the Socialist party’s stance on migration evolved 
to espouse anti-migrant sentiments amongst the population. During his presidential 
campaign, François Mitterrand had promised in January 1981 to grant the right to 
vote to non-citizens at local elections (after five years of presence on French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Until 1981, foreign nationals had to wait for five years to vote or to be elected after acquiring French 
citizenship. Cf Guiraudon, Virginie. 2000. “Analyse comparative des droits des étrangers depuis les 
années 1970”. In Les politiques d’immigration en Europe, Allemagne, France, Pays Bas. Paris: 
L’Harmattan.  
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territory).6 Facing hostile public opinion, he went back on his electoral promise as 
early as August 1981 (Gueslin, 1992, 226). As for Charles Pasqua, Minister of the 
Interior from 1986 to 1988 under the conservative government of Jacques Chirac and 
the presidency of Mitterrand, he sought to attract National Front voters by embracing 
the same discourse as the far-right party on nationalism and immigration7. He 
declared: “Overall, the majority and the National Front have the same values” 
(Colombani and Portelli, 1995, 301). His 1986 law made entry into France subject to 
proof of financial resources and facilitated immigrant expulsion (Gueslin, 1992, 226). 
When Socialists returned to power in 1988, the Pasqua law was partly abrogated but a 
strict policy of border control was maintained (Gueslin, 1992, 227).  
 
II. Long-term confinement in the international zone in inhumane conditions  
Lochak (1992, 680) describes the legal framework in place for non-citizens 
(étrangers was the official terminology) willing to enter French territory in the years 
before and until the Law on the Waiting Zone came into force on July 6, 1992. At the 
time, the conditions of entry were set out by article 5 of the Ordinance from 
November 2, 1945 (hereafter: “the 1945 Ordinance”) and specified by the decree of 
May 27, 1982 and modified and completed by the decrees of July 30, 1987 and 
August 30, 1991. In order to enter France, a non-citizen had to carry the documents 
and visas required by international conventions and domestic laws in force. Access to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Cf point 80 of the election manifesto of the Socialist Party for the presidential election of 1981, 
available at:	   http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/083001601.html.	  Today, citizens of countries that 
are not members of the European Union still do not have the right to vote at local elections, even after 
five years of presence on French territory.  
7 French political institutions allow for a peculiar configuration: the president and the parliamentary 
majority can be from different political parties. This situation is captured by the French word 
cohabitation, which can be translated in English as coexistence. A cohabitation took place from 1986 
to 1988 when a parliamentary majority hostile to the President was elected on March 16, 1986 
(Cohendet, 1993, 24 and 33). Out of the 577 seats at the National Assembly, the Left won 251, the 
Right 291 and the National Front 35 (Cohendet, 1993, 34).  
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French territory could be denied to anyone, even those who were in possession of the 
requested documents, whose presence would be deemed a threat to public order, or 
who had been banned from the territory or against whom a deportation order had been 
taken.  
In the 1980s, numerous non-citizens were deprived of liberty in Paris airports’ 
international zones for extended periods of time. The airports’ international zones 
acted as a buffer zone, where authorities “stored” those denied admission to the 
country or waiting on an admission decision. Dominique Monget-Sarrail, lawyer at 
the time and counsel in the Amuur vs France (1996) case, recalls:  
The French government told us: “no, they have not arrived in France yet since 
they did not exit the airport”. Some people arriving at Orly and Roissy airports 
were kept in the international zone, prevented by authorities from going 
beyond checkpoints-you know of admission to the territory- and people were 
kept like that, sometimes during months. There was an Iranian who lived there 
six months, I do not remember if it was (at) Orly or Roissy. So at night he 
slept in boarding rooms on benches, he would wash (in airports’ lavatories)… 
So at the time the situation of several groups of non-citizens like this had 
caught our attention. We had been told either by airline trade unions or by 
cleaners working at airports who were surprised to see the same kids play and 
sleep there for weeks. A certain number of (persons) were blocked like this. 
Even families. Not only isolated persons like the Iranian but also entire 
families (Interview, August 2014).  
 
Employees working for Paris Airports or airline companies were distressed by 
the plight of these foreign nationals. Indeed, in the 1980s and early 1990s, some of 
these travelers turned away at Paris airports were detained in small holding rooms in 
the airport’s international zone and/or in nearby hotels, which were deemed an 
extension of the international zone. Airport and airline employees were confronted 
first hand with the suffering of non-citizens crammed in holding rooms at airport 
terminals, as they were tasked with guarding them. Some of these employees 
belonged to the CFDT trade union. It was the case of Christophe, Jean and Aurélien. 
At the time, Christophe occupied an important position in the Air France CFDT trade 
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union. CFDT stands for Confédération française démocratique du travail and can 
roughly be translated as “Democratic French Work Confederation”. CFDT is a trade 
union gathering employees that belong to different professions and work in different 
structures, ranging from public to private. CFDT does not have any political 
affiliation.8 Christophe recalls that CFDT trade unionists employed by Paris Airports, 
Air France and even the border police gathered to discuss the role that they were 
forced to play with respect to rejected passengers: 
…We started discussions on this theme: we are confronted to things that are 
not our job; it is not our job to hold families. Why should we stay at the door 
and prevent people from leaving?  
Researcher: It was not even the police?  
Christophe: Oh no, often it was employees; they (non-citizens) were put in 
rooms and employees were in their office. And they were told “careful that 
they do not leave!” 
Researcher: Employees that were working for? 
Christophe: Air France or Paris Airports; who were on site  
Researcher: What was these employees’ occupation?  
Christophe: Station agents 
Researcher: In the plane?  
Christophe: No, not in the plane, at the counters. Basically people who are 
here when you enter the airport. Before you board the plane. They are in 
contact with passengers (Interview, February 2014).  
 
Conditions of detention were inhumane and unhygienic: no provisions were 
made to provide the stranded travelers with food, water or basic hygienic supplies. In 
an attempt to mitigate this unbearable situation, airline and airport employees asked 
border policemen to bring these supplies themselves. Christophe went on:  
We also had issues with meals, -I mean sandwiches- and sanitary supplies for 
babies and women. We were asking officers to bring (these things) for the next 
day, as people did not have anything 
Researcher: But agents brought these things from where?  
Christophe: From their home! Or went to buy it, we had to be resourceful 
(c’était le système D) because people were in rooms like that, imagine that you 
are left here (Interview, February 2014).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8Cf CFDT’s website: https://www.cfdt.fr/portail/nous-connaitre/la-cfdt-en-10-points-asp_5025 
Accessed July 9, 2016.  
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According to these (former) trade unionists, people could be detained for days in 
these small holding rooms where they lacked adequate access to toilet or shower 
(Interview, February 2014) 9.  
 
 
III. Detention in the international zone in a legal vacuum premised on extra-
territoriality  
In addition to being detained in unsanitary and inhumane conditions, most 
non-citizens denied entry at airport borders experienced confinement in international 
zones in a legal void. Yet, domestic law at the time provided for the detention of 
passengers turned away at the border and equipped them with legal safeguards. The 
1945 Ordinance (article 35 bis) allowed detention of non-admitted, non-citizens in 
administrative facilities for a maximum of seven days, time period deemed necessary 
for them to be returned10. However, detention was to take place “in case of absolute 
necessity” during “the time strictly necessary for the departure” of the non-citizens. 
While the decision to detain was taken by an administrative agent (préfet), detainees 
had to be presented to a liberty and custody judge (juge des libertés et de la detention) 
after 24 hours. On an exceptional basis, the judge could extend the duration of 
detention to six more days, bringing the maximum amount of time spent in 
confinement to seven days in total. After this time, if return had not taken place, the 
non-citizen had to be set free. The judge’s decision could be appealed and the public 
prosecutor (immediately informed of the detention decision) always had the 
possibility of checking detention conditions. Important rights were attached to article 
35 bis, including the rights to see a doctor and a counsel and to communicate with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 At the time of interview (February 2014), Aurélien and Christophe were still affiliated with the airline 
section of the CFDT trade union, while Jean had just left.  
10 Ordinance from November 2, 1945 (hereafter: “the 1945 Ordinance”). 	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consulate or any person of the detainee’s choosing. The non-citizen had to be notified 
of the rights aforementioned by an interpreter if he or she did not know French. It is 
important to note that this legislative provision also applied to those already deemed 
on the territory that were to be removed. The law provided all non-citizens detained 
for immigration control purposes with the same guarantees, whether they sought to 
enter France or were forced to leave the country.  
According to the newspaper Le Monde (Bernard, January 21, 1992), 10,000 
travelers per year were denied entry into France as a result of missing or improper 
travel documents. Less than one percent of these travelers were placed in 
administrative detention under the legal framework applicable at the time. Therefore, 
in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the bulk of non-citizens rejected at the border were 
held in the international zone without any legal framework. Detention outside of the 
1945 Ordinance allowed the border police to keep non-admitted foreign nationals for 
more than seven days and generally to deny them the safeguards provided by article 
35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance.  
 The government chose to leave rejected passengers outside of the protective 
reach of domestic laws. The case of asylum seekers was different: French legislation 
did not permit their detention. Indeed, the 1945 Ordinance authorized detention only 
once a non-admission decision was made, not before. At the time, a decree (May 27, 
1982) stated that only the Ministry of the Interior could decide to deny entry to 
asylum-seekers, after consulting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 
September 1991 refugee agency representatives were delegated to the borders to hear 
asylum-seekers and advise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before it offered its 
opinion to the Ministry of the Interior (Lochak, 1992, 680). Importantly, France was 
already a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and to its 1967 Protocol. As such, the 
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French state had to honor its non-refoulement obligation and could not impose 
criminal sanctions against refugees for illegal entry (respectively articles 33 and 31 of 
the Refugee Convention). The duty of non-refoulement is the cornerstone of refugee 
law: it “prohibits states from exposing a refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever’ to the 
risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft, 2015, 
238). Domestic legislation acknowledged the obligation to take international 
conventions into account in entry decisions (article 5 of the 1945 Ordinance). Under 
domestic and international law, asylum seekers could not be denied entry for lack of 
travel documents. They could only be refused access for security reasons, under 
article 5 of the 1945 Ordinance: threat to the public order, previous banishment from 
territory or deportation order.  
In practice, those seeking international protection could be confined for days 
or weeks in the international zone while the refugee agency, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior decided on their cases. Some claimants also 
experienced refoulement (cf section V). To justify these practices, the French 
government argued that the international zone had extra-territorial status. As a result, 
domestic laws (including laws that incorporated international obligations) did not 
apply to populations held in this space. As explained by Hoop de Scheffer, Council of 
Europe rapporteur, who visited Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airport on November 20, 
1989:  
Asylum-seekers are detained in a so-called international zone at the airport, 
which means that they are not yet on French territory and the French 
authorities are therefore not under a legal obligation to examine the request as 
they would be if a request was made by someone already on French territory. 
The international zone has no legal background and must be considered as a 
device to avoid obligations […]. No legal basis for detention exists and a 
maximum term is not prescribed by law (Lord Mackie of Benshie, September 
12, 1991,7).  
 
	   27	  
French authorities at CDG assumed that they were under no legal obligation to 
examine asylum-seekers’ requests in international zones, since they were not on 
French territory yet. French authorities insisted that the duration of detention was 
limited to a week. However, some asylum-seekers told the Council of Europe 
Rapporteur that they had been waiting for six weeks in the international zone (Report 
N° 6490, 1992, 7).  
In short, non-citizens denied admission or waiting on an admission decision at 
French airport borders were deprived of liberty in a legal limbo. The French 
government established the international zone as an “abject space”. There, non-
citizens were stripped of the possibility of exercising rights (Isin and Rygiel 2007). 
Isin and Rygiel explain: 
…abject spaces-extraterritorial spaces where international and national laws 
are suspended-have spread throughout the world in the past decade as spaces 
for holding refugees, asylum seekers, deportees, combatants, insurgents, and 
others caught in the new global policing and policies net. These spaces include 
various frontiers controlled by state authorities, zones where special rules and 
laws apply, and camps where laws are suspended (2007, 181).   
 
They note that Agamben’s logic of exception (1998) cannot capture the essence of 
abject spaces. In internment camps conceptualized by Agamben (i.e. “spaces of 
abjection”) undesirables were eliminated. By contrast, “abject spaces” render people 
invisible and inaudible. Although Isin and Rygiel envision “abject spaces” as 
relatively new, their concept applies well to the situation of non-citizens in French 
airports’ international zones in the 1980s and early 1990s. In these international zones 
resistance was possible: non-citizens challenged their confinement with the assistance 
of lawyers, and a series of legal proceedings led to the birth of the Waiting Zone 
legislation in July 1992. International zones were spaces of politics.  
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IV. The coalescence of activism inside and outside of the international zone 
Distressed by the plight of non-citizens, trade unionists decided to contact 
NGOs defending human and foreign nationals’ rights. Informal meetings led to the 
creation of the NGO Anafé in 1989. “Anafé” stands for Association nationale 
d’assistance aux frontières pour les étrangers, which can be translated as “National 
Organization for Assistance to Foreign Nationals at Borders”. The NGO was created 
“to provide legal and humanitarian assistance to foreign nationals in difficulty at 
French borders” (Anafé, 2010, 5). Anafé employees Lise and Anne explain that one 
of the first demands of the organization was to access international zones (Interview, 
December 2013). This original structure gathered diverse trade unions, NGOs, and 
lawyers representing foreign nationals. Aurélien, Christophe and Jean were all very 
active in the CFDT, some of them occupying key functions in the trade union’s airline 
section. As such they were instrumental in the creation of Anafé. Jean and Christophe 
recount how the NGO was born:  
Christophe: People stayed in this room for two, three, four, five or six days. It 
was inhuman… People called us, trade unions, it fell on the CFDT. I suppose 
that others (trade unions) were called too but they said: “We cannot do 
anything”. Well I do not know, I do not know what they said (…) 
Jean: There were many families going back and forth: inadmissible in France 
and inadmissible in (other countries)… they were doing ping-pong. These are 
anecdotes but it contributed (to the flight attendants’ trade union joining 
Anafé).  
Christophe: So this adventure began like this. We met the main NGOs: 
Amnesty International, the Cimade11, France Terre d’Asile. These contacts 
translated into a meeting that Jean organized at Roissy. Then we had a second 
and then a third meeting and quickly lawyers came, lawyers who were 
working on the case, who were defending foreign nationals. They came to 
these meetings and quickly the idea of creating an NGO appeared. It was 
original as Anafé was an NGO made of NGOs, and also of trade unions 
(Interview, February 2014).  
 
Interestingly, the CFDT police trade union was even affiliated with Anafé at first: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Cimade stands for “Comité Inter-Mouvements Auprès des Evacués” which can be translated as 
“Inter-Faith Committee for Evacuees”.  
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Researcher: The police trade union was a member of Anafé? 
Christophe: Yes, at first. Then they left because it brought them too many 
problems. I think that, we can say it; at some point they provided an internal 
note that went into the press 
Jean: It was when someone died 
Christophe: It was the case of the guy who had been suffocated; he had been 
forcibly put on the plane, the policeman had seated on him a bit too hard, he 
had squashed his rib cage and the guy died. There was an internal report. Of 
course it was confidential. We got it through them and obviously…they were 
not upset when they left but said it was not possible: “it is no longer possible 
for us to be both inside and outside”. 
Researcher: of course. And how long did they stay?  
Christophe: Two years. 
Jean: It was very small. At the time the police CFDT was very small 
(Interview, February 2014).  
 
Activist lawyers who were close to Gisti (Groupe d'information et de soutien 
des immigrés), a group providing information and support to immigrants and one of 
Anafé’s member organizations, launched a series of trials at the end of the 1980s 
against the French government. They challenged the detention of their clients (of 
different origins and nationalities but all caught in similar situations) in the 
international zone on the basis that it amounted to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. 
At the time, there were few lawyers specializing in foreign nationals’ rights in Paris. 
They were all activists and knew each other well. They were also at the forefront of 
legal fights in other fields such as labor law or the right to housing. Dominique 
Monget-Sarrail was one of them.  She recalls:  
They said there was no law, because we (lawyers) said “there is one, it is the 
one applicable to people to be removed”. Either there is no law and they have 
to be set free because you do not have the right to keep them since there is no 
law, or there is a law and you have to apply it, so they have to be set free. You 
have been keeping them long enough and not in decent conditions. So this 
translated into a series of trials organized by a group of friends. We all knew 
each other; we all had the same professional activity. At the time in the Paris 
area we must have been about twenty lawyers specialized in foreign nationals’ 
rights (Interview, August 2014).  
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V. Legal activism: the use of the “legal fiction” argument to challenge the extra-
territoriality thesis  
Lawyers used the term “legal fiction” as a weapon to challenge the 
government’s arbitrary practices in the international zone. They coined the term to 
debunk the French government’s extra-territorial theory according to which non-
nationals present in the international zone were deemed outside of France (Interview 
with Serge Slama, law professor, Paris, July 2014). It is not a legal term and therefore 
cannot be found in legal textbooks (Interview with Danièle Lochak, law professor, 
Paris, July 2014). Activist lawyers using the term of legal fiction did not define it. 
According to the Oxford online English dictionary (accessed December 7, 2014), a 
fiction is “an invention or fabrication as opposed to fact”. The term legal fiction was 
precisely meant to convey the idea that the government fabricated the international 
zone as a lawless area. Activists found the term useful to denounce the exclusion of 
individuals located in the international zone from the guarantees offered by French 
law and international human rights and refugee law. In Del Valle Galvez (2005)’s 
terminology, they fought the government’s creation of an extra-territorial legal 
fiction: they refused to consider that individuals in the international zone encountered 
themselves in an extra-territorial space.  
Lawyer Christian Bourguet explains that the term originated from a visit to 
Orly’s police station, which he made with fellow activist Patrick Mony (Israel, 2002). 
The policemen told them that the international zone was the fiction according to 
which they were able to deprive people of liberty. Bourguet seized this idea: he 
argued before the courts of first instance that the international zone was a legal 
fiction. As of 1988 he started to litigate against the Ministry of the Interior on behalf 
of people held at airports (Israel, 2002). From this date onward, many lawsuits were 
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introduced against the Ministry of the Interior. The goal was to obtain a ruling that 
would release the asylum-seekers in question from the international zone on the 
grounds that detention in this space was tantamount to arbitrary sequestration and 
therefore resulted in severe infringement upon a fundamental liberty (Lochak, 1992, 
682). The newspaper Le Monde, dated November 21, 1989, described one of these 
trials (Peyrot, 1989).  
Isabelle arrived at CDG from Zaire on November 4, 1989. She had fled her 
country where she had been imprisoned, beaten, and raped by soldiers on account of 
her religious opinions. In spite of presenting a regular passport, visa and financial 
means, she was denied entry at the border and detained at the Arcade hotel at CDG. 
Bourguet paid her a visit on November 11 and made her sign a refugee status request, 
which he forwarded immediately to the director of OFPRA (Office français de 
protection des réfugiés et apatrides), the refugee agency. A photocopy of the request 
was also forwarded to the border police. As his client remained deprived of liberty, 
Bourguet sued the Ministry of the Interior before the Paris court of first instance12. He 
pleaded that his client’s arbitrary detention had severely infringed upon her 
fundamental rights (voie de fait). But Isabelle was released just before the judge heard 
her case. The judge could not rule on “a situation that had ended”. As the newspaper 
notes, the government had already resorted to the same maneuver several times. The 
Ministry of the Interior had always made sure that the non-citizen was no longer held 
in the international zone at the date of the hearing. Since the foreign national had 
either been sent back to his or her country of departure or admitted to French territory, 
the point of contention had disappeared (Bourguet, 1992). Therefore, the judge had no 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The Harrap’s dictionary (2007) translates “Tribunal de grande instance” as “Court of first instance” 
(cf Figure 3).  
	   32	  
other option but to declare that he lacked jurisdiction. This game on the part of the 
government endured for a few years after Isabelle’s case.  
The Paris court of first instance finally put an end to it by issuing a very 
unusual ruling. On November 22, 1991, the court allowed a Haitian asylum-seeker to 
sue the Ministry of the Interior for “arbitrary sequestration” and monetary 
compensation even if he had been admitted to France in the meantime. The plaintiff 
had landed in CDG on November 6, 1991. He had been refused entry and confined for 
two days in the international zone and six days at the Arcade Hotel, which was 
construed as an extension of the international zone. He had been informed that he was 
to be put in the next available plane to Port-au Prince. The court hearing took place on 
February 26, 1992 and also dealt with the similar cases of four other asylum-seekers 
(three Haitians and one Zairian) who had landed in Roissy on November 19, 1991 
(Bernard, January 21, 1992). Their lawyers had also been authorized by the same 
court of first instance on November 26, 1991 to pursue the cases on their merits. At 
the hearing, the Ministry of the Interior acknowledged the following: their deprivation 
of liberty was not based on any legal document, a legal framework existed but was 
not applied and lastly, the order was expressly given to civil servants not to detain 
foreign nationals at the border under the existing legal framework. (Paris Court of 
first instance, hearing, February 26, 1992). The court ruled on March 25, 1992.  
The hearing revealed that the plaintiffs’ right to seek asylum (guaranteed by 
the French Constitution as well by international instruments) had been severely 
violated. Hathaway (2005) clearly explains that states cannot escape from their 
international obligations under the Refugee Convention by resorting to a “legal ruse.” 
He points out that the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention (article 
33) can be breached when states avoid acknowledging formally the arrival of a 
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refugee by changing their domestic law. International zones, excised territory, and 
territorial sea are all part of the state’s territory. This is a fact that cannot be changed 
by domestic law. Therefore, under international law there is no difference between 
refusing to examine the asylum claim of individuals located in international zones or 
excised territory and refusing to examine the asylum claim of individuals who are 
considered by the state to be on its territory (Hathaway, 2005). Yet France did not 
uphold its non-refoulement obligation, as decisions were made to return the asylum-
seekers in question to Kinshasa and Port-au-Prince. Their return was stopped in 
extremis when the court heard their case. The asylum-seekers also faced obstacles 
when filing their claim: only two plaintiffs could have their claim registered while the 
other two were treated as regular migrants failing to fulfill entry conditions. 
The court ruled on March 25, 1992. It rejected the government’s extra-
territoriality thesis. Asylum-seekers’ lawyers (Stéphane Maugendre, Simon Foreman 
and Christian Bourguet) argued that the “international zone” was a “police fiction” 
(fiction policière) designed to dispense with judicial oversight after 24 hours of 
detention. The court concurred with the plaintiffs’ counsels’ analysis: it explicitly 
stated that the international zone constituted a “legal fiction” and could not be exempt 
from fundamental principles of individual liberty.  It found that there was no domestic 
or international document giving extra-territorial status to all or part of the Arcade 
hotel where asylum-seekers had been held13. It rejected the Ministry of the Interior’s 
arguments and found that holding at the Arcade hotel constituted a deprivation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 These are the precise words of the court: “Attendu que le défendeur n'est pas fondé à soutenir pour 
écarter le grief d'atteinte à la liberté individuelle, que l'étranger serait seulement empêché d'entrer en 
France, en étant retenu dans un lieu devant être considéré comme une "extension" de la zone 
internationale de l'aéroport; qu'en effet, il n'est pas justifié de l'existence d'un texte, national ou 
international, conférant une quelconque extra-territorialité à tout ou partie des locaux de l'hôtel 
ARCADE, situé au demeurant hors de l'enceinte de l'aéroport et de la zone "sous douane" de celui-ci. 
Attendu qu'en l'état cette zone, qui constitue une fiction juridique, ne saurait être soustraite aux 
principes fondamentaux de la liberté individuelle.” 
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liberty. It is interesting to note that the centerpiece of the lawyers’ argumentation –the 
legal fiction thesis- originally began as an arbitrary, informal response fabricated by 
civil servants. It proved to be a powerful tool as it was endorsed by the Paris court of 
first instance and used to justify its ruling. But how did the French government 
develop the extra-territorial thesis in the first place? I would now like to offer some 
possible explanations.  
 
 
VI. Factors that contributed to the establishment of the international zone as an 
abject space 
International zones suddenly became the center of attention in the 1980s, when 
the number of people seeking international protection in Europe soared. The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (recommendation 1088, 1988) 
expressed concerns regarding the restrictive measures adopted by member states to 
limit the arrivals. Lord Mackie of Benshie (September 12, 1991, 5) pointed out that 
some asylum claimants may be “only admitted at the airport in so-called international 
zones, where their legal status is unclear”. France managed to keep undesirable 
migrants (and asylum-seekers in their midst) at bay by declaring that the international 
zone was not France. At the time, the status of the international zone, also called 
“transit zone”, was not well defined. Legal scholars had not given much thought to 
the status of this space and domestic courts had issued contradictory rulings. The 
French government seized this opportunity to pursue political aims. It took advantage 
of the discrepancy between legal and cartographic borders at airports.  
When events unfolded, international law did not directly address the status of 
the transit zone. International law did not explicitly state whether or not transit zones 
were part of a state’s territory or what laws applied to passengers located in these 
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spaces. It is interesting to note that, originally, Annex 9 to the Chicago Convention’s 
definition of a “direct transit area” (1st edition, 1950) did not include passengers. At 
first it was “a special area established in connection with an international airport, 
approved by the public authorities concerned and under their direct supervision for 
accommodation of traffic which is pausing briefly in its passage through the 
Contracting State”. In 2004 the Facilitation Division of the International Civil 
Aviation Organization proposed to broaden this definition to mention that “passengers 
can stay during transit or transfer without being submitted to border control” in the 
direct transit area (FAL/12-WP/6, 12/11/03). This international legal instrument did 
not, and still does not, specify the perimeter of the direct transit area. There are no 
indications as to what is encompassed by the direct transit area. It became apparent in 
1993, at a conference gathering lawyers and activists from Europe and North 
America, that countries delineated airport transit zones’ perimeter differently (Anafé, 
1993). This lack of consensus allowed the French government to claim that the 
international zone included hotels. Even today, the reader of an international law 
textbook looking for the “transit zone” page in the table of contents will be 
disappointed: there is no such thing. International law textbooks do not have a “transit 
zone” entry.  
Nevertheless, it does not mean that airports’ transit zones were not covered by 
international law in the 1980s. As previously mentioned, Annex 9 to the Chicago 
Convention established that the transit zone was directly supervised or controlled by 
the public authorities of the state concerned. This meant that the state in question 
exercised its territorial sovereignty over the transit zone. As Labayle (1993, 48) 
explains, a state exercising its sovereignty over a territory is competent both to create 
and implement rules. As soon as international legal scholars, international human 
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rights courts and treaty monitoring bodies turned to the matter of the international or 
transit zone, they clearly stated that this space was integrally part of the state’s 
territory. Under international law, airports’ transit zones are not extra-territorial 
spaces.  
French domestic courts’ lack of consensus regarding the status of the 
international zone may have also created a climate conducive to the development of 
the extra-territoriality thesis. The highest judicial and administrative courts of the 
country came to some contradictory conclusions during the 1980s. The former (Cour 
de Cassation) found that the international zone was part of French territory while the 
latter (Conseil d’Etat) found precisely the opposite. These domestic debates left the 
door open for the government to use the international zone as a device to deflect from 
its international obligations. The two diagrams below provide some background on 
the French legal system and help understand the significance of these rulings (Source: 
Harrap’s Unabridged Dictionary, 2007, 67-68).  
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Figure 3. French civil and criminal courts  
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Figure 4. French administrative courts  
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In the case Youssef, the Final court of appeal (Cour de Cassation) held that the 
international zone was part of national territory on October 28, 1987. The court 
explicitly stated that the entirety of Roissy airport was part of French territory, 
therefore agreeing with the ruling made earlier (June 12, 1984) by the court of appeal. 
The court of appeal had found that “[…] the entirety of Roissy-Charles de Gaulle 
airport, upon which French sovereignty applies, is part of French territory, the legal 
status of zones called ‘international’ or ‘under customs’ has no consequence on the 
French character of this part of national territory […]” (quoted in Final court of 
appeal, criminal chamber, public hearing of October 28, 1987-translation is mine).  
In this case, a criminal court had sentenced a Jordanian citizen, Youssef 
Youssef, on January 5, 1984 to leave France (precisely to be “taken back to the 
border”-reconduit à la frontière) for residing irregularly in the country. Invoking 
political reasons, Youssef refused to board the plane for Amman on January 7, 1984. 
As a result, further legal action was taken against him. The defendant argued that, 
having crossed the police and customs border checks, he had left the territory (he was 
in the international zone) and that therefore he could not be considered as being 
illegally in France. But the court rejected his argument and sentenced him again to 
leave the country since, as of January 7, 1984, he was guilty of being voluntarily 
present in France without valid documents authorizing his stay. His lawyer, Christian 
Bourguet, appealed the decision immediately. Youssef was finally forced to board the 
plane for Jordan on January 20, 1984. He returned to France a few months later and 
the court of appeal of Paris heard his case. The court upheld the previous ruling and 
found on June 12, 1984 that Youssef had indeed breached the law regulating foreign 
nationals’ residency in the country but did not hand down any sentence. The case 
went all the way up to the Final Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation), which also 
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rejected Youssef’s arguments: it stated that even if the defendant had been taken 
beyond police and customs checks, he had still breached the law as the entirety of the 
airport was indeed part of French territory (Lochak, 1992, 682). 
Interestingly, in this case it was Youssef’s lawyer, Bourguet, who developed 
the extra-territoriality thesis (i.e. the idea that the international zone was not part of 
French territory). He explains why and how he developed this argument (Bourguet, 
1992): his client, a Palestinian born in the West Bank, had told him that he was likely 
to be jailed in Jordan upon his arrival in the country (his fear materialized as he was 
imprisoned for four months when he was finally forcibly returned to his country of 
citizenship, Jordan). Therefore Bourguet thought of a way to stall the return: since his 
client had been sentenced to be “taken back to the border”, he questioned the location 
of the border. He argued that the border was where police and customs checks took 
place at the airport, not where the plane exited French air space. The implications of 
this argument were important: it meant that his client could be taken beyond police 
and customs checkpoints but not forced to board a plane for a specific country. If the 
border was indeed materialized by police checkpoints, his client could not be 
sentenced for staying irregularly in France as he would not be on French territory: 
French courts would not have jurisdiction. It is worth noting that the extra-
territoriality thesis was used at the beginning of the 1980s by an activist lawyer in the 
hope of protecting his client whose asylum claim had been rejected by France.  
Shortly after the first level court held that the international zone was part of 
France in the Youssef case, the Council of State (Conseil d’Etat), the highest 
administrative court in France, came to a completely opposite conclusion: the 
international zone was not part of France. The Eksir case (January 27, 1984) was 
about whether the implementation of the decision to refuse entry to a foreign national 
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could be deferred. The question boiled down to whether presence in the international 
zone equaled presence on French territory. The Council of State found the claimants 
to be in a situation of extra-territoriality, outside of France in the eyes of the law 
(Lochak, 1992, 680).  
Bourguet was also the counsel in the Eksir case. A few months after the 
Youssef case started, he advised three young Iranians who had fled their country to 
claim asylum in France. They arrived at Charles de Gaulle in November 1983 flying 
from Karachi via London. They were first returned to London after being turned away 
by the Ministry of the Interior at Charles de Gaulle on November 24, 1983. In London 
they refused to make the connecting flight to Karachi and were sent back to France. 
At Charles de Gaulle, they were put on a plane to Karachi on November 28. They 
finally landed again at Charles de Gaulle on December 2, after authorities at Karachi 
refused to readmit them (Robert, 1984). Bourguet (1992) appealed against the first 
decision refusing them entry to France. He asked the Paris administrative court to 
defer the implementation of the decision. In French administrative law, a decision’s 
implementation can only be deferred under certain conditions. It has to be proven that 
if the decision were to be maintained, it would modify (de facto or de jure) the 
situation the claimants were experiencing when the decision was made (Lachaume, 
1985). The Paris administrative court refused to defer the decision (on December 7): 
it found that its implementation would not make a difference to the situation of the 
claimants either in law or in fact. The Council of State confirmed this interpretation 
on January 27, 1984, therefore implicitly concluding that the international zone was 
located outside of France. The highest administrative court must have considered that 
the claimants were not yet in France as they had not exited the international zone 
when the border police first refused them entry. Hence the decision’s implementation 
	   42	  
(which maintained them outside of France) could not modify their situation. It is also 
interesting to note that the three Iranians had been deferred to a criminal court in 
Bobigny for breaching the law regulating the entry and residency of foreign nationals. 
The Bobigny court had authorized them to reside in France temporarily (Robert, 
1984).  
These two contradictory rulings worked to the State’s advantage: the 
international zone was both France and not France at the same time, according to the 
direction of the border crossing. When it came to returning someone to a country of 
origin or a third country the international zone was France, and foreign nationals 
refusing to embark could be subject to criminal prosecution for illegally staying in the 
country while in the international zone. However, for foreign nationals arriving from 
another country and landing in Charles de Gaulle, the international zone was not 
France yet. This interpretation allowed the French government to argue that non-
citizens were not to be subjected to the regular legal provisions (Gisti, January 1989).  
Article 35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance could not apply to them since the international 
zone was located outside of France and French laws only applied to French territory 
(Lochak, 1992, 681-682). Such an absurd situation led Bourguet (1992) to refer to the 
detention spaces at the airport and at the Arcade hotel as the “nowhere country”. 
 
Conclusion 
The history of French airports’ international zones illustrates how 
governments create extra-territorial legal fictions and the danger they pose to 
individuals who find themselves in these spaces. It corroborates Del Valle Galvez’s 
(2005) observations: extra-territorial legal fictions establish an internal no man’s land 
and raise issues of legal insecurity and the absence of legality. They result in the non-
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application, or at least incomplete application, of the domestic and international 
norms regarding immigration and asylum that bind states.  
French border authorities’ practices in the 1980s and early 1990s bear 
resemblance to practices that occurred in other countries at different points in time. 
Just like France, Australia engaged in excision: in both countries governments 
“erased” certain parts of the territory for immigration regulation purposes (Shachar 
2007). As Shachar (2007, 1) observes, excision enables immigration authorities to 
redefine the country’s border “[…] in response to perceived threats by unauthorized 
migrants and high-risk travelers”. Australia’s Excision from Migration Zone Act of 
2001 allowed authorities to treat asylum-seekers landing in excised areas as if they 
had never entered Australian territory, enabling removal and preventing judicial 
review (Shachar 2007). Australia and France both resorted to the legal maneuver of 
excision to remove some parts of their territory from domestic and international 
guarantees applicable to non-citizens. While in the Australian case exclusion was 
organized through the law, in the French case exclusion, just as in the case of 
Guantánamo Bay, was rather the result of a “carefully constructed legal absence” 
(Reid-Henry 2007, 630). In both cases, a piece of land was declared (by law or in 
practice) outside of sovereign territory for immigration control purposes.  
French airport international zones were deliberately placed outside of the 
reach of the law. Similarly, the US government established Guantanamo as a space 
devoid of laws. Reid-Henry explains: (2007, 629): 
Having thereby historically reconstructed GBC as a physically unique space, 
Philbin and Yoo then further continued to excise the American Camp located 
there (GITMO) from previous legal agreements, such as those extending 
workers rights to all American overseas bases; those regarding the application 
of tariffs to US overseas territories and those confirming the rights of former 
detainees of the very cell blocks that were soon to be re-furnished and 
augmented for the present purpose. 
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Foreign nationals detained at French borders were rendered without rights by French 
authorities. As Arendt (1968) has demonstrated, human beings who are stripped of 
their status of legal subjects no longer belong to a political community and lose their 
dignity along with their very place in the world (Caloz-Tschopp, 1993). In the 1980s 
non-citizens stranded at French borders were detained in a legal limbo. To use Paik’s 
terminology (2016), the French government “manufactured rightlessness”. Although 
referring to a different geographic area (camps located on US soil and at 
Guantanamo), Paik’s analysis illuminates the situation of foreign nationals detained at 
French airports in the 1980s. Paik points out that Guantanamo is not a lawless space: 
laws actually apply to this territory. However, there are different kinds of overlapping 
legal regimes. The US government has exploited these legal ambiguities or 
complexities to claim that Guantanamo is a legal void, where neither Cuban nor US 
law applies, and therefore nor international law. Similarly, the French government 
used to detain individuals at airports in a legal void, in spite of applicable laws. In the 
next chapter, I will trace how the Law on the Waiting Zone, a parallel and less 
protective legal framework premised on extra-territoriality, was established through 
regular democratic processes.  
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Chapter 2. The birth of waiting zones or the manufacturing of an 
illiberal law through regular democratic mechanisms  	  
Introduction  
Non-citizens in the international zone ceased to be detained in a legal void as 
of July 6, 1992, when the Law on the Waiting Zone was finally passed. The 
government presented this new legislation as significant progress: France was setting 
a fine example in terms of rights protection. Yet, the Law on the Waiting Zone 
offered a less advantageous legal framework to non-citizen populations compared to 
the one previously in place (i.e. article 35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance). Under this new 
law, detainees were to be presented to a judge after four days in the waiting zone 
(compared to one day previously) and could not spend more than 20 days in the 
waiting zone (confinement was limited to seven days previously). Furthermore, the 
Law on the Waiting Zone established a parallel and less protective system of rights 
based on the distinction between physical and legal entry. Before the Law on the 
Waiting Zone came into existence, the same legislative provisions applied to all 
foreign nationals detained for immigration control purposes: the law did not establish 
any distinction between those at French borders and those already deemed to be on 
French territory. Non-citizens all benefited from the same rights. This equality before 
the law ended in 1992, with the Law on the Waiting Zone. Since this time, foreign 
nationals arriving at the border have been subjected to a watered-down legal 
framework compared to the one applicable to their counterparts already deemed to be 
on French soil (who are either applying for asylum or are to be removed after being 
caught for staying illegally in the country). This less advantageous legal regime was 
precisely premised on the idea that international zones, renamed “transit zones” and 
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then “waiting zones”, were somehow extra-territorial spaces. The Law on the Waiting 
Zone did not dispel the ambiguity surrounding the status of this space in stakeholders’ 
minds. 
But how could a parallel system of rights be established in a liberal democracy 
bound by international human rights and refugee conventions? In this chapter, I will 
pay heed to the observation made by some scholars that liberal government and 
authoritarian practices are not mutually exclusive, but rather two sides of the same 
coin (Hindess, 2001, 94). As Dean (2002, 38) writes,  
(…) governing liberally does not necessarily entail governing through freedom 
or even governing in a manner that respects individual liberty. It might mean, 
in ways quite compatible with a liberal rationality of government, overriding 
the exercise of specific freedoms in order to enforce obligations on members 
of the population. 
 
These observations have translated into concrete lines of enquiry: European scholars 
have recently identified illiberal practices in EU member states and offered 
recommendations to end them (Bigo et al, September 2009). I will trace how the 
framework of the waiting zone was made possible through regular democratic 
mechanisms (Basaran, 2011). Both parliament chambers approved the government 
bill, in spite of some parliamentarians and civil society actors vigorously protesting 
against both procedure and content of the legislative provision. The Constitutional 
Council, a domestic moral authority, approved the government’s extra-territoriality 
thesis indirectly. This court found that non-citizens confined at the border did not 
experience the same degree of constraint as those confined on the territory. The 
former were therefore deemed less worthy of protection than the latter. Ironically, this 
less protective framework based on the concept of extra-territorial presence in the 
waiting zone was the direct product of activism that sought to oppose detention in a 
legal void. The history of the birth of the waiting zone illustrates the dangers (or 
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ambiguities at best) of activism using “the tools and grammar of law” (Makaremi, 
2009 a, 428) and proves Belcher and Martin’s (2013) point: law is not always liberal. 
In fact, as Basaran (2011) demonstrates, law is a technique of government that can be 
used to take away fundamental rights from certain populations. She explains: 
The government of populations called migrants develops its effectiveness, 
precisely by embedding the limitation of liberties within the legal framework. 
Migrants are not outside the law, but embedded and produced through it, 
similar to previous segregation and exclusion policies that provided a specific 
legal framework for particular populations (2011, 105).  
 
This chapter will highlight the political nature of the law. I will first describe 
the context and content of the Marchand amendment. As I will argue, it is important 
to study the history of this legislative provision, even though it was partly censored by 
the Constitutional Council. Indeed the Marchand amendment is truly the ancestor of 
the 1992 Law on the Waiting Zone: the latter derives its main features and philosophy 
precisely from the former. Both are premised on the idea that non-citizens arriving at 
the border do not need the same rights as their counterparts who are already deemed 
to be on French territory. I will then proceed to demonstrate that the ambiguous status 
of the transit zone persisted with the Marchand amendment and the subsequent Law 
on the Waiting Zone. I will also analyze the government’s justifications for the 
amendment. It will be my contention that the Constitutional Council played a 
significant role in the manufacturing of this illiberal law. Finally, I will highlight how 
litigation crises resulted in the broadening of the definition of the waiting zone.  
 
I. Context of the Marchand amendment  
As explained in chapter 1, activist lawyers started to sue the Ministry of the 
Interior from 1988 for arbitrary detention of foreign nationals in the international 
zone. The judge who heard the cases had a limited mandate: putting a stop to an 
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illegal administrative practice resulting in a severe violation of fundamental rights. 
The judge could therefore only order the government to put an end to confinement in 
the international zone. Until November 1991, these trials did not affect the 
government, who always instructed border authorities to return or admit to the 
territory the foreign national in question before the hearing took place. The situation 
finally changed when the Paris court of first instance issued a very unusual ruling. On 
November 22, 1991, the court allowed a Haitian asylum-seeker to sue the Ministry of 
the Interior for “arbitrary sequestration” and monetary compensation even if he had 
been admitted to France in the meantime. Faced with challenging upcoming litigation, 
Philippe Marchand, the Socialist Minister of the Interior at the time, decided to draft a 
legal provision (“the Marchand amendment”) addressing the situation of non-admitted 
foreigners in the international zone, which he renamed “transit zone” (cf section IV). 
While laws cannot apply retroactively, he hoped that this legislation would shield the 
Ministry from further legal troubles. As I will demonstrate throughout this 
dissertation, the French government has always passed laws regulating the status of 
persons held in the international (and then waiting) zone as a result of legal action. 
The Marchand amendment was an ad hoc response to a legal crisis.  
As the parliamentary session drew to a close, Marchand hastily introduced this 
new legal provision as an additional article (7 bis) to a bill under discussion at the 
National Assembly. MPs were debating a government bill whose purpose was to 
modify domestic law in order to align it with the requirements of the Schengen 
Convention (signed by France on June 1990 and ratified on July 1991) pertaining to 
the entry and deportation of unauthorized foreign nationals and to the carriers’ 
responsibility framework. Indeed, the Schengen Convention had significantly 
redefined borders of contracting parties. States had pledged to abolish borders internal 
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to the territory to which the Schengen Convention applied, and to tighten external 
ones: they had committed to shift border control from internal to external borders to 
create an internal area of free movement (article 2 and 4). With the Schengen 
Convention, each state party had become responsible for guarding other parties’ 
borders (article 4). Importantly, the Schengen Convention had also established the 
carrier responsibility framework (cf chapter 7 for extended discussion). Under article 
26, states had agreed to inflict financial penalties on carriers bringing inadequately 
documented individuals to their gates. Carriers had also been obliged to return non-
admitted passengers. As the numbering “bis” indicates, the Marchand amendment 
was grafted onto an already existing provision (article 7). This provision’s purpose 
was to incorporate some elements of the carrier responsibility framework into national 
law14.  
The bill under discussion also aimed to introduce non-Schengen related 
provisions to curb immigration. The goal was to increase the effectiveness of the 
measures in place to remove those staying irregularly on French territory. The 
government had declared the fight against illegal immigration an important objective 
during a Ministers’ meeting in July 1991. The bill proposed to penalize foreign 
nationals staying on French territory after their tourist visas had expired and to deport 
those who overstayed their residence permit for more than a month (French National 
Assembly debates, December 19, 1991). The history of the Marchand amendment, 
and of the subsequent Law on the Waiting Zone, is intertwined with the construction 
of the Schengen area’s external borders and restrictive domestic migration laws.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Article 3 of the bill under discussion sought to incorporate financial sanctions against carriers into 
domestic law while article 7 aimed at obligating companies to transport back the non-admitted 
passengers and to pay for their living expenses before return.	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The Minister of the Interior introduced the legislative provision on the transit 
zone at the end of the parliamentary session, after a declaration of emergency. This 
way of proceeding allowed the government to minimize preliminary checks. The 
domestic human rights commission, which was scheduled to examine the provision 
the following day, had not had the time to issue recommendations (French National 
Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8268). MPs were therefore forced to ponder 
the amendment in the absence of the commission’s report. Furthermore, introducing 
the bill as an amendment allowed Marchand to dispense with debates at the Council 
of Minister and with consultation at the Council of State. MPs from the right-wing 
opposition disapproved of the way the government introduced the transit zone 
provision (French National Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8266 and 8268). 
More significantly, Socialist senators, i.e. from the same political party as the 
government, also protested. They lamented that the human rights commission could 
not express its opinion on the matter (French Senate debates, January 16, 1992, 206). 
Senator Guy Allouche observed that the government bill should have been submitted 
to the Council of State. According to Allouche, careful consideration should have 
prevailed as the bill touched upon the fate of thousands of human beings hoping to 
enter France or Schengen area countries (French Senate debates, January 16, 1992, 
207). Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt, another Socialist senator, regretted such hastiness, 
which prevented careful consideration of the bill (French Senate debates, January 16, 
1992, 233).  
As for NGOs and counsel representing foreign nationals, they considered the 
amendment procedure a ploy to shield the government’s legal proposal from ordinary 
scrutiny. While they acknowledged that the amendment was related to the bill under 
discussion (in the sense that both aimed to modify the 1945 Ordinance) they argued 
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that the modifications and additions brought by article 7 bis exceeded by far the limits 
inherent to the government’s right of amendment, as defined by the Constitutional 
Council jurisprudence. Resorting to the amendment procedure allowed the 
government to skip the Council of Ministers’ debate as well as the Council of State’s 
consultation (Anafé et al, letter to the President of the Constitutional Council, January 
28, 1992, 1-215). The plaintiffs’ lawyers, who were suing the Ministry of the Interior 
for arbitrary sequestration, vigorously denounced the government’s arguments. They 
wrote a letter to Parliamentarians on January 21, 1992 in which they remarked that the 
hearing date of the case (i.e. January 26, 1992) had been known since November 
1991. The government could have, therefore, included the transit zone provision into 
its bill from the beginning. The provision would have then been examined under 
normal conditions and it would have been possible to have a serious democratic 
debate. But instead the Ministry of the Interior waited for December 18, 1991, the day 
before the National Assembly was due to debate the proposed bill, to introduce the 
provision via an amendment. 
 Yet, in spite of this discontent, the bill went through the law-making 
machinery unusually quickly. The amendment was submitted to the National 
Assembly for debate and adoption on December 19, 1991.  The National Assembly 
law committee (Commission des lois de l’Assemblée Nationale) had revised it the day 
before. The National Assembly adopted the text after the first reading. It then made its 
way to the Senate on January 16, 1992; the high chamber also adopted it after the first 
reading. Then both chambers worked together on improving the text. They both 
agreed on the updated version (which was adopted by the National Assembly on 
January 21st and by the Senate on January 22nd). The Constitutional Council declared 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The following organizations wrote to the President of the Constitutional Council: Anafé, Cimade, 
France Terre d’Asile, GISTI and the Ligue des Droits de l’Homme.  
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the Marchand amendment partly incompatible with the Constitution on February 25, 
1992. The government bill, expunged of the Marchand amendment, became the law 
of February 26, 1992. As for the provision on the transit zone, it finally came to being 
through the Law on the Waiting Zone of July 6, 1992. Table 1 below helps situate 
these developments chronologically.  
Table 1. The Law on the Waiting Zone in context 
Date Event 
1974 First oil shock 
5 July 1974 The French government decides to stop recruiting foreign workers. 
1980s Significant increase in the number of individuals seeking international 
protection in Council of Europe member states. Confinement of non-
citizens denied entry into French territory and of asylum seekers for 
extended periods of time in the international zone of Paris airports in a 
legal vacuum.  
1983 The National Front appears on the French political scene: makes 
inroads in local elections  
1984 The Council of State rules that the international zone is not French 
territory. Case of Eksir.  
1987 The Final Court of Appeal rules that the international zone is a part of 
French territory. Case of Youssef  
1988 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expresses 
concerns regarding the measures adopted by member states to limit the 
arrivals of asylum-seekers  
1989 Activist lawyers start suing the Ministry of the Interior (MI) for 
arbitrary detention of foreign nationals in the international zone. The 
judge has a limited mandate and can only order the government to put 
an end to confinement in the international zone. These trials do not 
affect the MI, who always instructs border authorities to return or admit 
to the territory the non-citizen in question by the date of the trial. The 
point of contention therefore always disappears by the hearing date.  
June 1990 France signs the Schengen Convention  
July 1991 France ratifies the Schengen Convention  
22 
November 
1991 
The Paris court of first instance allows a Haitian asylum-seeker to sue 
the MI for arbitrary sequestration and monetary compensation, even if 
he has been admitted to France in the meantime.  
19 
December 
1991 
The Marchand amendment is submitted to the National Assembly for 
debate and adoption.  
25 February 
1992 
The Constitutional Council declares the Marchand amendment partly 
incompatible with the Constitution  
26 February 
1992 
The Paris court hears the arbitrary sequestration case 
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25 March 
1992 
The Paris court hands down its decision: the international zone is not an 
extra-territorial space  
6 July 1992  Creation of waiting zones: the Law on the Waiting Zone is passed  
30 
November 
1992 
European Union Member States adopt the London resolutions, 
including the resolution on “manifestly unfounded applications for 
asylum”. This resolution is premised on the idea that a significant 
number of claimants are not genuine applicants.  
 
I will now discuss the content of the Marchand amendment.  
 
 
 
II. The Marchand amendment: a less protective provision premised on extra-
territoriality 
Article 7 bis intended to legally regulate (yet again) the detention of foreign 
nationals and asylum seekers in the international zone, which was renamed “transit 
zone”. The proposed legal provision applied to non-citizens, who were turned away at 
a French air or sea border (9044 individuals in 1990) as well as to individuals 
claiming asylum at these borders (690 asylum-seekers had gone through the 
international zone of airports in 1990 during the review of their claim16). It also 
applied to passengers who found themselves stranded in transit zones after having 
been sent back to France by their country of destination or who were refused boarding 
to another destination by the carrier. The transit zone was broadly defined as 
encompassing the space between boarding or landing and border control. It could also 
encompass one or several accommodations located on the airport or seaport 
compounds. The task of precisely delineating the transit zone was left to an 
administrative authority, (the prefect -préfet) which was granted tremendous leeway 
as no specific distance or radius was specified for the accommodation. The non-
citizen detained in the waiting zone could ask for the assistance of an interpreter or a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 These numbers were given by the Minister of the Interior to MPs (French National Assembly 
debates, December 19, 1991, 8255-8256).  
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doctor and communicate with any person of his choosing. The public prosecutor 
(immediately informed of the decision to detain) could check the detention conditions 
at any time.  
Compared to article 35 bis in force at the time (cf chapter 1), the Marchand 
amendment provided significantly fewer guarantees to foreign nationals confined in 
the transit zone. This was particularly striking on two points. The amendment did not 
set any time limits to detention in the transit zone (compared to a seven day maximum 
under article 35 bis). A non-admitted foreign national and asylum-seeker could be 
detained “for the time strictly necessary for his departure or for the examination of his 
asylum claim” (French National Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8279). Under 
article 35 bis, detainees had to be presented to a liberty and custody judge after one 
day of confinement. By contrast, the Marchand amendment did not provide for any 
judicial oversight.  
The National Assembly Law Committee suggested several significant 
modifications. Michel Pezet, rapporteur of the law committee, observed that under the 
Marchand provision asylum-seekers could spend months in the transit zone while the 
refugee agency determined their status. Indeed, under the amendment, asylum-seekers 
“claimed asylum at the border”. On behalf of the law committee, he suggested that 
asylum-seekers should instead seek permission from the Ministry of the Interior to 
enter France in order to file an asylum claim on French territory. This would shorten 
their wait in the transit zone to a few days. The law committee also suggested that the 
duration of detention be capped at 20 days. Importantly, only an administrative judge 
could then decide to prolong the detention for ten more days. This brought the 
maximum time in the transit zone to 30 days. The law committee also suggested that 
the hearing before the administrative judge took place in the transit zone where the 
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non-citizen was held. The government agreed to these modifications and the updated 
bill arrived before MPs on December 19, 1991.  
According to activist and law professor Lochak (1992, 682), the Marchand 
amendment (i.e. the ancestor of the law on the waiting zone) reflected a significant 
shift in the government’s approach to the international zone: this space was finally 
considered part of French territory. Before the amendment, the government clung to 
the argument according to which article 35 bis could not apply to the international 
zone due to the extra-territorial status of this space (Lochak, 681). In other words, 
French laws could only apply to French territory and the international zone was not 
French territory. Foreign nationals stranded in the international zone encountered 
themselves in an indeterminate space, literally outside of the law, excluded from its 
protective reach. Makaremi (2009 a) concurs with this analysis. In fact, most actors 
working today in and on the waiting zone consider the extra-territoriality issue to have 
been solved a long time ago, precisely when the Law on the Waiting Zone came to 
force (cf chapter 3). The Marchand amendment can be read as the French 
government’s acknowledgment of its sovereignty over the transit zone. By bringing 
back the individuals held in the international zone under the purview of the law, the 
government implicitly recognized that the transit zone was in France.  
Yet, it is my argument that the initial construction of the international zone 
(renamed “transit zone”) as an extra-territorial space persisted with the Marchand 
amendment and the subsequent Law on the Waiting Zone, albeit in a different form. 
Prior to the Marchand amendment, the law provided foreign nationals detained for 
immigration control purposes with the same guarantees, be they located on French 
territory or at its borders. The Marchand amendment put a stop to this, differentiating 
between non-citizens already on French territory and those arriving to France, 
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providing the latter with significantly fewer guarantees. This less protective legal 
framework was precisely built on the premise that non-citizens and asylum-seekers 
who were rejected at the border found themselves at the threshold of, but not having 
yet entered, French sovereign territory. Marchand’s entire argumentation in defense 
of his legal provision was based on the idea that individuals in transit zones had not 
yet arrived in France. Before the National Assembly he argued that foreign nationals 
in the waiting zone were not detained since they were not on French territory (French 
National Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8256). Contrary to those detained on 
French territory, non-citizens in transit zones were free to move and therefore did not 
need the same guarantees as foreign nationals confined on French territory. He said 
that, although public opinion saw the transit zone as French territory, it was actually 
an airport zone (zone aéroportuaire).  
Marchand refused to use the same vocabulary to describe confinement on the 
territory under article 35 bis and in the transit zone. While article 35 bis talked about 
rétention (a term that can roughly be translated by “detention” in English), Marchand 
insisted that the term maintien (holding) should be used regarding the transit zone. 
This different vocabulary was meant to convey the idea that foreign nationals in 
transit zones experienced a greater degree of freedom than their counterparts detained 
on French territory under article 35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance. Marchand claimed that 
non-citizens only faced one closed door in transit zones: that leading to French 
territory (French Senate debates, January 16 1992, 235). As the argument went, 
foreign nationals were free to leave the transit zone at all times for any other 
destination of their choosing. Lochak (1992, 687) debunked the government’s 
argumentation: as she pointed out, under the rétention regime the foreign national was 
also free to leave at any time for any other destination. Furthermore, she remarked 
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that for this freedom to be exercised, the non-citizen had to find a willing host country 
as well as a means of transport, which made it quite hypothetical. To convey the idea 
that the distinction between confinement under article 35 bis and confinement in the 
transit zone is artificial and unjustified, I use the English term “detention” to refer to 
both situations. This differentiation was created by the government and legitimized by 
the Constitutional Council to grant fewer rights to non-citizens at the border than to 
those already considered on French territory. 
Arguing that the transit zone configuration was fundamentally different made 
sense for the government for numerous reasons. It justified the assertion that there 
was indeed a legal vacuum; foreign nationals could not be detained under article 35 
bis of the 1945 Ordinance since their situation was completely different. A new law, 
especially tailored to them, was therefore necessary. The bill also proposed to 
abrogate article 35 bis. Along the lines of this logic, since foreign nationals in transit 
zones experienced deprivation of liberty to a much lesser extent, there was no reason 
why they would benefit from the same guarantees as those in rétention. Marchand 
misled parliamentarians, insisting that the transit zone was an accommodation zone 
without any prison-like character. One MP from the right-wing Opposition, Francis 
Delattre (French National Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8259), disagreed 
with this assessment and did not hesitate to call transit zones “internment camps” 
(camps d’internement). The response he received from Pezet, the National Assembly 
law committee rapporteur (i.e. himself an MP), revealed that parliamentarians had 
received erroneous and biased information from the government. Based on 
information provided by the Ministry of the Interior, the rapporteur replied that hotels 
could be found in transit zones. He explained that the domestic refugee agency, 
healthcare providers, consulates and embassies all had offices in these hotels. In 
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addition, interpreters and lawyers could be consulted on site (French National 
Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8259). This idyllic vision did not match 
reality as the aforementioned trial before the Paris court of first instance revealed. 
Likewise, the government’s contention that non-citizens could freely circulate in the 
transit zone was debunked at the trial where it became clear that asylum-seekers were 
locked up in hotel rooms and subject to constant police surveillance (Paris Court of 
first instance, hearing, February 26, 1992). Allouche, a Socialist senator was amazed 
to discover that non-citizens were detained in transit zones when watching a TV 
documentary (French Senate debates, January 22, 1992, 392). 
Some parliamentarians agreed with the government’s argumentation while 
others refused its logic. Paul Masson, rapporteur at the Senate (French Senate debates, 
January 16, 1992, 212) claimed that, unlike in rétention, the non-citizen was not 
locked up in transit zones, as he “freely circulated in a large perimeter defined by the 
administrative authority”. Gérard Gouzes (French National Assembly debates, 
January 21, 1992, 63) a Socialist MP, also argued that there was a fundamental 
difference between detention in the transit zone and under article 35 bis: in the transit 
zone the “migrant” (his term) was free to go to his country of origin at any time. The 
two situations could not be compared. Charles Lederman (a Communist senator) 
protested against the proposed duration of detention in the transit zone (French Senate 
debates, January 16, 1992, 232). He referred to the opinion expressed by the 
Constitutional Council on September 3, 1986: the Council had found that 
systematically detaining foreign nationals under the rétention regime, who were to be 
removed for three more days (i.e. on top of the seven days already provided for by the 
law), ran against the Constitution. The Council had concluded that when it was 
difficult to deport the foreign national, extending the detention for three extra days, 
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even under judicial oversight, infringed upon individual liberty guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Exceptions could only be tolerated in cases of absolute emergency or in 
the presence of a particularly significant threat against public order (Lochak, 1992, 
686). Masson dismissed Lederman’s point by arguing that the Council’s opinion was 
not applicable to the matter at hand: once again, being in the transit zone was different 
from being in rétention (French Senate debates, January 16, 1992, 232). Stakeholders’ 
different understandings of the status of the transit zone proved that the Marchand 
amendment did not clarify the status of this space.  
 
III. Persisting ambiguity regarding the status of the transit zone  
The status of the international zone was anything but clear in the 1980s, when 
the highest courts of the country ruled that this space was both inside and outside of 
France (cf chapter 1). Minutes from the parliamentary debates reveal that the 
Marchand amendment did not put an end to the transit zone’s ambiguous status. MPs 
and senators grappled with this notion and had diametrically opposed understandings. 
For example, Pezet (French National Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8259), 
the French National Assembly law committee rapporteur, wondered in which part of 
the territory individuals found themselves after disembarking from the plane and 
before crossing border checks. He highlighted that they were not in France under 
financial provisions; the entire body of French law was not meant to apply to 
individuals just because they landed on French territory. However, French criminal 
laws did apply. He concluded by noting the complexity of the transit zone. In contrast 
to Pezet, Socialist senator Allouche observed that the government wanted to 
transform a rightless zone into a zone where national law applied, “even though we do 
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not really know if it is French territory!” (French Senate debates, January 22, 1992, 
391).  
In contrast to both these positions, François Colcombet, an MP, comprehended 
the transit zone as a part of French territory. He said:  
The new article 35 quater of the 1945 Ordinance gives a legal framework to 
the situation of foreign nationals who, arriving by air or sea, are not admitted 
to enter French territory, or, more precisely, are not allowed to leave the transit 
zone, because they are indeed on French territory and not in an intermediary 
zone, like characters from Orphée’s testament who dwell between life and 
death. If a woman were to give birth in the transit zone, the child would be 
registered in France. Likewise, if an offence were committed, French police 
and judiciary would be competent17 (French National Assembly debates, 
January 21, 1992, 67).  
 
NGOs noted that the amendment did not solve the extra-territoriality question. 
Several organizations promoting human and non-citizens’ rights wrote to Robert 
Badinter, then president of the Constitutional Council18. They denounced the 
amendment’s inconsistencies by observing that there were only two possible 
scenarios; either the transit zone was geographically part of French territory as ruled 
by the Final Court of Appeal in 1987 (Youssef) or it was not, as ruled by the Council 
of State in the Eksir decision in 1984. If law-makers decided to abide by the Youssef 
ruling and therefore to exercise their competence over this space then what was the 
rationale for subjecting foreign nationals in the transit zone to a different law than that 
applicable to those on the rest of French territory? Why would they be governed by a 
law which would be less protective of their liberties? The implications of the second 
scenario were also far-reaching: acknowledging that the transit zone was not part of 
French territory meant that article 7 bis was contrary to the constitution as law-makers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The Marchand amendment intended to modify domestic legislation by inserting an article 35 quater 
in the 1945 Ordinance.  
18 The following organizations signed the letter: Anafé, Cimade, France Terre d’Asile, GISTI, and the 
Ligue des droits de l’homme.  
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were not competent to adopt it. Indeed neither lawmakers nor administrative 
authorities had the competence to pass a law that applies beyond national territory or 
take individual decisions implementing such law  (NGO letter to the President of the 
Constitutional Council, January 28, 1992, 5).  
 
IV. The government’s justification for the amendment: emphasis on progress, 
security and the upcoming litigation’s danger 
The government presented the amendment as necessary for striking a balance 
between individual liberties and border control and security (French Senate debates, 
January 16, 1992, 229). Marchand portrayed France as an exemplary, progressive 
country in Europe in this regard: France would be the first country to provide a legal 
status and safeguards to individuals held in transit zones, promising that they would 
not spend more than 30 days in these spaces (French National Assembly debates, 
January 21, 1992, 71 and December 19, 1991, 8256). Gouzes, president of the 
National Assembly Law committee, described the situation of non-admitted travelers 
in other countries’ transit zones. According to him, non-admitted passengers could be 
detained in prison in Ireland, Denmark and the United Kingdom, while in Germany 
and the Netherlands they could be detained in police premises at the airport (French 
National Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8271). Marchand insisted that his 
legal provision would place France far ahead of its neighbors in terms of legal 
protection in the transit zone. He explained that the government had decided to give a 
legal basis to what was currently an administrative practice (French National 
Assembly debates, December 19, 1991, 8256).  The Paris court of first instance that 
heard the arbitrary sequestration case expressed outrage precisely at the government’s 
efforts to give a legal base to an illegal administrative practice harmful to individual 
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liberties (Paris court of first instance, February 26, 1992). Appalled by the procedure, 
the court declared the Ministry of the Interior’s attempt to turn an illegal 
administrative practice into an acceptable one through law making as incompatible 
with the rule of law. 
Security loomed large in the Minister of the Interior’s discourse: he was 
adamant that freedom of movement neither could nor should run against the State’s 
security. Freedom of movement should not mean the loosening of migration controls. 
He emphasized that some non-admitted foreigners were undesirable (i.e. individuals 
whose presence would be a threat to public order, or who had been banned from the 
territory or against whom a deportation order had been taken). The Minister of the 
Interior used the upcoming legal proceedings to his advantage, referring to them to 
create a sense of urgency. He warned senators that state practices could be found 
illegal. He argued that, should this possibility materialize, discarding the transit 
zone’s legal provision would be tantamount to suppressing border control. Indeed, if 
article 7 bis was not adopted and the plaintiffs won the case, no foreign national could 
be detained in the transit zone. As a consequence, all non-admitted passengers and 
asylum-seekers would have to be granted entry even if they did not fulfill the criteria. 
Marchand raised the specter of invasion: a familiar trope associated with calls to 
increase border control. He claimed that the disappearance of French borders would 
translate into several thousands of individuals coming to France each year. These 
people would swell the ranks of illegal workers residing in the country without 
authorization. This uncalled-for situation would be against the State’s interest (French 
Senate debates, January 16, 1992, 229-230).  
Prime Minister Edith Cresson reiterated that the transit zone provision resulted 
from a legal crisis. When the president of the human rights commission wrote her a 
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letter expressing his dissatisfaction about the commission not being able to offer its 
opinion to parliamentarians, Cresson replied that the government could not wait for 
the commission’s report due to the looming trial date (letter of the Prime Minister to 
the president of the domestic human rights commission, January 16, 1992). She 
clearly stated that the government’s decision to legislate on the transit zone was 
triggered by the court of first instance’s November ruling allowing the plaintiffs to 
sue the Ministry of the Interior on the merits of their case. As she candidly admitted, 
at first the government had no intention to pass a law on the transit zone: the situation 
had not been challenged before national courts or the European Court of Human 
Rights. She argued that it was a government leader’s responsibility to make sure civil 
servants did not have to act illegally for extended periods of time. Therefore, the 
government could not wait for the spring parliamentary session. This unsettling 
admission on the part of the French government -that it did not care about respecting 
the rights of foreign nationals as long as there were no legal proceedings involved- 
will be found over and over again in the history of the Law on the Waiting Zone.  
I will now examine the role that the Constitutional Council played in the birth 
of the Law on the Waiting Zone.  
 
V. The role of the Constitutional Council in the manufacturing of an illiberal law   
Interestingly, while Socialist Party MPs adopted the government’s bill at the 
first reading in December 1992, Socialist senators refused to support the text when it 
came to the Senate for the first and second readings on January 16 and January 22, 
1992. Other political groups cast a positive vote and the bill was approved in spite of 
the Socialist Party senators’ Opposition. Yet, the minutes from the parliamentary 
debates reveal that Socialist senators supported the gist of the transit zone provision: 
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they agreed it was necessary to control borders. As such, they opposed the 
Communist group’s request to delete article 7 bis, as they agreed with the spirit of the 
bill (French Senate debates, January 22, 1992, 230). The Socialist senators were 
uncomfortable with the maximum length of time spent in the transit zone (thought to 
be excessive) and favored the intervention of a liberty and custody judge rather than 
an administrative judge to extend the duration of detention. During the first reading, 
Allouche, speaking on behalf of the Socialist group, explained that the Socialist 
senators would back the amendment only if the government promised to refer it to the 
Constitutional Council (French Senate debates, January 16, 1992, 207). Allouche 
requested a clear answer from Marchand, but was not given one. He reiterated his 
request at the second reading, making it very clear that the Socialist group’s vote 
depended on the government’s favorable response.  
According to French law, two different actors are entitled to refer a legislative 
text to the Constitutional Council: the Prime Minister and a group of 60 
Parliamentarians -either MPs or senators- (Constitutional Council website, accessed 
January 201519). The Socialist group at the Senate counted enough members to fulfill 
the requirements: Why did the senators not refer the bill to the Constitutional 
Council? Allouche explained that he preferred the former option, arguing that it was 
in the government’s interest: by referring the bill to the Constitutional Council itself, 
the government would shield itself from any criticism (French Senate debates, 
January 22, 1991, 392). The bill was passed without the Socialist senator’s blessing 
and became a law. However, confronted with significant opposition both inside and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr 
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outside of parliament, the government decided to refer the Marchand provision to the 
Constitutional Council.  
The French Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel), established in 
1958, “is a court vested with various powers, including in particular the review of the 
constitutionality of legislation” (French Constitutional Court website, accessed 
January 19, 2015). The circumstances under which the Constitutional Council was 
tasked to review the constitutionality of the proposed legislation on the transit zone 
were unheard of. Until now, opponents to legislation had introduced referrals 
(Genevois, 1992). In stark contrast, Edith Cresson, Socialist Prime Minister, who 
therefore belonged to the same government that introduced the Marchand amendment, 
referred the amendment to the Constitutional Council on February 25, 1992. The 
Council’s decision was released on the same day.  
The Constitutional Council examined the Marchand amendment under two 
aspects: the right to liberty and the right to seek asylum (both protected under the 
French Constitution). Importantly, the Council endorsed the government’s contention 
that detention in the transit zone and in rétention were of a different nature: it found 
that foreign nationals detained (the word used by the Constitutional Council is not 
detention but holding -maintien) in the transit zone under the proposed article 35 
quater were not subject to the same degree of constraint as those placed in 
administrative detention under article 35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance. Nevertheless, the 
Council found that the amendment infringed upon the right to liberty because the 
responsibility to extend the duration of detention rested on the administrative judge, 
not the liberty and custody judge. Indeed the French Constitution of 1958 (article 66, 
still in force today) tasked the latter with upholding individual liberties, not the 
former. As for the right to asylum, the Council found that the Marchand amendment 
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was compatible with this constitutional right, provided that the asylum-seeker’s 
detention in the transit zone only occurred for the time necessary for the claimant to 
be returned, if the claim appeared to be manifestly unfounded. The Council censored 
part of the Marchand amendment but legitimized its very rationale. The court thus 
contributed to creating an exceptional legal framework for individuals detained in the 
transit zone. The Council gave legitimacy to the government’s bill, thereby soothing 
the conscience of parliamentarians who were unsettled by the Marchand provision. It 
played a significant part in the birth of the subsequent Law on the Waiting Zone.  
 
VI. The Law on the Waiting Zone from 1992 to 2016: successive extensions of the 
definition of the waiting zone following litigation crises  
In March 1992, the Paris court strongly condemned the government’s efforts 
to turn an illegal administrative practice, harmful to individual liberties, into a law. 
Yet this is precisely what happened. Partly censored by the Constitutional Council, 
the Marchand amendment was modified and became the Law on the Waiting Zone of 
July 6, 1992. Such a law gave a legal framework to the administrative practices of 
detention outside of article 35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance and abolished the provisions 
of article 35 bis pertaining to the detention of foreign nationals turned away at 
borders. Although the final version of the waiting zone provision was more protective 
than the initial Marchand amendment, it still granted significantly less protection to 
individuals than article 35 bis. The Law on the Waiting Zone gave fewer rights to 
non-citizens arriving at the border than to those already considered on French soil.  
Today, the Law on the Waiting Zone establishes a particular legal regime for 
non-citizens (French: ‘étranger’) denied entry into French or Schengen territory or 
claiming asylum at a French border arriving by train, boat or airplane (CESEDA, 
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2016 articles L221-1 to L224-4). Individuals located in the waiting zone are still not 
governed by ordinary laws, but instead subjected to its particular legal regime. The 
regular refugee determination procedures do not apply to asylum-seekers at the 
border. Unaccompanied minors are denied due process rights that children in France 
enjoy (Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2014). This parallel – and less protective – legal 
framework builds on the premise that rejected non-citizens and asylum-seekers at the 
border find themselves at the threshold of, but not having yet entered French 
sovereign territory. They find themselves, instead, in territorial border zones where 
the state establishes the distinction between physical and legal entry: physical 
presence proves insufficient and only lawful admission amounts to entry into the 
territory (Basaran, 2011). Individuals falling under the purview of the waiting zone 
framework are detained during the time necessary for them to be returned or, if they 
are claiming asylum, to determine whether or not their claim is inadmissible or 
‘manifestly unfounded’. As a general rule, only asylum-seekers passing this initial 
screening will be entitled to enter French territory where claims will be examined on 
their merits. The Law of July 29, 2015 was adopted to incorporate two European 
directives of June 2013 pertaining to asylum: the Asylum Procedures Directive 
(2013/32/EU) and the Reception Conditions Directive (2013/33/EU). Since this law, 
asylum-seekers may also be admitted to the territory when deemed particularly 
vulnerable by the refugee agency. When not considered as such, unaccompanied 
minors seeking asylum still have to pass the “manifestly unfounded test”, save in a 
very few cases (cf chapter 4).  
Since July 1992, the scope of the Law on the Waiting zone has been extended 
significantly, following litigation “crises”. Initially (in the early 1990s), those denied 
entry were geographically circumscribed by an administrative authority (le préfet) to 
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waiting zones, which ran between points of boarding or disembarkation and border 
checkpoints. These zones could include accommodation located on or nearby the 
airport, port, or train station. In 2003, the definition of the waiting zone was extended 
to include accommodation “nearby the place of disembarkation” (article 50 of the 
Law of November 26, 2003). The definition was also expanded to include any place 
where an entering non-citizen goes for administrative or medical reasons (Law of 
November 26, 2003). As a result, the waiting zone status now accompanies the 
individual, even kilometers from the point of arrival. For example, individuals turned 
away at the border at Charles de Gaulle (CDG) airport are deemed outside of France 
under immigration law when presented to a judge at the Bobigny court – located 17 
kilometers from the airport – after four days of detention. Trapped by the waiting 
zone framework, aliens “are not expelled by the border, they are forced to be the 
border” (Khosravi, 2010, p. 99). Thus the term ‘waiting zone’ refers both to a 
geographical and legal space.  
Interestingly, the 2003 extension of the definition of the waiting zone was 
prompted by the arrival of 910 refugees (mostly Kurds of Syrian citizenship, who first 
said they were from Iraq) on the beach of Boulouris on the French Riviera during the 
night of February 17-18, 200120. The secretary of the relevant administrative authority 
created an ad hoc waiting zone, that run from the point of disembarkation on the 
beach to the Fréjus military compound where the refugees were detained. At the time, 
the law did not sanction the creation of a waiting zone outside of a port, airport or 
international train station. Law professor Serge Slama explains that the government, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Rotman, Charlotte. April 23, 2001. “Les Kurdes naufragés venaient de Syrie, non d’Irak” [“The 
shipwrecked Kurds came from Syria, not Irak”].  Libération, Available at: 
http://www.liberation.fr/societe/2001/04/23/les-kurdes-naufrages-venaient-de-syrie-non-d-irak_362048 
Accessed August 11, 2016.  
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led by Lionel Jospin,21 decided to admit all refugees into the territory before the 
liberty and custody judges handed down their ruling. This decision appears to have 
been motivated by a conversation with Dominique Simonnot, journalist at Libération: 
They create a waiting zone of several dozens of kilometers to transport people 
to the camp. Then all the activist lawyers arrive: Jean-Eric Malabre, Stéphane 
Maugendre, Dominique Monget-Sarrail, it was the same crowd; (…) they 
were often somehow related to Anafé, but mostly to Gisti. They go down 
there, they try to release everybody by appealing to principles. And the case 
was solved, -I do not know if this story is really well-known: Dominique 
Simonnot, who was journalist at Libération, starts to write articles on this 
(Libération is a respected newspaper in France). She speaks on the phone with 
someone from the Ministry and lets him know that she is going to publish in 
Libération (an article saying) that lawyers will manage to release all refugees.  
They get scared and I think it is Matignon (official home to the Prime 
Minister, this term refers to the Primer Minister in common language), so 
Jospin, who decides to release them. Anafé had contested the act creating the 
waiting zone and four years afterwards, years afterwards, the administrative 
court cancelled it (Interview with Serge Slama, July 2014).  
 
All refugees were released from the waiting zone, except for a dozen, who were 
believed to be Palestinians (Simonnot and Hassoux, February 21, 2001). Anafé and 
six other NGOs defending non-citizens’ rights sued the government before the 
administrative court of Nice for the creation of an illegal waiting zone. The court 
condemned the government in 2005 and cancelled this ad hoc waiting zone 
(Administrative court of Nice, December 9, 2005). Meanwhile, the government, 
anticipating a legal defeat, had managed to expand the definition of the waiting zone 
with the Law of November 26, 2003. Initiated by Nicolas Sarkozy, then Minister of 
the Interior, this law aimed at cracking down on illegal immigration.  
On paper, there are 67 waiting zones in France, all located in ports, airports 
and train stations open to international passengers (Anafé, November 2015, 13). Most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Lionel Jospin was Prime Minister from June 1997 to May 2002 when Jacques Chirac was President 
(from 1995 to 2007). Jospin and Chirac were from different political parties (the former was left-wing 
while the latter was right-wing). Jospin therefore led the government during times of cohabitation (cf 
chapter 1).  
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are not significant crossings and therefore used infrequently. Since 2011 (Law of June 
16, 2011), ad hoc waiting zones can also be created when a group of 10 non-citizens 
arrives in France outside of a border crossing (for example on a beach). In this case 
the waiting zone will run between places where authorities have found the non-
citizens and the closest border checkpoint.  Once again, this change in legislation was 
triggered by a (perceived) immigration crisis: a boat dropped off 123 refugees - 
mostly Kurds from Syria - in Corsica in January 2010 (Jamet, January 22, 2010). 
After being placed in detention centers all over the country (in rétention), these non-
citizens were released by judges. The latter found that the government had not 
respected legal procedures. Eric Besson, then Minister of Immigration22, spearheaded 
the Law of June 16, 2011, whose goal was to enhance both control over immigration 
and integration of migrants. Referring to the Corsican case, Besson argued that it was 
necessary for administrative authorities to be able to create temporary waiting zones 
so that irregular migrants would not abscond and wander around the Schengen area 
freely (Law commission of the French National Assembly, September 8, 2010). Table 
2 below presents the successive extensions of the definition of the waiting zone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 There was a Ministry of Immigration from May 2007 to November 2010. Aside from this time 
period, the Ministry of the Interior has been handling matters pertaining to immigration.  
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Table 2. The Law on the Waiting Zone from 1992 to 2011 
6 July 1992 Creation of waiting zones: the Law on the Waiting Zone is passed. 
Waiting zones run between points of boarding or disembarkation and 
border checkpoints. They can include accommodation located on or 
nearby the airport or port. The task of demarcating waiting zones is left to 
an administrative authority.	  
Night between 
the 17 and 18 of 
February 2001 
The boat East Sea carrying 910 refugees (mostly Kurds of Syrian 
citizenship) runs aground near the beach of Boulouris, on the French 
Riviera. The secretary of the competent administrative authority creates a 
waiting zone that runs between the point of disembarkation on the beach 
to a military compound, where the refugees are detained. The government 
decides to release them all before the liberty and custody judges hand 
down their decision.  
26 November 
2003 
Extension of the definition of the waiting zone to include accommodation 
“nearby the place of disembarkation” as well as any place where an 
entering non-citizen goes for administrative or medical reasons.  
22 January 
2010 
A boat drops off 123 refugees (mostly Kurds from Syria) in Corsica. 
After being placed in detention centers all over the country, they are all 
released by custody and liberty judges, for the government had not 
respected legal procedures.  
16 June 2011 Extension of the definition of the waiting zone: ad hoc waiting zones can 
also be created when a group of 10 non-citizens arrives in France outside 
of a border crossing (for example on a beach). 
 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have traced how a parallel and less protective legal 
framework, one premised on extra-territoriality, was established through regular 
democratic processes. The history of the birth of the waiting zone and of its 
subsequent extensions highlight the difficulties of legal activism. Paradoxically, 
defending non-citizens through litigation has resulted in significant extensions of the 
scope of the waiting zone. Each time, the government managed to turn the illegal 
administrative practice in question into a law. While liberal discourse and the 
discourse of exception (Agamben, 1998, 2005; Butler 2004) associate deprivation of 
rights with exception, extra-legality or emphasis on executive powers, these findings 
illustrate Basaran’s (2011, 109) observation:  “The challenge of liberties is inherent to 
liberal rule and the rule of law, which always contain within themselves the 
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possibility for limiting liberties, for creating new legal exclusions”. As she and other 
scholars note, the infringement of liberties is not an anomaly in liberal democracies or 
a discontinuity with liberal rule. In the following chapters, I will further explore the 
extra-territoriality notion and argue that the initial construction of the international 
zone as an extra-territorial space has endured in both mindsets and practices.  
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Chapter 3. Non-citizens in airports’ waiting zones today: the 
endurance of exclusion through extra-territoriality 
 
Introduction 
Since the birth of the Law on the Waiting Zone in 1992, international treaty 
monitoring bodies, legal scholars and the European Court of Human Rights (Amuur vs 
France, 1996) have explicitly stated that international zones, or transit zones, are 
integrally part of the territory of the state on which they are located. Under 
international law, airports’ transit zones are not extra-territorial spaces. Many people 
working on or in Charles De Gaulle’s waiting zone think that the legal issues attached 
to “extra-territorial legal fictions” (Del Valle Galvez, 2005) in the 1980s and early 
1990s disappeared when the Law on the Waiting Zone came into being in 1992. To 
them, the Law on the Waiting Zone represents a striking shift from the previous era, 
when asylum-claimants and rejected travelers were excluded from legal guarantees 
based on their presence in geographical spaces construed as extra-territorial. Rémi 
Rouquette, a lawyer and former lecturer in public law, rejects the use of the term 
“extra-territoriality” to describe today’s situation (i.e. at the time of data collection in 
2013-2014), pointing out that waiting zones are not-extra-territorial zones but places 
where a different set of rights apply (Interview, February 25, 2014). Christian is a 
lawyer specializing in the defense of non-citizens in administrative detention (at the 
border and on the territory). He affirms that courts are no longer wondering whether 
those in waiting zones are de facto on French territory. All ambiguity on this matter 
has been dispelled (Interview, December 10, 2013). As for Jeanne, who works at the 
Ministry of the Interior in the department tasked with reviewing asylum-seekers’ 
applications to enter French territory, she argued that the French government 
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adequately responded to the critiques mounted against its practices at the borders by 
creating the Law on the Waiting Zone (Interview, November 2013). To my question 
“How does the Ministry of the Interior interpret the European Court of Human Rights 
ruling Amuur versus France?” Jeanne replied:  
We do not pay attention to it. It is a ruling from 1996, but events took place in 
1992. The waiting zone was created in 1992. We saw that there was a small 
issue at the time. As usual, the court took its time, but it does not mean that the 
State did not react. The waiting zones were created in 1992. This is the reason 
why the law came into existence (Interview, November 2013). 
 
 I agree that the establishment of extra-territorial international zones as devices 
to deflect from domestic and international obligations has been formally rejected in 
July 1992. When MPs passed the Law on the Waiting Zone, they implicitly 
acknowledged French sovereignty over the international zone, renamed “transit zone” 
and then “waiting zone”. From the moment the Law on the Waiting Zone came to 
force (and was applied) non-citizens stopped being deprived of “the right to have 
rights” (Arendt, 1968). Furthermore, the excision of airports’ international zones was 
clearly condemned by the Court of Human Rights in 1996. But was the Law on the 
Waiting Zone really a cause for celebration and a resolution to a problem? Is the term 
“extra-territoriality” in fact inappropriate to describe the current situation?  
In answering these questions, I will make the following arguments. Firstly, the 
initial phase of extra-territoriality has endured in mindsets and practices. Amongst 
individuals working in or on the waiting zone can be found the deeply ingrained idea 
that the waiting zone is not French territory (at least) for non-citizen populations. This 
argument, just like in the 1980s and early 1990s, has been used to exclude non-
citizens from rights. In other words, some individuals have been denied the protection 
of international law based on their presence in excised, non-French territory. 
Secondly, the Law on the Waiting Zone has reinvented exclusion through another 
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form of extra-territoriality, premised on the non-citizen’s legal status at the border. 
Although physically in France, rejected non-citizens and asylum-seekers at the border 
are not present from a legal standpoint, for they have not crossed yet “law’s admission 
gate” (Shachar 2007). The first argument will be developed in this chapter but the 
second one will be saved for chapter 4.  
In this chapter, I will first review how international law explicitly addressed 
the status of the international or transit zone at airports. I will then highlight how the 
international zone may still be a lawless space for those denied access to the waiting 
zone status. I will also provide evidence to demonstrate that the excision issues 
attached to the international zone have been transferred to the waiting zone. A 
possible explanation regarding the causes of this transfer will finally be offered. 
 
I. The case of Amuur vs France (1996): airports’ international zones are not 
extra-territorial spaces  
When the French government established the airports’ international zones as 
non-French spaces, international law had not directly addressed the status of the 
international zone yet. Legal scholars had not given much thought to the status of this 
space (cf chapter 1). This changed when the European Court of Human Rights 
specifically ruled on June 25, 1996 in the Amuur case that the international zone at 
Orly airport did not have extra-territorial status. The court found that the Somali 
asylum-claimants had been illegally deprived of liberty: no appropriate law had 
authorized their detention.  
The Amuur case started at the domestic level when Dominique Monget-Sarrail 
and her associates Laurence Roques and Pascale Taelman first brought the case to the 
Créteil court of first instance on March 26, 1992. The day before, the Paris court of 
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first instance had rejected the government’s extra-territoriality thesis, according to 
which the government argued that the Arcade hotel at CDG airport was part of the 
international zone and as such had extra-territorial status (cf chapter 1, the plaintiffs 
were four Haitian and one Zairian asylum-seekers). It was also about a month after 
the Constitutional Council had upheld the French government’s contention that 
confinement in the international zone and on French territory differed on the grounds 
that the former was less detrimental to individual liberty than the latter (cf chapter 2). 
The Law on the Waiting Zone came to force a few months after the Amuur case 
began. The Amuur case has to be understood as part of a series of trials that activist 
lawyers launched against the French government from the late 1980s (cf chapter 1 and 
2).  
When these events unfolded, the European Commission of Human Rights was 
tasked with filtering the requests to determine their admissibility. The facts of the 
Amuur case are therefore described in both the Commission’s decision Barir and 
Amuur against France of October 18, 1993 and in the Court’s ruling Amuur versus 
France of June 25, 1996. The information given by Monget-Sarrail, one of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers, complements that provided in these legal accounts. The Amuur 
case highlights the plight of asylum-seekers detained in international zones, caught in 
the extra-territorial legal fiction designed by the French government. It reveals that 
those seeking international protection were particularly at risk of refoulement when 
arriving at Parisian airport borders.  
Four Somali siblings arrived on March 9, 1992 at Paris Orly airport from Syria 
where they had spent two months after fleeing from Somalia via Kenya. They alleged 
their lives were at risk in Somalia after the fall of President Siyad Barre. The border 
police refused them entry on the basis that their passports were forged. They were 
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placed at the Arcade hotel, which was construed as an extension of the international 
zone (cf chapter 1). On March 12 the Ministry of the Interior examined their request 
to enter France to claim asylum. By March 14, 18 other Somali nationals (among 
which 11 children) had arrived at Orly from Syria and Egypt. Of these 18 Somali 
citizens, five were cousins of the Amuur brothers and sister. They were all members 
of the Darob Marhan tribe, which was in power during the regime of President 
Mohamed Siyad Barre. They explained that several members of their family had been 
murdered. On March 24 they obtained legal aid after the NGO Cimade (i.e. one of the 
founding members of Anafé) put them in touch with a lawyer. On March 25, they 
wrote a letter to the refugee agency (OFPRA) requesting refugee status according to 
the Geneva Convention of 1951. On March 26, their case was referred to the court of 
first instance at Créteil on the grounds that their deprivation of liberty was arbitrary.  
Lawyers Monget-Sarrail, Roques and Taelman referred the case of the 22 
plaintiffs to the European Commission of Human Rights on March 27, 1992. In spite 
of the President of the European Commission indicating to the French government on 
March 27 “that it was desirable, in the interest of the parties and the proper conduct of 
the proceedings, to refrain from sending the applicants back to Somalia before 4 April 
1992” (European Court of Human Rights, 1996, 18), the four Amuur siblings were 
forcibly returned on March 29. The Minister of the Interior had refused them entry. 
The government bypassed the Commission’s request by returning the applicants to 
their country of transit, Syria -which was not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention- 
instead of Somalia. At the time of their return (March 29), the Somali claimants not 
yet received the answer from the refugee agency. Their case before the court at Créteil 
was still pending. The government insisted that the French ambassador in Syria had 
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obtained diplomatic assurances from Syrian authorities that the country would take 
the Somali nationals.  
On March 29 Monget-Sarrail and her associate Taelman were at a conference 
on asylum. They received a phone call letting them know that the four young Somali 
(the Amuur siblings were young adults of 22, 21, 19 and 17) were no longer at Orly 
airport. Monget-Sarrail recounts:  
On Friday the European Commission had invited France not to return them to 
Somalia, but on Saturday morning they were put on the plane anyway. So we 
came back from the conference, Pascale (Taelman) went to Orly to see the 
families that were still there. They were terribly upset as they had been forced on 
the plane, they did not want to go, they were put in the plane on a hoist. So she 
went to the airport and I came back to find someone to stop the return. So we 
called Mrs. Mitterrand who, at the time, was head of “France Libertés” when 
(François) Mitterrand was president of the Republic23. We explained to her the 
situation: there were only women and children left. She made him promise not to 
try to return the others before the (court of first instance at Créteil’s) decision on 
Monday. We also told the European Court that France had not respected its 
invitation to postpone (return). (France) bypassed this requirement quite cleverly, 
since the European Court was saying that they should not be returned to Somalia, 
and they were sent back to Syria where they had transited (Interview with 
Monget-Sarrail, August 2014).  
 
Yet, in spite of Monget-Sarrail securing a non-return commitment from the 
President’s wife, the 18 remaining asylum-seekers were presented to a plane for Cairo 
on March 30. They refused to board it. They were then referred to a criminal court for 
refusing to abide by the decision denying them entry. On the following day, March 
31, the refugee agency declared itself incompetent, as the claimants had not yet been 
admitted to French territory. This same day, the judge of the court of first instance at 
Créteil declared that the detention of the remaining claimants was illegal and ordered 
the Ministry of the Interior to immediately release them. The 18 Somali nationals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 “France Libertés” is an NGO that was created in 1986 to defend human rights and ethnic minorities. 
The organization’s website explains that the NGO has been active in defending the right of peoples and 
individuals to self-determination. Cf: http://www.france-libertes.org/Notre-histoire,2217.html .  
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were granted refugee status by the refugee agency on June 25, 1992 and withdrew 
their request before the European Commission of Human Rights.  
Monget-Sarrail and her associates were ready to drop the case as the plaintiffs 
had all left the international zone. But a lawyer from the European Court called them: 
he was adamant that they press on with the request nonetheless. Monget-Sarrail 
recalls:  
It was the first time we referred a case to the European Court; we did not know 
how to proceed, so we explained how unfair it was. When they were set free, the 
four others had disappeared so we thought: “It is over”. And a lawyer from the 
Court, a Greek, called us. Luckily he spoke French flawlessly and told us: “Yes, 
you have to press on, even if they disappeared, because we are looking for a case 
to rule on these zones where incoming people are placed. There are many 
countries in Europe where there are no laws and they are waiting for the court’s 
decision. Press on with your request, we are going to help you, we will explain 
how it works.” So this is how we could file our request. The (European) 
Commission examined it and then we were referred to the Grand Chamber and 
invited to come plead. (Interview, August 2014) 
 
Most of the proceedings before the European Commission and the European Court 
took place in the absence of the plaintiffs. Monget-Sarrail explains that for a long 
period of time, she and her associates completely lost the trace of the Amuur siblings 
after their return to Syria. The European Court ruling (1996, 2) reads: “The lawyer 
who had represented the applicants before the Commission stated that she was unable 
to contact them but that the terms of the authority to act that had been produced 
before the Commission also covered the proceedings before the Court”, confirming 
her story. According to Monget-Sarrail, the UNHCR had received assurances from 
the Syrian government that the Somali nationals would not be placed in refugee 
camps but would instead receive a residency permit. On this basis, the international 
refugee organization had tried to convince the four Amuur to return to Syria, their 
country of transit. Yet, as Monget-Sarrail and her associates later learned, the Amuur 
had landed in Syrian refugee camps where they had “stagnated” (végéter) for months 
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before leaving. They then heard that the siblings were in Moscow (Interview, August 
2014). The European Commission’s opinion corroborates her story: “The applicants 
claimed they were arrested upon arrival in Damascus and two of them were forced to 
leave Syria for Russia” (European Commission, 1993).  
The Commission finally referred the case of the four Amuur siblings to the 
European Court on March 1, 1995. The plaintiffs had argued that several articles of 
the European Convention of Human Rights had been violated (articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 13 
and 25) but the Commission rejected all of the alleged violations save the one based 
on article 5 (right to liberty and security) 24. 
Not surprisingly, the arguments of the government in the Amuur case (at the 
domestic and European level) were the same as those fed to parliamentarians to 
justify the Marchand amendment and used at the trial before the Paris court of March 
25, 1992. In its observations to the European Commission (transmitted on July 7, 
1992), the French government claimed that the plaintiffs’ “holding” (maintien) in the 
international zone did not amount to deprivation of liberty: they were not arrested or 
detained. They were instead “staying” (séjourner) in the international zone. They 
were free to leave for any other destination than France (European Commission, 
1993). The Créteil court of first instance came to the same conclusions as its Paris 
counterpart the day before: the plaintiffs’ detention was not provided by any 
legislation and “detention may not be ordered by the administrative authorities in 
cases other than those provided for in Article 35 bis of the 1945 Ordinance, which in 
any event makes such detention subject to supervision by the courts” (Créteil court’s 
ruling quoted in the European Court of Human Rights’ judgment). The court found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The full name of the Convention is “ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms”. The Convention was opened for signature in Rome on November 4, 1950. It 
came to force in 1953. Cf website of the European Court of Human Rights.  
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therefore that the applicants’ detention was unlawful and directed that they be 
released. The European Court concurred with the domestic court’s judgment. It ruled 
that individuals in the international zone were subjected to French law, even though 
French authorities claimed the opposite. As France exercised sovereignty over this 
zone, the protections offered by the Refugee Convention had to be granted. This case 
law highlights that jurisdiction cannot be withdrawn at will. Under international law 
these situations of extra-territoriality do not exist, despite states’ effort to create “legal 
fictions” through national policies or legislation (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2011).  
Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen (2015, 245) explain that the excised zone, 
“in which some or all of the legal obligations of the territorial state are declared not to 
apply” constituted a traditional non-entrée mechanism (cf chapter 1). The concept of 
“non-entrée”, first coined by Hathaway in 1992, is defined as the efforts deployed by 
wealthy states to ensure refugees never reach their jurisdiction. They argue that 
traditional non-entrée mechanisms, such as international zones, have been 
successfully challenged both in law and in practice. They write: “The notion that a 
state can delimit the geographical scope of its territory for purposes of avoiding legal 
liability-for example, by excision or the declaration of an international zone in an 
airport-has simply been rejected” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2015, 246-
247). They argue that, in order to keep refugees at bay, powerful states have now 
turned to a new generation of non-entrée mechanisms based on international 
cooperation, since they can no longer rely on former tools such as excision. The 
European Court of Human Rights also implied that, had the Law on the Waiting Zone 
been in force at the time the complaint was lodged, the applicants would have had no 
grounds for complaint.  
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I take issue with these positions. As I will now demonstrate, non-citizens have 
continued to be excluded from rights based on their presence in excised, non-French 
territory many years after the Law on the Waiting Zone came into force and the 
Amuur ruling was handed down.  
 
II. When history repeats itself: evidence of the endurance of the initial phase of 
extra-territoriality  
The legacy of the excision of international zones weighs heavily on 
contemporary mindsets and practices. As chapter 1 demonstrated, in the 1980s the 
French government claimed international zones in Paris airports were outside of 
France, leaving migrants and asylum-seekers outside of the protective reach of 
domestic and international guarantees.  
In the 1980s, judges from the highest courts issued contradictory rulings, 
which gave greater regulatory power to the State. The rulings reveal that the 
international zone was understood to mean different things according to the political 
usage of the law. The international zone was both France and not France at the same 
time, according to the direction of the border crossing (cf chapter 1). When it came to 
returning someone to a country of origin or a third country, the international zone was 
France, and non-citizens refusing to embark could be subject to criminal prosecutions 
for illegally staying in the country while in the international zone (Final court of 
appeal, Youssef, 1987). However, for foreigners landing in Charles de Gaulle arriving 
from another country, the international zone was not yet France (Council of State, 
Eksir, 1984).  
When the Ministry of the Interior presented the bill that later became the Law 
on the Waiting Zone, parliamentarians grappled with the status of transit zones (in 
	   83	  
December 1991 and January 1992). They exhibited confusion regarding the status of 
this geographic space. Some of them endorsed the government’s assertion according 
to which it was not France (cf chapter 2). The status of Paris airports’ international 
zones was anything but clear.  
Years after the Amuur against France judgment, French domestic courts still 
issued contradictory rulings regarding the status of the waiting zone, coming again to 
the conclusion that waiting zones were both located outside of and part and parcel of 
French territory. Some courts espoused the government’s 1980s argumentation 
according to which waiting (previously international) zones were not French territory 
for certain populations. This argumentation was used in order to circumvent granting 
rights guaranteed by French and international law. This resulted in an uneven 
enforcement of rights. It is fascinating to observe that the same court could make 
diametrically opposed rulings on exactly the same topic. This seemingly permanent, 
persistent indecision reveals that the status of waiting zones remains unclear in 
stakeholders’ minds.  
In France, the children’s judge (juge des enfants) has jurisdiction whenever 
there is a threat to a child’s health, security or morality or if the child’s education or 
his or her physical, emotional, intellectual and social well-being are severely at risk 
(Anafé, January 2013, 32-33). On December 7, 2004, the Paris appeals court ruled 
that legal provisions pertaining to the protection of minors were applicable to all 
minors present on French territory, regardless of their nationality. The court therefore 
found that the children judge’s protection extended to minors held under the waiting 
zone law who, although turned away at the border, were de facto on French territory. 
Yet the very same Paris appeals court ruled exactly the opposite in 2008 (February 
21): as the minor placed in the waiting zone was not on French territory, he could not 
	   84	  
benefit from protection measures that could be implemented only on French territory 
(cf Final court of appeal, March 25, 2009). The court found that the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child did not apply to children in the waiting zone.  
Finally, the Final court of appeal (i.e. the highest court in the domestic judicial 
order, Cour de Cassation) rejected the appeals court’s February 2008’s reasoning, 
stating that “the waiting zone was under national administrative and jurisdictional 
supervision”. The Final court of appeal found that a minor (here an Iraqi asylum-
seeker) placed in Charles de Gaulle airport’s waiting zone was de facto on French 
territory. French law pertaining to the protection of childhood was applicable to all 
minors located on French territory, regardless of their nationality or legal status in 
France. The Final court of appeal found that the inferior court had violated article 20 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that “a child temporarily or 
permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best 
interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special 
protection and assistance provided by the State” (Final court of appeal, March 25, 
2009).  
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to study all of the rulings issued by 
liberty and custody judges and by the appeals court. This would constitute not only a 
tedious but also an impossible task due to their sheer number. Indeed, a liberty and 
custody judge from the Bobigny court of first instance –i.e. the judge who assesses 
whether detention in Charles de Gaulle waiting zone’s facility should be extended 
after four and 12 days- can work from 11:00 am until 2:00 am, deciding on the cases 
of dozens of individuals. I have myself observed days of hearings finishing after 
midnight. Hearings do not stop during weekends or holidays and the rulings are not 
available in electronic format. However, more instances of exclusion from rights on 
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the grounds that waiting zones are not French territory could perhaps be found in 
other rulings.  
In practice, the Final court of appeal’s 2009 ruling pertaining to the status of 
the waiting zone has not really been followed. Yet, in the French legal order, the 
judgments of the Final court are a reference. Children’s judges have the power to 
order placement in a group home or with family members, therefore ending detention 
in the waiting zone. Gérard, an experienced ad hoc administrator, explains that in 
practice children’s judges very rarely dare to take a decision that would contradict the 
administrative decision placing the minor under the waiting zone regime (Interview, 
December 2013)25. He argues that the children’s judges’ jurisdiction over children 
confined in the waiting zone should be reaffirmed and explicitly written into the law. 
It was actually Gérard’s organization that brought the issue to the Final court of 
appeal in order to obtain a ruling confirming that the children judge had the power to 
intervene on behalf of children placed under the waiting zone regime. Gérard deplores 
that the children’s judge’s jurisdiction over the waiting zone is neither in the culture 
nor in most people’s psyche –including that of the children’s judges’-. Children’s 
judges are reluctant to intervene in such cases. Gérard recounts:  
As soon as we had the opportunity we went before the Final court of appeals, 
thinking that it could establish the principle. At the end the Final court of 
appeals confirmed the principle that had been chosen, in another case, by the 
Appeals court. But today in practice, the fact that judges are entitled to make 
these decisions is not in the culture, in people’s unconscious, including 
judges’. So, in spite of jurisprudence from the Final court of appeals it remains 
complicated (Interview, December 2013).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Minors are subject to the exact same legal regime as adults, except for their appointment of a legal 
guardian called “ad hoc administrator” (administrateur ad hoc). Under French law minors lack the 
capacity to represent themselves in legal proceedings. Therefore, the ad hoc administrator’s mission 
consists in assisting the child during his or her detention in the waiting zone and in ensuring the child’s 
legal representation in all administrative and judicial procedures pertaining to his or her detention (law 
n°2002-305, 2002, article 17). Cf chapter 6 and 4 for an extended discussion of the role of ad hoc 
administrators. 	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Organizations advocating on behalf of unaccompanied minors in waiting zones have 
to constantly reiterate that the children’s judge had indeed jurisdiction.  
 
III. The waiting zone: the heir of the international zone 
Beyond court judgments, it appears that stakeholders are still unsure as to 
whether CDG airport’s waiting zone is (fully) part of French territory. Actors working 
in and on CDG’s waiting zone have confessed their ignorance regarding the status of 
waiting zones. Some of them carry the deeply ingrained idea that individuals detained 
at the legal border find themselves somehow physically outside of the country, in an 
excised space, justifying a less favorable treatment. Generally, the waiting zones’ 
status remains a vexed issue that triggers negative emotional responses on the part of 
most interview participants who belong to different professions. After a few 
interviews, I quickly realized that the question “Is the waiting zone French territory?” 
was emotionally charged, and found it was better to ask it when nearing completion of 
the interview, after rapport had been established and in order not to jeopardize the rest 
of the interview.  
For example, I asked Jacques, an inspector of places of deprivation of liberty, 
the following question: “Are you on French territory when you visit CDG’s waiting 
zone”? Jacques first answered: “This is a good question. When I visit I am not on 
French territory, but you need to ask the question to a lawyer”. When I insisted that I 
valued his perspective, Jacques became wary: “I may say something stupid, I do not 
know and I do not care. Why do you ask me this question?” After I quoted the Amuur 
vs France ruling, Jacques was openly annoyed: “I am not able to answer you because 
I do not know and I can say that I am not interested. It does not matter to me whether 
or not I am in the international zone when I visit, I do not know and I do not care: not 
only does the law authorize me, it instructs me to go there. What is the status of this 
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zone? I do not know and I do not care” (Interview with Jacques, August 2013). 
Jacques’ answer is interesting on two accounts: to him there is no doubt that the 
international zone is not France, as he equals being located in the international zone 
with being outside of France. Secondly, it illustrates that one can write detailed 
reports on the enjoyment of human rights in the waiting zone without having a clear 
idea of its status.  
Why is the status of waiting zones so unclear? Why do some consider waiting 
zones excised space? I would like to offer two hypotheses. First, years after the 
Amuur v. France ruling, those working in and on CDG’s waiting zone still held the 
view that the geographical area of the international zone (i.e. the zone between the 
runaway and first border checks) was somehow located outside of France. Second, the 
different stakeholders confuse the international zone and the waiting zone, and 
therefore envision the waiting zone as excised space. This confusion probably 
originates in the definition of the waiting zone itself. Initially, when the Law on the 
Waiting Zone was first passed in July 1992, it read that the waiting zone “runs 
between the points of embarkation and disembarkation to the border checkpoints”, 
therefore covering the area of the “international zone”. The law also specified that the 
waiting zone could include nearby hotel-like accommodations. The geographical 
space of the waiting zone therefore mapped onto that of the international zone and 
onto what the government construed as its extension, i.e. hotels close by. Why, then, 
would not the waiting zone inherit from the issues attached to international zones? As 
previously explained, the perimeter of the waiting zone is now larger than that of the 
international zone, as it also encompasses any place where the person goes for 
administrative or medical reasons. One can also be located in the international zone 
without being assigned the waiting zone regime (cf chapter 5). Interviews with 
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relevant actors indicate that the issues associated with Paris’ airports’ international 
zones in the 1980s and early 1990s have been passed onto waiting zones.  
In response to the question: “Is the waiting zone French territory?” Jeanne, a 
civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior’s department tasked with reviewing 
asylum-seekers’ requests to enter France, forcefully replied: “I think you know the 
answer? It is an international zone”. I explained I was interested in her opinion as 
rulings from the Court of Appeals and the Final Courts of Appeals reiterated that the 
waiting zone was de facto French territory. Jeanne disagreed: “Not at all, it is not (de 
facto French territory). For us (at the Ministry of the Interior) it is not; if we start to 
say it is, it would mean that they have entered France. It is really an international 
zone, a bubble” (Interview, November 19, 2013). Dominique, a high-ranking border 
police manager at CDG, explains that individuals turned away at terminals are 
brought to the detention center through the runways so that they do not enter the 
country (Interview, September 2013). This way, Dominique argues, when the person 
is brought to the detention center, he or she remains in the international zone. 
Dominique therefore believes that airport compounds are not French territory, and 
that using the regular roads connecting terminals to detention center would be 
tantamount to entering the country.  
Interestingly, some stakeholders have declared that the waiting zone was non-
French territory for both non-citizens and those working there. Conversations with 
two former Red Cross employees who had accumulated significant experience in 
CDG’s waiting zone proved illuminating. The Red Cross has been offering 
humanitarian support to detainees in CDG’s waiting zone since 2003, after signing a 
first convention with the Ministry of the Interior on October 6, 2003. Red Cross 
employees, called “mediators” spend an important amount of time in ZAPI 3, in direct 
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contact with both authorities and detainees (cf chapter 6). Laura, a former mediator, 
explains that the waiting zone is located in the international zone. According to her, 
neither non-citizens nor Red Cross employees are on French territory when situated in 
ZAPI 3 (Interview, 2013). Paul, also a former mediator in CDG’s waiting zone, tells a 
revealing anecdote transpiring around the time when the smoke-free policy was first 
implemented in public spaces (i.e. February 200726). Before the policy was enforced, 
it was possible to smoke in one of the detention center’s TV rooms. From February 
2007 Red Cross employees were instructed to inform smokers that cigarette 
consumption was no longer permitted within the perimeter of the waiting zone. 
However, some border policemen resisted, claiming the policy could not apply in, 
what they argued, was not French territory: “We are not in France, so why enforce the 
law?” (Interview, August 2013).  
The terms “international zone” and “waiting zone” are even used 
interchangeably by legal practitioners. For example, Clémence and Frédéric, who 
both represent non-citizens in court proceedings, use the word “international zone” to 
mean “waiting zone”  (interviews, respectively December 2013 and October 2013). 
While observing court hearings at Bobigny, I also noted that a liberty and custody 
judge used the term “international zone” to refer to the waiting zone (field notes, 
November 2013). The choice of this term is not innocent. As Bauder (2013, 2) 
contends, “language matters in public discourse and everyday exchange: terminology 
can imply causality, generate emotional responses and transmit symbolic meanings”. 
He concurs with Barnett and Duvall (2005) who, in their analysis of productive 
power, note that discourse produces subjects with associated rights and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Cf Decree n°2006-1386 of November 15, 2006. Available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000818309&categorieLien=id 
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responsibilities. Such classification has material consequences for people on the 
ground. For example, assignment to the categories of “civilian” or “combatant” 
translates into differential protection under international humanitarian law (Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005). The adjective “international” both reflects the various 
stakeholders’ perspective on the waiting zone and plays a role in the constitution of 
extra-territorial subjects: it triggers the idea that non-citizens do not share the same 
space as citizens. This logic legitimates granting them differentiated and watered-
down rights compared to the rights granted to those who are similarly categorized (as 
illegal migrants, asylum-seekers and unaccompanied minors) but who, like citizens, 
are located on French territory.  
	  
Conclusion  
In summary, the initial extra-territorial fiction still very much informs 
stakeholders’ understanding of the waiting zone. The government’s initial attempt to 
establish the international zone as an excised geographical space for some populations 
had far-reaching consequences that are still felt today. The geographical dimension of 
exclusion has endured as the issues attached to international zones were passed onto 
waiting zones. In the following chapter, I will demonstrate that the Law on the 
Waiting Zone established another layer of exclusion by creating a “legal space” of 
lesser rights through the “legal entry doctrine” (Basaran, 2011, 49 and 65).  
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Chapter 4. The Law on the Waiting Zone: The reinvention of 
exclusion through extra-territoriality  
 
Introduction  
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, in the collective imagination of 
waiting zone practitioners, this space is not French territory (at least) for non-citizen 
populations. Non-citizens have been excluded from rights on this basis. I will now 
argue that the Law on the Waiting Zone has reinvented exclusion through another 
form of extra-territoriality, premised on the non-citizen’s legal status at the border. 
Although physically in France, rejected non-citizens and asylum-seekers at the border 
are not present from a legal standpoint, for they have not yet been legally admitted to 
the country. My findings concur with the Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe’s observations. During his visit to France in 2005 he remarked that 
border police at CDG airport still considered waiting zones as not belonging to French 
territory, and that a separate set of laws applied to people in waiting zones:  
The first thing that struck me when I visited the Arenc and Roissy waiting 
zones was their status, as the authorities seemed to take the view that they 
were not part of French territory. Yet, in so far as I could make out, these 
zones are physically located in France and not floating somewhere in outer 
space. Furthermore, there are a number of laws which relate specifically to 
such zones and establish separate rules for them and so French law should 
apply to them. Yet, according to the officials I talked to, this was not so – a 
circumstance which gives these zones an uncertain legal status which should 
be remedied as soon as possible so as to dispel the legal ambiguity with which 
they are surrounded. (Gil-Robles, 2006, §187.) 
 
The French government brushed aside the Commissioner’s remarks, 
highlighting the creation of a new “accommodation center” at CDG in 2001 and the 
resulting improvement in material conditions. Before the opening of a detention 
center specifically designed to house them, non-admitted citizens and asylum-seekers 
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arriving at Charles de Gaulle were detained in nearby hotels in rooms specifically 
earmarked for this purpose, with sealed windows and cleanliness issues27. The 
government also pointed out that French law applied to the waiting zone, which was a 
“clear legal concept”. It did not acknowledge that the Law on the Waiting Zone had 
established a discriminatory and less protective framework (French government 
response, appendix, §187-203). Finally, the government also insisted on the rights 
granted to those placed in waiting zones which included: the right to be assisted by an 
interpreter and by a doctor; the right to communicate with a legal counsel or any 
person of one’s choosing; the right to be notified of one’s rights in a language that one 
understands, and a maximum length of detention of 20 days following judicial review 
after four days of confinement. 
In this chapter, I will show that the Law on the Waiting Zone excludes 
particularly vulnerable groups from the protection they are entitled to under 
international law. I will also situate the Law on the Waiting Zone within the global 
landscape of legal maneuvers deployed to control migrants and asylum-seekers’ 
arrivals. Finally, I will unveil stakeholders’ perspective on the waiting zone 
framework, demonstrating that to most actors working in or on CDG’s waiting zone, 
border control takes precedence over rights.  
 
I.  The Law on the Waiting Zone: an exclusionary framework forced upon the 
most vulnerable.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For a description of the conditions of detention in hotel rooms located nearby CDG airport (and 
construed as an extension of the international zone), see Olivier Clochard’s thesis, entitled « Le jeu des 
frontières dans l’accès au statut de réfugié, une géographie des politiques européennes d’asile et 
d’immigration » [Border games in the access to refugee status, a geography of European policies of 
asylum and immigration], 2007, p. 202.  
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When the Law on the Waiting Zone came into force in July 1992, the overt 
mechanisms of exclusion shifted in the sense that the law itself (and not the absence 
thereof) created a less protective regime than that applicable to the same groups 
already deemed on French territory. Exclusion, in other words, was reinvented: 
instead of individuals being placed outside of the law, the law itself organized 
exclusion. The waiting zone’s exclusionary legal framework builds on the premise 
that groups at the border find themselves from a legal standpoint at the threshold of, 
but not yet having entered French sovereign territory. Volpp (2012, 1-2), writing 
about the law of immigration, remarks: “Whether formal legal doctrine recognizes a 
human body as inside or outside a nation’s territory is deeply consequential.” She 
notes that physical entry can have various meanings: 
Immigration doctrine does not treat everyone inside (or outside) the same way. 
“Being here” can mean many different things, depending upon the initial 
conditions of a person’s presence inside. The same empirical fact – the 
physical presence of a human body – can be alternatively understood as an 
entitlement, if the person is a citizen; as a matter of hospitality, if the person is 
a legal permanent resident, a lawful temporary visitor, or a refugee; as a 
trespass, if the person is an undocumented immigrant; or as a nullity, if the 
person is a “parolee,” meaning that the person is physically here but is not 
recognized as having effected an entry. Thus, we can say that physical 
presence inside the territory is polysemic, in that it does not have the same 
meaning for everyone (Volpp, 2012, 1-2).  
 
Her observations shed light on the specific “legal space” (Basaran 2011, 50) 
applicable to those confined under the waiting zone regime. Although individuals 
placed under the waiting zone framework are physically present within the state, they 
are not present from a legal standpoint, for they have not yet crossed the state’s legal 
borders. Non-citizens at the legal gate receive less favorable treatment as compared to 
the same groups (i.e. illegal migrants, asylum-seekers and unaccompanied minors-
these categories not being mutually exclusive) who are deemed to have entered 
French territory. The concept of legal space makes it possible for individuals sharing 
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the same geographical space to have entirely different sets of rights stemming from 
their different legal statuses. It contradicts Bosniak’s (2007) notion of “ethical 
territoriality”, according to which individuals should be granted the same rights by 
virtue of being located on the same geographical territory of a national state.  
In the 1980s, exclusion started from the moment the non-citizen set foot in the 
geographical location of airports’ international zones. Exclusion was triggered by 
geography and legal absence. Today, under the Law on the Waiting Zone, exclusion 
is triggered by a combination of geography and law: an individual is placed under the 
waiting zone framework when arriving in the border’s physical location and when he 
or she is either refused entry or registered as an asylum-seeker. As will be explained 
in the next chapter (5), some non-citizens in the international zone never reach the 
waiting zone framework. Presence in territorial border zones alone is insufficient to 
trigger the waiting zone regime.  
As Basaran (2011, 55) points out, “the law on the waiting zone equips 
detainees with some fundamental rights, but these rights are limited when compared 
to the ordinary French legal regime”. Two groups particularly suffer from the eroded 
rights attached to the waiting zone status: asylum-seekers and minors (especially 
when unaccompanied). The waiting zone regime has dramatic consequences for these 
groups that are granted specific rights under international human rights and refugee 
law on account of their particular vulnerability. 
 
 
A. Asylum-seekers  
Asylum-claimants in waiting zones cannot yet apply for refugee status: they 
first have to be legally admitted to the country. In waiting zones, their requests are not 
examined on their merits. Instead, they are evaluated against the “manifestly 
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unfounded” yardstick over an interview carried out by refugee agency’s employees28. 
Since the law of July 29, 2015, asylum-seekers may also be admitted to the territory 
when deemed particularly vulnerable by the refugee agency. CESEDA’s legal 
provision L.221-1 reads: 
When OFPRA … considers that the asylum-seeker, due to his or her minority 
or to having been the victim of torture, rape or another serious form of sexual, 
psychological or physical violence, needs particular procedural guarantees that 
are not compatible with holding in the waiting zone, this holding is put to an 
end. 
 
When they do not fall within the purview of article L.221-1, unaccompanied minors 
seeking asylum still have to pass the “manifestly unfounded test”, save but for a very 
few cases (cf section C). It would be interesting to know how many claimants have 
been admitted to territory under this article since the new law came into force. This 
legal provision did not apply at the time of research.  
As Basaran (2011) notes, the refugee agency (OFPRA) only has an advisory 
function, the final decision being left to the Ministry of the Interior’s department of 
asylum at the border. In practice, the Ministry of the Interior follows OFPRA’s 
advisory opinion almost 100 percent of the time. Jeanne, from the Ministry of the 
Interior’s department of asylum at the border, has been reviewing OFPRA’s opinions 
since 2008. Since she entered the department, the Ministry of the Interior rejected 
OFPRA’s recommendations only twice (Interview, November 2013). However, from 
a symbolic standpoint this organization is not neutral: it signals that the Ministry of 
the Interior (whose agenda regarding border control necessarily differs from that of 
the refugee agency) ultimately decides who can enter France to claim asylum, not the 
refugee agency. As the Ministry of the Interior decides whether an asylum-claimant 
should be admitted to France, the issue of asylum is subjected to border control. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 For a discussion of the origins of the term “manifestly unfounded” cf chapter 1.  
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Jeanne insists that I should not use the expression “asylum procedure at the border”. 
She explains: “These are not asylum claims at the border, but entry procedures to the 
territory on asylum grounds. It is very important to have this definition, as those 
allowed to enter the territory will not have obtained any status. They will still have to 
apply. It is really a request to enter the territory, a police procedure” (Interview, 
November 2013).  
The waiting zone therefore functions as a buffer zone where asylum-seekers 
are filtered, in order to keep those deemed undesirable at bay. Only a fraction of 
asylum-seekers gain access to the actual refugee determination procedures. Those 
who successfully pass the waiting zone barrier are granted leave to enter France on 
asylum grounds and have eight days to file a claim. Once they enter the regular 
refugee determination system the Ministry of the Interior has no more say regarding 
their claim: the decision to grant protection lies entirely with OFPRA in the first 
instance and with the National Court of Asylum if necessary (CNDA-an 
administrative court adjudicating appeals against OFPRA’s decisions). In 2011 
OFPRA reviewed the cases of 1857 claimants (for all waiting zones) and 
recommended that 188 be admitted to the territory: about 10 percent of claimants got 
access to regular refugee determination procedures (OFPRA, April 11, 2012). In 
2012, this number was 13.1 percent and 18.5 percent for unaccompanied minors 
specifically (OFPRA, April 24, 2013). In this regard, waiting zones should be 
understood as part of many areas flourishing at the margins of the European territory 
that treat human beings like waste to be sorted, stored and thrown away (Caloz-
Tschopp, 2004). Actors working in and on the waiting zone use the disposal 
vocabulary; for example, a lawyer representing the border police at the Bobigny court 
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of first instance did not hesitate to claim: “France is not the garbage can of Europe” 
(field notes, October 2013). 	  
At the time of research, the law did not define what constituted a “manifestly 
unfounded” asylum claim. In 2000, the administrative court of Paris had noted that a 
claim was manifestly unfounded when “it is manifestly unlikely to fit the criteria set 
out by the Geneva Convention of July 28 1951 or other criteria justifying the granting 
of asylum” (Anafé, January 2013, 53). In theory, OFPRA agents were not supposed to 
go into details: they just needed to rule out individuals seeking to enter France for 
work, study or tourism. However, scholars and activists had documented just the 
opposite (Clochard et al, 2003; Anafé, December 2012). Basaran writes: “In reality, 
however, it has become a predetermination procedure for refugee status, including an 
analysis of refugee narratives, their truth content and their provenance from safe 
countries” (2011, 56-57). OFPRA agents at Charles de Gaulle admitted that they 
considered asylum claims to be manifestly unfounded in the following situations: 
when they had nothing to do with asylum but also when they relied upon deliberate 
fraud (for example a Lebanese national claiming to be Syrian), when the discourse 
was not “personalized” (i.e. when the claimant fails to demonstrate that he or she is 
the specific target of persecution-escaping war is not enough) or when the discourse 
was incoherent or too vague (Interview, November 2013) 29.  
Since July 29, 2015, the law defines what constitutes a “manifestly unfounded 
claim”. Provision L. 213-8-1 reads: “A claim that is manifestly unfounded is a claim 
that, considering declarations made by the foreign national and documents produced 
when applicable, is manifestly devoid of relevance regarding conditions under which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 OFPRA agents reviewing asylum claims at the border are based at Charles de Gaulle’s detention 
center. They review the cases of asylum-seekers placed under the waiting zone regime at Charles de 
Gaulle but also anywhere in the country (in which case the interview takes place over the phone) Cf 
chapter 6.  
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asylum is granted or manifestly devoid of credibility regarding risk of persecutions or 
severe violations.” The law now explicitly states that asylum-seekers’ stories are 
assessed on their content at the border. It means that a claimant is expected to provide 
a detailed and coherent account of the persecutions that he or she experienced. Yet, 
someone who just travelled a great distance after surviving difficult events is not in 
the best conditions to narrate his or her story. While claimants on the right side of the 
legal border can rely on several NGOs to help prepare their application, those in 
waiting zones do not have access to the same services, due to the scarce NGO 
presence and urgency that prevails in these spaces (cf chapter 6). The Law on the 
Waiting Zone established a dual set of rights: one for the border and one for what is 
considered to be the territory. One has to exit the waiting zone regime to access the 
normal rights regime (Basaran, 2011). I will now compare the legal regime and 
policies applicable to minors (accompanied and unaccompanied) in waiting zones 
with those applicable in the rest of the territory. 
 
B. Accompanied children in the waiting zones  
Numerous bodies monitoring human rights treaties have stressed that states’ 
obligations apply to all individuals subject to their jurisdiction. For example, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child issued the following comment (Report, 
A/61/41, 2006, 19-20):  
State obligations under the Convention apply to each child within the State’s 
territory and to all children subject to its jurisdiction (art. 2).  These State 
obligations cannot be arbitrarily and unilaterally curtailed either by excluding 
zones or areas from a State’s territory or by defining particular zones or areas 
as not, or only partly, under the jurisdiction of the State.  Moreover, State 
obligations under the Convention apply within the borders of a State, 
including with respect to those children who come under the State’s 
jurisdiction while attempting to enter the country’s territory.  
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Yet, children and their families awaiting deportation from France for lack of 
residence permit receive more favorable treatment than those awaiting return in 
waiting zones30. The former are not routinely detained pending their deportation, 
contrary to the latter. The government’s willingness to respect its international and 
regional obligations under international law does not extend to individuals placed 
under the waiting zone regime. An internal policy brief from the Ministry of the 
Interior dated July 2, 2012 (“Circulaire Valls”) instructs local administrative 
authorities to ensure that families with minors to be deported from France be 
circumscribed at home (or in a hotel if they do not have a “stable and decent home”) 
rather than be placed in administrative detention facilities31. Families under 
compulsory residence orders have to abide by certain rules, such as checking in from 
time to time at the closest police station or handing in their identity and travel 
documents32. Overall this represents a significant shift in deportation policies. The 
brief specifically refers to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to its core 
“best interest of the child” principle as the rationale for such a change. Under the 
brief, the detention of families with children under eighteen years of age is still 
possible but constitutes the exception rather than the rule. Detention will happen if the 
family fails to comply with the deportation order, i.e. in case of the escape of one or 
several family members, in case of refusal to board the plane or in case of failure to 
comply with the rules pertaining to compulsory residence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The French legal term “éloignement” is translated as “deportation”. It refers to the removal of 
individuals residing illegally on French territory. It is used by opposition to the French word “retour” 
or “réacheminement” (“return” in English), which refers to the removal of individuals who, although 
physically present on French territory, have not crossed yet French legal borders.  
31 The French term “circulaire” is translated as “internal policy brief”.  
32 The French term ”assignation à residence” is translated as “compulsory residence order” (which is 
the term used in the European Court of Human Rights’ Popov v. France judgment). 	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The brief also speaks of the necessity to comply with the European Court of 
Human Rights Popov v. France judgment (January 19, 2012). In Popov, the Court had 
ruled that France had breached article 3 prohibiting inhuman or degrading treatment 
by detaining children (aged five months and three years) with their parents in an 
administrative detention center in unsuitable conditions. The applicants, a Kazakh 
family, had been arrested at their house in August 2007 after the rejection of both 
their asylum claim and application for residence permits. They then had been taken to 
CDG airport to be deported to Kazakhstan. However, with their flight having been 
cancelled, they had been transferred to a detention center in Rouen-Oissel. The Court 
found that the detention conditions of the children at the facility had amounted to a 
violation of article 3: although the center was authorized to accommodate families it 
did not offer play areas or activities for children. The beds with sharp metal corners 
and automatic bedroom doors were dangerous for children.  
The Court referred to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
findings (Gil-Robles, 2006): detaining children in administrative facilities with their 
parents was contrary to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. During his visit to 
France from September 5 to September 21, the Commissioner had noted: “Very few 
centres are equipped to receive them. In any event, no children should be detained on 
the grounds that their parents do not have the necessary papers to remain in France, in 
places marked by overcrowding, dilapidation, promiscuity and very strong tensions” 
(Gil-Robles, 2006, § 257). The Commissioner had remarked that, although French 
law provided an alternative to detention in the form of compulsory residence orders, 
those were rarely used. The Court observed: “[…] it is important to bear in mind that 
the child’s extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over 
considerations relating to the status of illegal immigrant” (§91, emphasis added). It 
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found that the Rouen-Oissel facility was not adapted to the children’s age. Moreover, 
although the length of detention (15 days) was not excessive per se, the children could 
have perceived it as never-ending. In Popov the Court did not go as far as 
condemning the detention of children in and of itself. Only the length of their 
detention and conditions of confinement were found illegal. As for the parents, the 
Court found that their detention conditions did not amount to a violation of article 3 
since they had not been separated from their children.  
Whether the brief from the Ministry of the Interior has been really 
implemented is another issue, but on principle this constitutes a significant shift in 
deportation policies33. It originates in a promise François Hollande, then Socialist 
candidate running for president, had made to NGOs to abolish the detention of 
families with children under eighteen in administrative facilities (Le Monde, March 
14, 2012) pending their deportation from French territory34.  
The commitment to end the detention of children for immigration regulation 
purposes does not extend to minors placed under the waiting zone regime. Anafé 
employees, Lise and Anne raised the issue with the Ministry of the Interior, 
denouncing blatant discrimination between the waiting zone and the rest of the 
territory. To justify this difference of treatment, the Ministry of the Interior argued the 
waiting zone was not French territory, but the external border (Interview, December 
2013). Again, the argument that waiting zones are excised territory was deployed.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Children are still detained pending their deportation from France (Cf Journal du droit des jeunes, 
2015).   
34 The letter is available on the website of the NGO France Terre d’Asile : http://www.france-terre-
asile.org/toute-lactualite-choisie/item/6963-francois-hollande-repond-aux-propositions-de-france-terre-
dasile Accessed April 26, 2015.  
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C. Unaccompanied children in the waiting zones 
Not only are children traveling with their families locked up in waiting zones, 
but so too are all unaccompanied minors who are not asylum-claimants. Who falls 
under the status of “unaccompanied minor”? According to Anafé (January 2013), the 
border police consider a person under the age of eighteen to be unaccompanied when 
he or she arrives alone at the border. Interviews with different actors (judges, not-for 
profit employees and volunteers, lawyers, border police agents), visits at CDG and 
observations of court hearings revealed that minors placed under the waiting zone 
legal regime have many different motivations for travelling alone to France, where 
they may or may not have family. It is hard to categorize unaccompanied minors 
according to their travel motives, as individuals do not fit into clear-cut categories and 
may be unwilling to disclose their reasons for travelling.35 Categorization also masks 
individuality and personal stories.  
Keeping this caveat in mind, I will quickly explore their rationales for 
travelling. Some travel with the intent of doing some sightseeing but others encounter 
themselves in far more precarious situations: some flee war, persecution, abuse or 
poverty in their country of origin, some are brought in by parents who reside legally 
in France but could not secure the authorization to bring their child via legal routes. 
Some do not enlist the assistance of other parties to travel while others are smuggled. 
Finally, some are trafficked for various exploitative purposes (such as prostitution or 
forced labor). Asylum claimants at the border do not represent the majority of 
unaccompanied minors. For example, in 2011, only 8.53 percent of unaccompanied 
minors at French borders claimed asylum (i.e. in all waiting zones). This number was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Cf French Red Cross, January 2013, “Bilan d’activité, mineurs isolés étrangers, 2011”, p. 10	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19.74 percent for 2012, 12.96 percent for 2013 and 17.34 percent for 201436. As only 
those seeking asylum may be admitted into the territory (under very limited 
circumstances), in practice the law provides for the detention of most unaccompanied 
minors. As for asylum claimants, the law allows for their detention in many cases.  
The Law of July 29, 2015 is written in such a way so as to suggest that the 
detention of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in the waiting zone is the 
exception, not the rule (CESEDA, 2016, L. 221-1). While the law implies that most 
unaccompanied minors will be admitted into the territory when they are in search of 
international protection, it makes it possible for them to remain in the waiting zone 
under many circumstances. Unaccompanied children may still have to pass the 
“manifestly unfounded” test if they come from countries that are deemed safe by the 
refugee agency or if they presented false identity or travel documents37. Their claims 
may also be assessed against the “manifestly unfounded” yardstick if they provided 
false information or hid information or documents regarding their identity, citizenship 
or conditions of entry to the country or introduced several asylum claims under 
different identities (CESEDA, 2016, articles L.723-2). As Anafé pointed out, these 
grounds for detention are very broad and not well defined, giving significant margin 
of maneuver to OFPRA (Anafé, October 21, 2014). Gérard, ad hoc administrator at 
the Red Cross, explains that many unaccompanied children, in an attempt to protect 
themselves, do not tell their true stories to ad hoc administrators, let alone to refugee 
agency employees: “It is true that a certain number of minors who are brought in by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36I obtained these statistics by computing numbers provided by OFPRA and by Anafé. In 2011, 516 
unaccompanied minors were detained in all waiting zones. Of this number, 44 applied for leave to enter 
French territory on asylum grounds (Anafé 2015, 28 and OFPRA 2012, 34). In 2012, they were 416 
unaccompanied minors and 81 claimants (Anafé 2015, 28 and OFPRA 2013, 67). In 2013 and 2014, 
the numbers were respectively 49 claimants out of 378 minors (Anafé 2015, 28 and OFPRA 2014, 69) 
and 45 claimants out of 259 minors (Anafé 2015, 28 and OFPRA 2015, 65).  
37 As of October 2015, the refugee agency had decided that 16 countries were safe (OFPRA, October 
17, 2015).  
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networks come with stereotyped stories, not only with respect to asylum, but about 
the entirety of their lives, and so they have a sort of armour that even we do not 
manage to break” (Interview, December 2013) 38. Do OFPRA agents let minors enter 
the territory to claim asylum when they sense that they are hiding behind fabricated 
stories? Again it will be interesting to study how the Law of July 29, 2015 has been 
translated into practice. The OFPRA report for the year 2015 did not state how many 
unaccompanied minors (or asylum claimants in general) had been released from the 
waiting zone on the basis of the new law (OFPRA, May 13, 2016).  
At the time of research, 500 unaccompanied children were detained in French 
waiting zones each year, contrary to unaccompanied minors who were already 
deemed present on French territory (Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2014). Systematic 
detention at the border is per se contrary to international law: it runs against the “best 
interest principle” (article 3) and article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) which clearly states that detention should only take place as a last resort 
and for the shortest amount of time possible. Section D of the Statement of Good 
Practice established by the Separated Children in Europe Programme39 also 
specifically reads: “They [separated children] must never be detained for reasons of 
immigration policy and practice” (2009). The Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights also specifies: “Members states should avoid holding unaccompanied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	   It is interesting to note that most actors (i.e. judges, border police officers, Red Cross employees, 
lawyers, inspectors of places of deprivation of liberty, etc) do not make the distinction between 
immigrant smuggling and trafficking rings. Instead they use the word réseau, which can literally be 
translated in English as “network”. In the debate surrounding the detention of unaccompanied minors 
in waiting zones, the term “network” mostly refers to trafficking enterprises.	  
39	  The Separated Children in Europe Programme is a consortium of international intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations.  The 2009 Statement of Good Practice reads: “The Separated Children 
in Europe Programme (SCEP) started as a joint initiative of some members of the International Save 
the Children	   Alliance and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It has 
grown and evolved and is now comprised of many non-governmental partners throughout Europe who 
continue to work closely with UNHCR”.	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minors, pregnant women, mothers with young children, the elderly and people with 
disabilities in waiting areas” (Gil-Robles, 2001, point 6).   
At CDG, a separated detention area specifically dedicated to unaccompanied 
minors opened in July 2011 (hereafter the “minor area”). Yet, conditions of detention 
sometimes run against international standards as the said area has limited capacity: it 
can only host six children at a time (it has three bedrooms, each containing two beds). 
Whenever the number of unaccompanied minors exceeds this capacity, those who are 
above 13 will be held in the regular part of the center, with unknown adults, in 
violation of article 37 (c) of the CRC Convention. Children above 13 will also be 
detained with adults should the number of unaccompanied male and female be uneven 
(as boys and girls do not share bedrooms).  
At CDG, unaccompanied children placed under the waiting zone regime have 
always been confined in different places according to their age. Before the dedicated 
space of detention opened, those under 13 were placed in nearby hotels under the 
supervision of Air France hostesses. Those older than 13 were detained at CDG’s 
detention center (ZAPI 3) with adults. Laura, a former Red Cross mediator, narrates 
that when the minor area first opened, the border police considered that only those 
under 13 could be hosted there. The Red Cross obtained that, space allowing, children 
older than 13 also benefit from the structure (Interview, August 2013).  
Authorities seem to believe that separating minors from adults does not 
constitute a legal requirement but a favor. Dominique, a high-ranking border police 
agent, insists that having a specific area for minors is not an obligation. Furthermore, 
he does not seem to pay much attention to the fact that, under French law and the 
Children Rights Convention, every person under 18 is a child. Dominique minimizes 
the issue of detention with adults: “If the person is 17 –almost an adult- it is less of a 
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problem to detain him or her with adults, especially considering that in some 
countries they attained majority a long time ago.” The law can be dispensed with. 
According to him, the minor area “in principle preferably hosts minors who are under 
13” (Interview, October 2013).  
Beyond the issues of illegal deprivation of liberty and detention conditions, 
confinement in the waiting zone can have dramatic consequences for minors who 
arrive at the border on their own. Contrary to minors already deemed in France, those 
in waiting zones may potentially be returned at any time (save during the assessment 
of their application to enter France to seek asylum). They are indeed subject to the 
exact same legal regime as adults, except for the appointment of a legal guardian 
called “ad hoc administrator”(administrateur ad hoc). Under French law minors lack 
the capacity to represent themselves in legal proceedings. Therefore, the ad hoc 
administrator’s mission consists in assisting the child during his or her detention in 
the waiting zone and in ensuring the child’s legal representation in all administrative 
and judiciary proceedings pertaining to his or her detention (law n°2002-305, 2002, 
article 17)40. Ad hoc administrators are based in two organizations: the Red Cross and 
Famille Assistance (which can roughly be translated as “Family Aid”), a not-for-
profit organization. Gérard has been serving as ad hoc administrator since the mission 
was created in 2005. According to Gérard, the return of minors held at Charles de 
Gaulle’s waiting zone constitutes one of the three challenges that his organization has 
to tackle (Interview, December 2013). Gérard recalls that when he first started, almost 
three quarters of unaccompanied minors were sent back. Over the years this number 
has diminished dramatically, but return still takes place occasionally. In January 2014, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In French, article 17 reads: “L'administrateur ad hoc assiste le mineur durant son maintien en zone 
d'attente et assure sa représentation dans toutes les procédures administratives et juridictionnelles 
relatives à ce maintien”. 	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Sylvie, mediator in the minor zone, told us that four or five forced returns had taken 
place over the last two months41. Gérard explains: 	  
When returns do take place it is always in bad conditions. The bad conditions 
are that the return goes against what we identified to be the best interest of the 
child. It takes place in situations where the youth declares not having parents, 
no family, or to be running from a mistreating family in countries that lack 
proper childcare structure, in situations where the minor is particularly fragile 
(…) (Interview, December 2013).   	  
Unaccompanied minors seeking asylum face all of the hurdles and diminished 
guarantees that come with the waiting zone framework. They, just like adults, must 
prove that their claims are not “manifestly unfounded”, only to be granted the 
subsequent right to apply for asylum once on the right side of the legal border. An 
interview with refugee agency agents at CDG confirmed that the asylum screening 
process at the border is absolutely the same for unaccompanied children (interview, 
November 2013). Gérard explains that those applying for leave to enter France to 
seek asylum very rarely obtain such permission (Interview, December 2013). In 2012, 
OFPRA considered that 18,5 percent of unaccompanied minors’ requests were not 
manifestly unfounded (OFPRA, April 24, 2013).  
Martini (2004, 31) summarizes well the situation of unaccompanied minors 
placed under the waiting zone regime:  
Deprived of liberty, sometimes the victim of violence, returned forcefully to 
countries where his or her security is not guaranteed, the minor held in the 
waiting zone is an undesirable being to be jettisoned. Once past the imaginary 
line that separates the waiting zone from the rest of French territory, he or she 
theoretically, is worthy of all attentions (translation from French is mine).  
 
As soon as they cross the legal border, laws and policies prohibit both their detention 
and return and allow them to access ordinary asylum procedures.  
The Law on the Waiting Zone establishes a legal space of lesser rights. This 
exclusionary framework is premised on individuals being outside of the country from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 “Us” refers to Human Rights Watch researchers and me.	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a legal standpoint. The notion of extra-territoriality has been reinvented to curtail 
rights and diminish international obligations. Extra-territoriality is both the origin and 
the purpose of the waiting zone regime: individuals are assigned the waiting zone 
status for not yet being in France and precisely to control their access to and keep 
them outside of France. In the eyes of the state detainees in waiting zones are first and 
foremost individuals whose mobility needs to be controlled, not rights-holders. 
Revealingly, the function of ad hoc administrator was created to safeguard the state’s 
interests, not to protect unaccompanied children. As Martini (2004) explains, the 
number of unaccompanied minors started to soar in 1998. Liberty and custody judges 
therefore had to adjudicate numerous unaccompanied minors’ cases (according to the 
law detainees have to be presented to a judge after four days spent in waiting zones-
the judge can either prolong the detention or set the detainee free). Many judges 
decided to release the children from waiting zones on the basis that they lacked legal 
capacity to represent themselves and were not assigned a legal representative. Once 
liberated, children disappeared, becoming illegal migrants. In order to fight this 
jurisprudence, the government first attempted to grant legal capacity to minors above 
16. This would have infringed upon established principles of minor protection, and 
the government was confronted by hostile reactions. It finally decided that all 
unaccompanied minors in waiting zones should be assigned a legal representative. 
The function of ad hoc administrator in waiting zones was therefore invented to 
prevent judges from releasing children arriving alone at the border (Martini, 2004).  
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II. Actors’ perspective on the waiting zone framework: when border control 
takes precedence over rights 
 Following Agamben’s conceptualization of a “vanishing point” as “a hidden 
point of intersection between the juridical-political institutional and the bio-political 
models of power” (Gregory, 206), Gregory analyses the war prison (through a study 
of US Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq) as a 
“dispersed series of sites where sovereign power and bio-power coincide” (206).   
Drawing on Agamben (1998, 1999 and 2005) and Gregory’s work (2007), 
Mountz argues that nation states create “vanishing points” through geography to 
prevent and diminish asylum-seekers and migrants’ enjoyment of the rights attached 
to presence on sovereign territory. Vanishing points are “sites where national security 
is prioritised over human security and where the protection of human rights and 
human life disappear” (Mountz, 2013). Although the geographical moves described 
by Mountz take place offshore, she notes that the same mechanisms are at work on 
sovereign territory.  
Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone and the waiting zone legal framework in 
general are an example of such vanishing points on mainland territory. The previous 
section has demonstrated how, in the eyes of the state, the categorization of 
individuals in waiting zones as illegal migrants trumps their status of rights-holders. 
This translates into dramatic consequences for those entitled to specific protection 
under international human rights and refugee law on account of their particular 
vulnerability. Asylum-seekers and unaccompanied minors (sometimes also asylum-
claimants) are perceived and treated as economic migrants (and therefore as bogus 
applicants), undeserving of the guarantees applicable to their counterparts who have 
crossed the legal border.  
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Strikingly, even those entrusted with safeguarding the rights of individuals in 
Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone can embrace the state’s perspective according to 
which border control should take precedence over rights. The general inspector of 
places of deprivation of liberty (Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté) 
is an independent public body whose mission consists in controlling the conditions of 
management and transfer of people who are deprived of liberty in order to ensure 
their fundamental rights are upheld (Law of October 30, 2007)42. This public body 
came into being following France’s ratification of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. 21 inspectors assist the head of this monitoring body (called the “general 
inspector”). An interview with one of these inspectors (Jacques, August 2013) reveals 
that even those who are tasked with safeguarding the rights of detainees can endorse 
the state’s perspective.  
When asked whether there were vulnerable groups in the waiting zone, 
Jacques explained that during his visit to the CDG waiting zone (on January 27 and 
28, 2009) he met with Yin, a seventeen-year-old Chinese girl at the detention center. 
She told him (via an interpreter) that she had been smuggled to France after the death 
of her parents. The smuggler had taken the land she had inherited as payment for her 
passage.43 Jacques acknowledged that this situation was absolutely terrible in the 
sense that it was very difficult to determine the best course of action. Should Yin be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Law n° 2007-1545 of October 30, 2007. Article 1 reads: “Le Contrôleur général des lieux de 
privation de liberté, autorité indépendante, est chargé, sans préjudice des prérogatives que la loi 
attribue aux autorités judiciaires ou juridictionnelles, de contrôler les conditions de prise en charge et 
de transfèrement des personnes privées de liberté, afin de s'assurer du respect de leurs droits 
fondamentaux. Il exerce, aux mêmes fins, le contrôle de l'exécution par l'administration des mesures 
d'éloignement prononcées à l'encontre d'étrangers jusqu'à leur remise aux autorités de l'Etat de 
destination. Dans la limite de ses attributions, il ne reçoit instruction d'aucune autorité.”.  
43 The case of this young Chinese is briefly described in the 2009 report of the general inspector of 
places of deprivation of liberty (p. 58)  
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taken to a group home? In this case the smuggler would be happy, as she would have 
managed to cross the border: he would take it as a signal that more people should be 
sent and get rich as a result. Or should she be returned to China? But she had nothing 
left at home. Jacques’ dilemma was not framed in terms of determining the best 
course of action for the young Chinese but rather in terms of what was best for the 
control of borders. Yet, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which France is 
a Party, explicitly states:  “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by 
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration” 
(article 3). Furthermore, Article 20 of the same convention specifies that “A child 
temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose 
own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled 
to special protection and assistance provided by the State.” Instead of envisaging 
people in the waiting zone as right-holders, Jacques embraces the state’s perspective 
by being overly concerned with border control.  
Even George, an experienced ad hoc administrator who explicitly presents 
himself as an activist (“I am an activist”), observes that it is impossible to end the 
detention of unaccompanied minors at the borders as this would clearly constitute a 
“suction effect” (appel d’air): it would incite more people to come (Interview, 
October 2013) 44.  
Stakeholders whose task it is to assist and comfort detainees in the waiting 
zone in a spiritual or medical way appeared overly concerned with security and lacked 
empathy with detainees. Several places of worship and prayer for Christians, Jews 
and Muslims can be found on Charles de Gaulle airport’s compounds. Catholic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 When I say “at the borders”, I mean at the legal borders, not the cartographic borders.  
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priests, pastors, rabbis and imams are allowed to visit those placed in waiting zones 
should detainees expressly call for them. Such visits rarely take place, as detainees are 
often unaware of this possibility: the information is nowhere to be found in spaces of 
confinement. During data collection two Catholic priests were listed on the airport’s 
website45. One of them, Cédric, simply refused to talk to me: he was very angry and 
told me that “he knew people like me, who just want to sell their products and are not 
even thankful afterwards”. But the other one, Raphaël, agreed to a short phone 
interview.  
Raphaël explained that he had been to Charles de Gaulle’s detention center 
twice. He was first called by an Orthodox priest and then by a Catholic priest. Both 
were lacking one document to enter the country. He had the opportunity to talk with 
Red Cross agents and doctors working onsite and could visit the entire center. He was 
very suspicious of those in CDG’s waiting zone, denouncing individuals who “abuse 
the system”. For example, some detainees pretend to be sick. He noted that some 
priests might be frauds: sometimes there are “false priests” and “false nuns”. The 
border police must be careful, as nothing proves their identity: “In detention centers 
there are people of all kinds. There are people who may be terrorists or wanted by 
Interpol”. Raphaël remarked that CDG airport was a very sensitive zone: “Should the 
slightest problem arise, an entire plane crashes with many passengers onboard”. 
Raphaël did not find the detention of children problematic, explaining that ZAPI 3 
was well equipped to receive families: conditions are satisfactory (Interview, June 
2014).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 I also contacted a pastor who was willing to talk but could not provide me with information as he had 
not been called yet and therefore did not know waiting zone issues. Due to time constraints, I did not 
contact rabbis or imams.  
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During one visit to the detention center, I met Pierre, one of the doctors 
working onsite. He described the medical unit comprised of three doctors and three 
nurses, working in shifts. I asked Pierre: “What is the impact of detention on 
children?” Pierre did not answer my questions directly but observed that parents were 
to be blamed for putting their children through this: “They take their children all 
around the globe for 15 days, giving them anything to eat, not to mention the presence 
of fleas”. The parents made the decision to carry their children to the other end of the 
world. As far as unaccompanied minors are concerned, he wondered whether it was 
better for them to be hosted in hotels with nannies (i.e. before the minor area opened) 
or at ZAPI 3, in an area with toys. Clearly Pierre did not find the confinement of 
minors problematic. Pierre admitted: “As a clinician, I really do not care about the age 
(of detainees)”. I remarked that a different legal framework applied to children. Pierre 
insisted: “I do not care about the legal regime”. Once again, the law is something that 
can be dispensed with. As a doctor, Pierre sees minors under 13 every day and those 
older than 13 once during their stay at ZAPI 3. Even though he “agrees to check on 
the little ones”, he thinks that this policy has been established so as to please NGOs 
and the Ministry of the Interior. Generally, Pierre minimized detention, explaining 
that ZAPI 3 was “a hotel from which one cannot leave”. Like Raphaël, Pierre thinks 
many detainees are frauds. He explained: “Every time there is a conflict somewhere, 
people take advantage of it”. For example some claim they are Syrians but they are 
not. Pierre espouses the state’s perspective; in waiting zones people are first and 
foremost illegal migrants who seek to take advantage of the country. He added: “The 
majority of people come for economic reasons or to get cured here”. The legal 
technique of the waiting zone is not isolated. On the contrary, it is one of many 
maneuvers deployed globally to control migrants and asylum-seekers’ arrivals.  
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III. The Law on the Waiting Zone within the global landscape and perspectives 
on the concept of legal space 
The Law on the Waiting Zone resembles immigration practices and laws in 
other countries. Once the waiting zone regime is assigned to non-citizens, they carry it 
with them wherever they go, even when they leave the geographical space of the 
border. The waiting zone framework creates a particular legal space of lesser rights 
that always follows the individual, no matter his or her location. Practitioners explain 
that non-citizens carry the waiting zone status like a “backpack” or are in a waiting 
zone “bubble”. Christian, the lawyer aforementioned uses both terms (Interview, 
December 2013). This brings to mind the notion of the “personalized border” as 
defined by Weber (2006) in the context of her analysis of United Kingdom (UK) 
frontiers. As she observes, the new immigration rules that came into force in the UK 
in April 2000 changed the moment at which entry to UK territory is officially granted. 
Under the new rules, entry is officially granted when a consular official issues a visa 
overseas. This means that “British borders can be conceptualized as fragmented and 
fully portable, their location defined, not by sites of enforcement action by states 
officials but in terms of the current whereabouts of certain intending visitors” (Weber 
2006, 36). In both the UK and the French cases, the conception of borders has shifted 
from physical location to personal immigration status. Shachar’s findings, while 
describing United States’ immigration policies, illuminate the waiting zone 
legislation: “The border itself has become a moving barrier, a legal construct that is 
not tightly fixed to territorial benchmarks” (2007, 2).  
The Law on the Waiting Zone allows immigration authorities to tailor the 
border to their needs: as explained in chapter 2, ad hoc waiting zones can be created 
when a group of 10 non-citizens or more arrives in France outside of a border 
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crossing (for example on a beach). The non-citizens can all be found in one place or 
in different locations separated from one another by 10 km maximum. In this case the 
waiting zone will run between places where authorities have found the non-citizens 
and the closest border crossing: the perimeter of this area may be quite large.  
How do legal practitioners view ad hoc waiting zones? A former lawyer, 
Louise, who was serving as Senator at the time of the interview, described these 
waiting zones as “an aberration”. However, she did not find the practical 
consequences of such waiting zones to be dire: lawyers defending non-citizens know 
how to plead. She trusted them to draw the liberty and custody judge’s attention to 
any weakness or breach to the law (Interview, January 2014). As for Ségolène, a 
liberty and custody judge at Bobigny, she trusted judges to release individuals should 
there be any legal irregularity. She explained that she never had to deal with ad hoc 
waiting zones. She did not find the concept particularly shocking, as those placed 
under the waiting zone regime will always be presented to a judge after four days: 
they will be able to enforce their rights. She said: “It is true that it is a little disturbing 
that an administrative authority has the powers to extend the waiting zone to any 
place where individuals are found but the procedure still has to be respected” 
(Interview, November 2013). When I observed that it would be challenging for 
detainees to exercise their rights due to lack of access to legal aid, she agreed but, 
once again, highlighted immigration authorities’ responsibilities: they would have to 
respect detainees’ rights. Should these rights be violated, the judge would release 
individuals from the waiting zone (Interview, November 2013). I asked Léa, also a 
liberty and custody judge at Bobigny, whether the creation of ad hoc waiting zones 
should be controlled by the judiciary. She sighed: “What type of control would we 
have? What would we be good for? There is a tendency to put the judiciary at the 
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heart of everything. For me it is an immigration policy issue, an administrative 
problem, not a judiciary one…Immigration is a policy” (Interview, November 2013).  
France is not the only country where immigration authorities tailor the border 
to their needs. As Shachar observes, the US and other countries of immigration have 
managed to create “malleable borders”, i.e. borders that can be flexibly redrawn to 
keep at bay “unwanted untruders”. She writes (2007, 2):  
This redesign [of the border] has been accomplished by enforcing the 
sovereign prerogative to deny or permit access in a whole new way: by 
redrawing (indeed, redefining) the once fixed and static territorial border, 
transforming it into something more malleable and movable, which can be 
placed and replaced - by the words of law - in whatever location that best suits 
the goal of restricting access. 
 
With the Law on the Waiting Zone, French authorities can create legal spaces 
of lesser rights pretty much anywhere they see fit. This legal maneuver involves 
shifting “the border of immigration regulation” (Shachar, 2007) to circumvent 
granting some rights has been used by other states and may or may not be enshrined 
in the law. For example, Mountz (2010) documents how the Canadian government 
used the “long tunnel thesis” to claim that Chinese people (intercepted on four boats 
off the coast of British Columbia in 1999 and transported to Vancouver Island) had 
not reached Canadian soil yet, in spite of them being physically located on Canadian 
sovereign territory. The Canadian government used this trick to shape the migrants’ 
access to legal rights: their access to refugee lawyers was delayed on the basis that 
they were still walking through the tunnels of an international airport, not yet landed 
on Canadian territory.  
In the United States, the 1996 modification of the US Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) established the distinction between physical entry into the 
country and lawful admission at a recognized port of entry. The implications are far-
reaching for those whose presence is deemed unlawful: “In this way, entry into the 
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territory - the material act of crossing the geographical border and physically being 
present within the jurisdiction of the United States, does not equate with gaining 
immigration-related procedural protections that would apply to those who have been 
admitted” (Shachar, 2007, 4). Similarly, individuals are placed under the waiting zone 
regime because they have not been legally admitted.  
How do individuals subjected to the waiting zone framework comprehend 
their situation? Evidence suggests that the notion of legal space can be difficult to 
grasp for those detained in Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone. While visiting places of 
confinement in CDG terminal 2D in February, I met a family with two small children 
(aged one year and one month and three years) that had fled Syria. Hassan46, the 
father, explained that they had undertaken a long journey travelling from Syria to 
Lebanon, Turkey and then Cyprus before finally arriving at CDG two days before my 
visit. The family’s final destination was Sweden, where his wife’s family was living. 
They had not asked for asylum at French borders and the police had attempted to 
return them to Cyprus that very morning. The father enquired: Was this France? My 
explanation: Yes, this was France but they were detained in this small room for they 
had been refused entry as they lacked valid travel documents, was met with a puzzled 
look. The detainees’ confusion surrounding their physical location may be 
compounded by the official posters located in some police stations at terminals, which 
remind border policemen of the rules by which they must abide. I saw one such poster 
in terminal 1. Such posters remind policemen to be courteous, say “hello” and 
“welcome to France”. Not without irony, they are located in rooms where people are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  Hassan explained that he was a descendant of Palestine refugees, born in Kuwait. He confided that 
he wanted to go back to Israel but the country did not want him. Hassan and his family had refugee 
cards. Hassan wanted to know whether they could seek refugee status again in a European country. 	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taken to be further interrogated about their travel motives, i.e. after the agent at the 
checkpoint determined they could not be admitted, at least not before more thorough 
checks. It is in these rooms that travelers, when applicable, are informed of their 
placement under the status of the waiting zone.  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the Law on the Waiting Zone does not represent a striking shift 
from the previous era, when asylum-claimants and rejected travelers were excluded 
from legal guarantees based on their presence in international zones construed as 
extra-territorial. The international zone is still a non-rights place for those denied 
access to the waiting zone status. Furthermore, the excision issues attached to the 
international zone have been transferred to the waiting zone: the argument according 
to which waiting zones are excised territory has been used to exclude non-citizens 
from rights. Finally, the Law on the Waiting Zone itself forces an exclusionary legal 
framework on the most vulnerable, premised on their location outside “law’s 
admission gate” (Shachar, 2007) at the border. The term “extra-territoriality” 
appropriately captures the situation today. CDG waiting zone functions like an extra-
territorial, offshore vanishing point described by Mountz (2013): it is a physical and a 
legal space where border control takes precedence over access to rights.  
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Chapter 5. Airport terminals: the border police’s realms. The less 
visible part of CDG’s waiting zone 	  
Introduction 
In previous chapters, I explored the ways in which exclusion of non-citizens 
through extra-territoriality endured and was reinvented. I showed how CDG’s waiting 
zone was a physical and legal space where border control takes precedence over 
rights. Now that this conceptual framework has been established, I would like to 
change the level of analysis to concretely describe daily practices in and discourses of 
the waiting zone. Is CDG’s waiting zone a homogenous space? What happens to non-
citizens confined there? Are their rights being respected? What organizations or actors 
are working in CDG’s waiting zone and how do they relate to non-citizens and each 
other? In this and the following chapter, I will share ethnographic findings, unveiling 
practices and mental landscapes in spaces inaccessible to the general public and 
journalists. This chapter will focus on airport terminals while the next one will turn to 
the detention center, “ZAPI 3”. I will demonstrate that airport terminals are truly the 
border police’s realms. Here, asymmetrical power relations prevail and both detainees 
and researchers experience arbitrariness. Airport terminals constitute the less visible 
part of CDG’s waiting zone. I begin with a description of the geographical and legal 
path followed by passengers prior to and upon conferment of the waiting zone status. 
Some passengers may have difficulties reaching the waiting zone status, deprived of 
the “right to have rights” (Arendt, 1968) in the international zone.  
 
I. Path followed by passengers prior to and upon placement under the waiting 
zone regime 	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Passengers arriving at the airport may meet the border police as soon as they 
get off the plane at gangway checks (also called “on-board inspections”) or at built-in 
border checkpoints. I will describe how, in both cases, passengers may be returned 
immediately, without conferment of the waiting zone status. For these non-citizens, 
Paris airports’ international zones remain a legal black hole, or, as Basaran calls it, a 
“zone of non-rights” (2011, 63). It is the only space where some individuals can still 
exist in a legal vacuum. Indeed those who have not been registered yet as non-
admitted travelers or as asylum claimants at a border checkpoint do not benefit from 
the rights attached to the waiting zone framework (among them the right not to be 
returned before 24 hours or the right to communicate with any person of their 
choosing). Because they are not registered as having been denied entry, they are not 
accounted for under the law. As their existence is not acknowledged in the border 
police’s records, it is possible for border agents to intercept them as soon as they get 
off the plane and to return them immediately.  
Christian, a lawyer representing foreign nationals in the waiting zone and in 
rétention, flew from Kinshasa to Belgium a few years ago. He explains that 
authorities boarded the plane where they identified travellers who did not meet the 
criteria to enter Belgian territory. These passengers were forbidden from exiting the 
plane, which was returning to Kinshasa (Interview, December 2013). Christian 
wondered how people could claim asylum in such circumstances. At CDG, on-board 
inspections have been common practice since 2005 (Iserte, 2008). According to Iserte 
(2008, 16), 40 onboard inspections are carried out daily at CDG. The practices 
witnessed by Christian in Belgium also take place at CDG. Several European reports 
denounced these illegal practices in respect to CDG airport.  In 2007, the European 
Parliament report recommended that France “prohibit the almost immediate removal 
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of illegal immigrants during ‘on-board inspections’, which is contrary to asylum law” 
(European Parliament, 2007). The Commissioner for Human Rights also noted in 
2004: 
A final matter to address is that of foreigners who are not allowed to enter the 
waiting zone. Representatives of specialist NGOs passed on several reports to 
me which show that gangway checks are on the increase and lead on occasion 
to immediate expulsion or removal to international areas of the airport 
terminal, preventing the persons concerned from being registered or reaching 
the waiting zone (Gil-Robles, 2006, §193).  
 
Therefore, asylum-seekers and migrants are sometimes returned without even leaving 
the runway, as in the 1980s and early 1990s. Jean, an Air France employee at CDG in 
the 1980s, describes the practices at the time: “When the border police caught 
someone this person would not even cross the gangway, the person was left on the 
plane, the airline company had to deal with the person” (Interview, February 6, 2014). 
Issues pertaining to the absence of legality in the international zone have endured well 
after the birth of the Law on the Waiting Zone in July 1992.  
Luc is a lawyer who occasionally represents non-citizens placed in the waiting 
zones of Paris’ airports. Luc had a client who never reached the legal guarantees 
attached to the status of the waiting zone (Interview, October 2013). He explains that 
the family of a pregnant Moroccan woman contacted him in 2008 or 2009. Living in 
France with her husband, Leïla had requested administrative permission to reside 
lawfully in the country. She was given a receipt acknowledging that her request was 
under examination. Mistaking the receipt for proof she had been entitled to stay in 
France, Leïla travelled to Morocco. When she returned and presented herself at Orly 
airport’s border, the police denied her entry and kept her at the terminal, in their 
offices. When Luc arrived at Orly, two hours after his client had landed, he found no 
trace of her. The border police had not issued the usual administrative paperwork: 
there were no documents certifying she had been denied entry or placed in the waiting 
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zone. Leïla was completely unknown, her name absent from police electronic records. 
It was as if she had never come. Luc understood how events had unfolded later, when 
Leïla contacted her family from Casablanca, Morocco. She explained that the police 
had attempted to beat her to put her back on the plane. Already six or seven months 
pregnant, she had not resisted her return. There are frequent flights to major 
Moroccan cities, perhaps making it easier for authorities to return travellers without 
registering them. When denied registration under the waiting zone regime, those 
turned away at the borders at French airports are rendered nonexistent, as in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. While the rights conferred to those placed under the waiting zone 
regime are no panacea, they are nonetheless better than being denied legal existence. 
In particular, the waiting zone framework grants the right not to be returned before 24 
hours.  
It is important to note that the international zone remains an “abject space” 
(Isin and Rygiel 2007) only for those left outside of the waiting zone regime. To 
illustrate this point, imagine two individuals detained in the same holding room in one 
of CDG airport’s terminals. One of them possesses paperwork indicating he has been 
turned away, while the other will never receive such documents. Both are 
geographically located in the international zone. However, from a legal standpoint 
they do not share the same space: the former is detained in the waiting zone, while the 
latter is located in the international zone. The illegal practice of non-registration under 
the waiting zone status may have dramatic consequences on people’s lives. As in the 
era preceding the birth of the Law on the Waiting Zone, asylum-seekers may 
experience refoulement in Paris airports’ international zones.  
Travelers may also spend lengthy amounts of time in the international zone, in 
a legal vacuum, before reaching the waiting zone status. The Roissy Charles de 
	   123	  
Gaulle airport is not a homogeneous place: terminals were built at different points in 
time and do not have the same shape or length.  
Figure 5. Map of terminals at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle airport. Source: airport 
website August 2016  
 
In some terminals, passengers have no choice but to reach the border checkpoint 
immediately. However, in other terminals, passengers have to walk for a while and/or 
to take a shuttle to reach the border checkpoint: the international zone covers a vast 
amount of space. Extended stays in the international zone may be voluntary or 
involuntary. Some travelers avoid reaching the checkpoints immediately so that it 
becomes impossible to track their point of departure and therefore to return them 
(Interview with Clotilde from the Ministry of the Interior, December 2013). But 
others are confronted with the police’s refusal to register their asylum claims (Anafé, 
February 2016). 
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I will now explain the path followed by those who are granted the waiting 
zone status. When authorities suspect the traveler of lacking the appropriate 
documents to cross the border, the individual is put aside and taken to meet another 
authority called an officier de quart. This border officer proceeds to conduct further 
checks, interrogating the individual. The officier de quart ultimately decides whether 
or not the individual should be admitted to the country. When the individual is placed 
under the waiting zone regime, this authority issues the following administrative 
documents: a form certifying that entry was denied (or requested on asylum grounds), 
a form certifying the placement under the waiting zone regime, the transcription of 
the hearing and documents detailing the types of control that were carried out by the 
officier de quart.  
According to the Law on the Waiting Zone, authorities must inform the 
rejected traveler or asylum seeker of the non-entry decision and the rights attached to 
it “in a language that he or she understands” (art. L213-2). The rights in question are 
the following: right to communicate with the person that was meant to host the non-
citizen, with the consulate or counsel of the non-citizen’s choosing and the right to 
refuse to be returned before 24 hours (this 24-hour period is called the jour franc, art 
L.213-2). The non-citizen must also be informed that he or she can require the 
assistance of an interpreter and a doctor (art. L.221-4). Authorities have to let the non-
citizen know that he or she can ask to leave the waiting zone to go anywhere but 
France at any time (art. L.221-4). These rights are written in French on the first two 
administrative documents aforementioned and must be communicated orally to the 
person placed in the waiting zone (art. L 213-2), through an interpreter if need be. 
Ethnographic findings and interviews revealed that, in practice, these rights are really 
difficult to access. I distinguish between what I call “sine qua non rights” and other 
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rights. Sine qua non rights are rights without which the enjoyment of all other rights 
proves impossible. In other words, these sine qua non rights determine the ability to 
enjoy the rights one has in principle. Sine qua non rights include the right to be 
informed of one’s rights, the right to an interpreter (this right is connected to the 
former) and the right to stall return for 24 hours. I will start by describing barriers to 
the enjoyment of sine qua non rights, detailing the number of ways in which they are 
curtailed.  
 
II.  Barriers to the enjoyment of sine qua non rights  
For individuals to be able to exercise the rights set out in the law, they must 
first be able to understand their very existence. However, evidence suggests that 
interpretation issues prevent non-Francophone travelers from being aware of their 
rights. Upon placing an allophone individual under the waiting zone status, border 
officers may call professional interpreters but also anybody present on the airport 
compounds, such as an agent from an airline or a cleaning company. Border officers 
themselves may also act as interpreters (Anafé, 2015). There are many obstacles to 
comprehension: the police may stop interpreters from doing their job, interpreting 
may occur in a language that the person does not master, or interpreters may lack 
ethical considerations.  
Michaël discussed the first of these obstacles. He runs an interpreting 
company that used to provide interpreters in person at CDG. Companies compete to 
win tenders to provide interpreting services to the police at CDG. Languages are 
divided into different bundles and companies compete over one or more bundles. 
Companies can provide interpreters that are physically present or available by 
telephone (Interview with Michaël, July 2014). Interpreters speaking English, Arabic, 
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Chinese, Spanish and Russian (i.e. UN official languages) are based at CDG (Anafé, 
2013) from 6:00 am to 9:00 pm, in order to provide interpretation in person as soon as 
the need arises. For any other languages or during the night time, interpreters may be 
physically dispatched or available by telephone (Interview with Michaël, July 2014). 
After much hesitation, Michaël confided that he was forced to terminate the contract 
of Joël, one of his employees, after the police complained about Joël’s work. Joël 
wanted to translate the entire content of administrative documents, including the part 
mentioning rights. Michaël explains:  
 
I have to tell you this: the officers’ behavior with respect to individuals is 
seriously questionable. I have an interpreter who was fired because he did not 
fit in the system, which means that he was doing his job but it was not like the 
police wanted. The police wanted to put these people back into planes; it is 
that simple. So they gave them… There are written rights so there are forms, I 
do not know if I have some here, forms to notify “you have the right to a 
lawyer, to this and that”. But the police are interested in the duties: “You have 
to do this, you have to do that.” But when it comes to recourses etc, we do not 
dwell on it (Interview, July 2014).  
 
Michaël’s statement matches what numerous detainees (Francophone and 
allophone) told me: their rights were never explained to them. In some cases, the 
police specifically stood in the way of people understanding their rights. For example, 
in February 2014, in terminal one I met Arthur, a Congolese national born in 
Kinshasa, who explained that he had been living in France with his son and wife since 
2010. Arthur said he was coming from Istanbul, Turkey where he had spent a few 
days for vacation. He had a valid document allowing him to stay in France until 
October of the following year, but was suspected of carrying a fake passport. Arthur 
contended that a female officer told him “no, you mustn’t read everything”. He did 
not have time to read his administrative paperwork. When I saw Arthur, he was in the 
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terminal’s holding cell to be returned to Turkey in spite of having his family in 
France. It was particularly important that he understood his rights.  
Michaël explains that the case of Joël is not isolated but is part of a pattern. 
Many interpreters would like to translate the entirety of administrative paperwork but 
are prevented from doing so:  
Maybe, after working for some time (there) interpreters are disillusioned, but I 
had several interpreters including this one, who wanted, it was part of his job 
to do this but he was prevented. He was found “too kind to claimants”. A 
colleague of his who was not fired, but who raised serious objections 
regarding this system, was wondering whether he would stay. Moreover it was 
in the same language, in Portuguese. So there is a real problem here. (…) I 
received a registered letter from the police for my interpreter to be excluded, 
where it is clearly written that this person should work for the Red Cross 
instead of the police (Interview, July 2014).  
 
Michaël admits that he found himself in a complicated situation: he does not like to 
fire people after recruiting them, and Joël threatened to sue him in court. At the same 
time, Michaël’s interpreting company was working for the police: officers at CDG 
were his clients, and he needed to keep them satisfied. He finally terminated Joël’s 
employment.  
Not only may interpreters be prevented from doing their work, but they may 
also speak a language in which the detainee is not fluent. During a February visit, I 
met Ajitabh from Sri Lanka. Communication in English was extremely uneasy and I 
could only get a basic understanding of his situation after reading his administrative 
documents. Yet, his form specified that an interpreter physically present had notified 
him of his rights in English. A native Tamil speaker, Ajitabh lacked proficiency in 
English and therefore likely had a very limited understanding of his rights.  
The fact that anyone can provide interpretation services also raises ethical 
questions. Lydia had recently joined Anafé as a volunteer when I met her at the 
Bobigny court of first instance. A detainee explained to Lydia that an airline company 
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employee acted as an interpreter for him. In lieu of translating the documents 
notifying him of his rights, the carrier’s staff told the detainee: “Here they do not give 
asylum, go back home” (observations). It is also interesting to note that in theory 
anybody can become a professional interpreter as the profession is not regulated: 
there is no exam to be taken or training specifically required (Interview with Michaël, 
July 2014). Nobody controls the quality of interpretation and Michaël laments that 
cost-management takes precedence over quality in selecting interpreting companies 
for the CDG market (Interview, July 2014). It would have been valuable to gather the 
perspective of interpreters working for the border police at CDG at the time of 
research. Unfortunately the two companies providing such interpretation services -in 
person or by telephone- either refused to talk to me or never replied, leaning me to 
rely instead on interviews with those who had been doing this work previously and 
my own ethnographic observations.  
Just like the right to be notified of one’s rights in a language that one 
understands, the right not to be returned before 24 hours is a sine qua non right, a 
right without which all others cannot be enjoyed. Delaying return by 24 hours allows 
the individual placed under the waiting zone regime to contact whomever he or she 
wants and therefore to try and gather missing documents in order to be able to enter 
France or any other Schengen area country or to prepare for return. This period of 
time is particularly important for asylum-seekers who otherwise face refoulement. 
However, actors in charge of monitoring or defending non-citizens’ rights routinely 
notice many barriers to the enjoyment of the jour franc. Non-citizens must 
specifically ask to be granted this 24-hour delay (article L.213-2), but often fail to 
grasp this right or its significance. Furthermore, in many cases the police seem to 
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make the decision for the person. Jacques, an inspector of places of deprivation of 
liberty (cf chapter 3), recalls his visit to a terminal in January 2009:  
We say it in the report, there was something that was really less satisfying in 
this terminal, we saw a high-ranking officer tell one of his colleagues: “you 
give it to this one”, you know the 24-hour period, it has a name.  
Researcher: The jour franc?  
Jacques: “You give him the jour franc”, meaning “you do not give it to this 
one”. Normally everybody has the right: anybody has the right to ask for the 
jour franc, and it was not satisfying because it was not offered to them in an 
intelligible manner. They were not asked whether they wanted to take the first 
plane back to Sao Paulo or benefit from the jour franc. It was not satisfactory 
at all (Interview, August 2013).  
 
The non-citizen is supposed to indicate whether he or she wishes to benefit from 
the jour franc on the administrative form certifying that entry was denied or requested 
on asylum grounds. The following tick boxes can be found under the rights section: 
 
1. “I do not want to go back before the expiry of a 24-hour time period, to be 
spent in waiting zone, from midnight today”. 
2. “I want to go back as soon as possible”.  
 
But in practice, I observed that the police may tick box number two on the computer 
before handing the document over to the non-citizen to gather his or her signature. 
Anafé has been denouncing this practice for a long time (Anafé, January 2013, 37). 
Christian, a lawyer defending non-citizens, observes that it is difficult to prove that 
the non-citizen did not tick box number two himself or herself. But the behavior of 
many of his clients is at odds with the box that they supposedly chose. Christian 
explains: “Sometimes people tell me ‘no I was not told about this’ (jour franc). 
Sometimes there are contradictions, the person does not ask for the jour franc but 
refuses to board the very same day. So you say ‘it is weird, there is something 
wrong’” (Interview, December 2013). This was the case for Arthur: his form 
mentioned his desire to leave as soon as possible. Yet Arthur had his family in France 
and had no intention of living in Turkey. The right to remain in the waiting zone for 
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24 hours is subject to discretion; it is only available to some. Luc, another lawyer 
defending non-citizens’ rights (cf section I), finds this state of affairs infuriating:  
 
It is them (the border police) who decide whether they can grant the jour franc 
or not, depending on the case. Very often you will see at Roissy the jour franc 
is granted to individuals whose flight is not departing immediately. Because 
they know that within the next two or three days they cannot do anything, they 
grant the jour franc. Because they know that within 24 hours nothing will 
happen so they can grant the jour franc. But for individuals who have a 
possible return flight within the next 24 or 12 hours, they tick the box “I want 
to go back as soon as possible”. Who is this person, who earns a meager living 
and paid a flight ticket, who arrives here and is told “you can stay on the 
territory, you can stay in waiting zone during 24 hours for you to talk to 
family members or to your consulate”? And this person, who spent his or her 
money would tell you, “I want to go back as soon as possible”! (Interview, 
October 2013).  
 
As Luc observes, it is highly unlikely that travelers would agree to be returned as 
soon as possible after disbursing money on a plane ticket, especially when this 
represent a significant financial investment in comparison to their income. In practice, 
the right to stall return after 24 hours has been emptied of its content. Border officers 
routinely deny this right in order to expedite returns. This is particularly an issue for 
asylum claimants.  
During a January visit with Human Rights Watch researchers, we met André. 
He had been denied entry to France for carrying a fake Cameroonian passport and a 
fake French residence permit. André was in terminal 1’s holding cell, awaiting return 
shortly: his flight was scheduled at 11:00 am and it was just a few minutes past 9:00 
am. At first André was really wary of us, wondering whether he could trust us. After 
one HRW researcher showed him a business card, he confided that his travel 
documents were indeed forged; he was from the Central African Republic (CAR). 
André had undertaken a long journey from the CAR, transiting through three different 
countries before arriving in France. Explaining that his life was at risk in his country 
on account of being a Muslim, he recounted that he had not been able to apply for 
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asylum on the previous day at the detention center (ZAPI 3) because he had arrived 
too late, around 10:00 pm. André clearly did not wish to be sent back, yet the box “I 
want to go back as soon as possible” was ticked on his form. André explained that the 
box was already ticked when he was given the form. He refused to sign it. I informed 
André that he could refuse to board the plane: he would then be taken to the detention 
center where he would be able to make an asylum claim. When we left, the authority 
did not seem pleased that I had given André this information. André did manage to 
reach the detention center: we saw him there that afternoon. But being denied the 
right to stall return for 24 hours nearly cost him the opportunity to apply to enter 
France on asylum grounds.  
In theory, claims can be made at airport terminals but in practice the police 
seldom accept or register them (Anafé, November 2015, 23). Christian, legal counsel, 
laments that inadmissible individuals are not informed of their right to seek asylum. 
Yet foreign nationals in administrative detention who have passed “law’s admission 
gate” (Shachar 2007) are notified of this right. Christian explains: “So this is a first 
difficulty: they are not notified of the right to seek asylum. Contrary to the detention 
center (on the territory, rétention center), it is not a right that is notified to the person 
who is not admitted. It is the person who must express this demand.” (Interview, 
December 2013). Ethnographic findings in fact suggest that authorities go to great 
length to hide the fact that detainees are entitled to seek asylum (cf section V. below). 
The law changed since I collected data: article L. 221-4 of the CESEDA (introduced 
on July 29, 2015) now states that the individual placed in the waiting zone “is 
informed of the rights that he or she may exercise regarding asylum claim”. It would 
be interesting to know whether practices have changed since this new legislative 
provision was introduced. I would now like to describe the multiple barriers that have 
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been erected between travelers placed under the waiting zone regime and other rights. 
I will show that material conditions of detention may also stand in the way of rights 
enjoyment. Geography is used to exert control.  
 
III. Material conditions of detention and barriers to accessing other rights 
After - but also sometimes prior to - conferment of the waiting zone status, 
rejected travelers and asylum-seekers are detained in small cells located in or outside 
of police stations at airport terminals (in terminals 1 and 2A, 2C, 2D, 2E and 2F)47. 
Individuals await their transfer to the detention center (ZAPI 3) in these small cells, 
which are also the last stop of those who are to be returned before boarding. Men, 
women and children of all ages (accompanied or unaccompanied) are all detained 
together, sitting on rough benches that are attached to the walls. Conditions of 
detention in these transitional places of confinement are anything but homogeneous. 
These rooms present different degrees of cleanliness and are of varied surface area 
(from five square meters to 28 square meters). Some walls are covered with sentences 
such as “Put your trust in God”, “Jesus is Lord”, “No one is a stranger in this world” 
or “God is great, DRC” (Dieu est grand, RDC). Some of the cells’ doors are opened, 
being guarded by one or several police officers at the entrance. However others are 
locked without a door handle on the inside, creating a very claustrophobic atmosphere 
to the space. Most rooms are windowless except for a small window that cannot be 
opened - about the size of an A4 paper - on the door itself. None of the rooms I visited 
had windows allowing natural light into the room. Although my visits took place 
during the winter, some of the rooms were very hot. They were more or less crowded, 
depending on the level of activity and the destinations covered by the terminal in 
question.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 At the time of visits, terminal 2B was closed for renovation.  
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Some terminals receive significantly more passengers than others. According 
to one authority, 70 percent of the flights land in terminals 2E (including Air France 
flights) and 2F combined. Many flights from Africa land in these two terminals. The 
border police consider African citizens as presenting a “high migratory risk”. Not 
surprisingly, during each of my two morning visits to terminal 2E, the detention room 
(about 18 square meters) was quite full, with detainees occupying most of the 
benches’ space. I met Arnaud, a border agent, in terminal 1. Having previously 
worked in terminal 2E, he explained that, although holding cells in the two terminals 
were of the same surface area, terminal 2E hosted twice as many individuals. Arnaud 
remarked: “Terminal 2E’s holding room really looks like a prison. And from the point 
of view of hygiene it is not great. There is a ventilation system but no air 
conditioning, while terminal 1 has both” (observations). A picnic is served to 
detainees during meal hours, but according to an agent in terminal 2F, there are no 
meals for babies. During a February visit to terminal 2D I met a Syrian family 
(Hassan’s family, cf chapter 4) with two small children aged three years and 13 
months. The toddler was eating the solid food provided: potato crisps and a tuna 
salad, in spite of the choking hazard.  
The possibility of accessing legal aid is highly variable from one terminal to 
the next. Posters featuring Anafé’s number and/or a list of lawyers accredited by the 
bar office of the Seine Saint Denis department (i.e. that are capacitated to represent 
detainees at the Bobigny court hearing) are attached to the cells’ walls in a few 
terminals only. The NGO Anafé provides free legal advice over the phone upon 
request when detainees call the organization during legal aid clinics.48 These clinics 
are held three times a week on average (Anafé November 2015, 116). Yet, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Anafé volunteers also call holding cells’ phones during legal aid clinics. 	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appropriate numbers are a necessary starting point to access legal aid, they are not 
enough. Non-citizens must first comprehend whose number is listed and trust their 
interlocutors enough to explain their stories. In France, only individuals interested in 
non-citizens’ rights have heard of Anafé.  How can a foreign national travelling to 
France for the first time, understand the organization’s mandate? Also, how can 
detainees be sure that individuals listed as Anafé volunteers or lawyers are not, in 
fact, working for the French government? Difficulties are compounded for allophone 
detainees: while Anafé’s posters are written in different languages, the lawyers’ 
poster is written solely in French. In any case, detainees must be able to express 
themselves in a language in which their interlocutor is comfortable. Those seeking the 
assistance of a legal professional must also have enough financial resources. 
Furthermore, detainees are confronted with a very practical obstacle: many had their 
mobile phones taken away upon placement in the waiting zone. It is forbidden to take 
pictures in airport areas whose access is restricted; therefore phones with cameras are 
usually confiscated.  
It is true that all confinement rooms are equipped with a phone. According to 
authorities, individuals could make and receive domestic and international calls 
whenever they wanted, without any time limit. However, the presence of a phone 
alone does not guarantee effective or satisfactory communication. First of all, 
detainees need to know how to use the phone and what number to dial. During my 
first visit to terminal 2E, Philippe, the police officer, informed us that a country code 
list used to be posted inside the holding room. In an attempt to be reassuring, he 
added that detainees just had to knock on the door (from the inside of the cell) for a 
border agent to provide them with the appropriate country phone code. However, 
observations suggest that once people are locked up, it is very hard for them to 
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communicate with authorities. In late February, while I was waiting at the entrance of 
terminal 2F’s police station, a loud and prolonged banging could be heard from a 
nearby door. The policeman behind the entrance desk did not move, continuing his 
activities as if there had been no sound. About ten minutes afterwards, a female 
officer arrived, asking him whether he could hear the noise. He replied that he could 
hear, but was alone and could not go. The policewoman responded that she was alone 
too and therefore could not go either, shrugged and walked away. 
In practice detainees may also lack the inclination to ask the border police and 
give up on contacting the person of their choosing. In terminal 2E I met Françoise, a 
Senegalese woman whose journey from Dakar to Milan, Italy ended at Charles de 
Gaulle where she was refused entry to the Schengen area. She wanted to contact her 
sister in Italy, but thought that the phone did not work. In fact, the phone was 
functioning, but Françoise did not have the right country code, which was then given 
to her by the HRW research assistant. Individuals may also fail to contact their 
families for they do not know that the number “zero” has to be dialed first. Indeed, 
very few cells feature instructions as to how the phone should be used. The absence of 
written guidelines places detainees in a situation of dependence: they rely on 
authorities to communicate with the outside world. Is this is a deliberate strategy to 
exercise petty control over individuals in waiting zones or just negligence?  
After one frustrating visit to terminal 2E in February (cf section IV) Jérémie, 
the officer accompanying me, asked if I had any recommendations so that he could 
convey them to his superiors. He warned: “ I am not Santa Claus”, meaning that he 
could not guarantee their implementation. It was the only time I was invited to offer 
recommendations after terminal visits. He refused to write down my remark that 
detainees should be allowed to use the bathroom more frequently, arguing that they 
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only had to knock: every time a police officer passed by they could go. They were 
“not deprived” of using the bathroom. But he did note two of my propositions: I 
suggested that the country code list be posted on the wall next to the phone, as well as 
Anafé’s number. When I carried out a subsequent visit to terminal 2E a few days 
afterwards, I was informed that my recommendations had been followed. The Anafé 
poster was still at the same place, outside of the holding cell, visible from the tiny 
window on the door, but letters were written with a bigger font size. When I inquired 
why the document was still not inside the room, the officer replied that the walls were 
made of concrete, so documents could not stick to them. He also gave another reason: 
the detainees tended to pull off posters. Yet this did not seem to be an issue in other 
holding cells, where documents were posted on cells’ walls. As for the country code 
list, it was nowhere to be seen. Precarious external communications represent a 
significant issue for detainees who experience a high degree of isolation in airport 
terminals.  
 
IV. Isolation 
 The presence of third parties is very rare in airport terminals. These spaces are 
the realm of the police; most of the time non-citizens are alone with border agents. 
Detainees are therefore highly isolated there. Many actors equate Charles de Gaulle’s 
waiting zone with ZAPI3: in common language, the term “waiting zone” refers to the 
detention center. Usually, when I presented myself at police stations’ entry desks in 
terminals, border agents were surprised and tried to divert me, claiming that the 
waiting zone was not located in airport terminals, but at the detention center. This 
attitude probably denotes that policemen are not used to receiving visitors in 
terminals. The law entitles legal counsel to visit their clients anytime and anywhere 
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within the waiting zone. But in practice, lawyers are generally turned down when they 
present themselves in airport terminals (Anafé, January 2013, 40-41). I met four 
lawyers who, at the time of interview, represented or used to regularly represent non-
citizens detained in CDG’s waiting zone. None of them visited their clients in 
terminals.  
As for ad hoc administrators, they do not visit unaccompanied minors in 
airport terminals either. Unaccompanied minors are alone when placed under the legal 
regime of the waiting zone: they sign the administrative paperwork without their ad 
hoc administrator being present49. Ad hoc administrators are normally designated 
upon placement of the child in the waiting zone (art. L.221-5). However, in violation 
of the law, some time may elapse before the public prosecutor office is able to 
designate an ad hoc administrator. Anafé (January 2013, 29-30) explains that border 
officers may question the person’s age even if he or she carries official documents 
proving his or her age as a minor. When border officers are unsure as to whether the 
person is under 18, they contact the public prosecutor’s office. The latter may then 
order a medical diagnostic: a bone test.50 When individuals are finally recognized as 
minors, they usually have already been transferred to ZAPI 3. Even when the ad hoc 
administrator is swiftly designated, he or she does not meet the child in the terminals’ 
holding cells (interview with Anafé employees Anne and Lise, January 2014 and 
conversations with border officers).  
Family members and friends are also banned from terminals. As far as NGOs 
are concerned, some of them do visit - but sporadically. Two organizations secured 
privileged access to airport terminals: Anafé and the Red Cross. As per a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Cf chapter 4 for a discussion of the role played by ad hoc administrators.  
50	   This way of assessing a person’s minority is controversial; the medical community contests its 
accuracy, pointing out that such method only offers a rough estimation of a person’s age (Anafé, 2013, 
31). 	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Memorandum of Understanding signed with the Ministry of the Interior on February 
25, 2011 (valid for two years and renewable), Anafé is entitled to visit the airport 
terminals four times per week (Anafé, January 2013, 2).51 However, the agreement 
prevents the organization from carrying out unannounced visits: Anafé has to let the 
border police know one day in advance of their intention to visit (Interview of Lise 
and Anne, January 2014). In practice, Anafé lacks the necessary resources to 
frequently visit the terminals. Noémie had volunteered for Anafé for nine months at 
the time of interview. According to her, the NGO only visits terminals once a month 
(Interview, September 2013). Other restrictions apply to terminal visits: the 
agreement forbids Anafé visitors from speaking to non-citizens when they are the 
“object of an ongoing procedure”52 (Anafé, 2007, 1). Raoul, an Anafé volunteer, 
observes:  “An ongoing procedure can mean anything and we say it very often. 
Depending on the agent that we have in front of us, an ongoing procedure can mean 
that the person has just arrived and has not signed yet his or her administrative forms, 
that the person will be boarding in two hours or refused to board two hours ago, it can 
be anything and everything” (Interview, October 2013).  
The Red Cross also visits places of confinement in terminals and the 
international zone from time to time. The organization, which has also signed a 
bilateral Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of the Interior, faces the 
very same limitation as Anafé. The Red Cross report (2013, 18) reads: “The argument 
of an ongoing procedure is often used, mediators are invited to come back later”. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Anafé first signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of the Interior on March 5, 
2004. The Convention was subsequently renewed. At first the organization only had the authorization 
to visit twice a week. This number was then extended to three visits per week in 2005.  
52	   The Memorandum of Understanding reads: “habilitated individuals (…) can talk to foreigners, 
except for those who are the object of an ongoing procedure, and access places where these people are 
waiting” (“les personnes habilitées (…) peuvent avoir des échanges avec les étrangers, à l’exception 
de ceux pour lesquels une procédure est en cours, et accéder aux locaux où ces personnes sont en 
attente.”). 	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Furthermore, agents often assert to mediators that confinement cells are empty in an 
attempt to thwart them.53  In general, officers do not seem to understand the rationale 
for mediators’ visits:  
(…) policemen present in terminals’ police stations do not seem well aware of 
the precise role of our mediators and of what motivates their visits to 
terminals. Some civil servants are surprised by their presence, even though 
this is a contractual task which is an integral part of the mission that has been 
assigned to us (Red Cross, 2013, 18).  
 
Just like Anafé, the Red Cross had to reduce the number of visits due to its shortage 
of personnel. While the organization’s report (2013, 9) does not specify any visit 
number, it suggests that they are infrequent: visits can only take place when there is 
little activity at ZAPI 3 and when teams are complete.  
Other NGOs are authorized to access the waiting zones, including CDG 
airport terminals. NGO access to the waiting zones has fluctuated tremendously over 
the years. The Prime Minister first issued a decree (décret, i.e. an administrative act) 
on May 2, 1995, allowing a UNHCR delegate as well as eight NGOs (of which six 
were Anafé members54) to access the waiting zones. Conditions of access were 
stringent: each NGO was allocated ten visitor’s cards but could not carry out more 
than eight visits per year and per waiting zone. Visitors had to request the Ministry of 
the Interior’s permission prior to visiting. Visits had to take place between 8:00 am 
and 8:00 pm, and only two visitors were allowed each time. Other NGOs then 
requested visiting privileges. In reaction to ongoing court proceedings, the Minister of 
the Interior authorized thirteen NGOs to access the waiting zone on May 30, 200655 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Mediators understand that the confinement cells were not empty when they witness non-citizens 
arrive in ZAPI 3 shortly afterwards from these very same cells (Red Cross, 2013,14). 	  
54 The following Anafé members were granted access to waiting zones: The French section of Amnesty 
International, Anafé, Cimade, Forum réfugiés, France Terre d’asile and MRAP. The other two non-
Anafé members to be granted access were the French Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders.  
55 Cf French Minister of the Interior, May 30, 2006. In addition to the eight NGOs that were granted 
access in 1995, the following organizations obtained the right to visit waiting zones in 2006: 
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(of which ten were Anafé members). The government ended the limitations to visits. 
Then, in 2009, two additional NGOs secured authorization to visit waiting zones 
(French Minister of Immigration, May 27, 2009), bringing the number of accredited 
NGOs to fifteen. This number was finally reduced to fourteen in 2012, when one 
NGO lost its access (Anafé January 2013, 64-65). In 2015, fifteen organizations, 
including Human Rights Watch (HRW), had access to waiting zones.  
HRW sought accreditation in the Fall 2013 when I offered to work 
collaboratively to update the 2009 report on unaccompanied minors56. These 
organizations’ visits to terminals depend on each NGO’s mission and priorities. For 
example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) dedicates itself to the production of reports 
documenting human rights violations, reports upon which an advocacy strategy is 
then devised and implemented. For such an organization, fieldwork takes place to 
collect enough data in order to write thorough reports. Dedicated to fact-finding, 
fieldwork is limited in time. I carried out a few visits alongside with HRW researchers 
(two of CDG’s and one of Orly’s waiting zones) and pressed on by myself after they 
had collected enough data. Conditions of accreditation to waiting zones are listed in 
the CESEDA (art R223-8 to R223-14). NGOs willing to apply need to have had legal 
existence for at least five years and must aim to provide social or medical assistance, 
defend human rights or assist non-citizens. Accreditation is granted for three years 
and one NGO can request up to ten visitor’s cards. The law specifies that 
representatives from different NGOs cannot visit the same waiting zone on the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Association d’accueil aux médecins et personnels de santé réfugiés en France, Groupe d’accueil et 
solidarité, Groupe d’information et de soutien des immigrés, Ligue des Droits de l’Homme, Médecins 
du Monde.  
	  
56 For the 2009 report (Lost in Transit, Insufficient Protection for Unaccompanied Migrant Children at 
Roissy Charles de Gaulle) the HRW researcher did not access terminals. The interviews that took place 
in the waiting zone were conducted at the detention center, in the visitors’ room (accessible to the 
general public). Cf p. 6 of the report.  
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day. However, this was never an issue: over the course of my visits to terminals, I 
never ran into any other NGO visitor from these 14 organizations. NGO presence in 
terminals is limited in time and irregular: most of the time detainees are alone with the 
police.  
For all of these aforementioned reasons, airport terminals are not places where 
detainees can exercise their rights satisfactorily. Both Dominique, high-ranking 
border officer, and Luc, legal counsel who represents non-citizens in waiting zones, 
agree on this point. Dominique admits:  
It is (ZAPI 3) a more appropriate structure to exercise rights than the terminal. 
At the terminal, where the person’s rights are notified, she has access to a 
phone and can make international calls. There are no difficulties but it is not a 
place that is suitable to host the person over a long period of time. It is not 
suitable at all to ensure confidentiality for interviews with lawyers or others so 
she is transferred to this structure (ZAPI 3) (Interview, September 2013).  
 
Yet the law considers the waiting zone as a homogenous space; it does not distinguish 
between airport terminals and the detention center. Lawyers representing the border 
police in proceedings before the custody and liberty judge often state that “the waiting 
zone is one and indivisible” in response to the other counsel’s claim that his or her 
client’s access to rights was impeded by extended stay in terminals (observations).  
Several officers that I met during the course of my visits insisted that detainees 
spent as little time as possible in airport terminals. For example, Philippe asserted: 
“Detainees are normally kept four to five hours before their transfer” (observations). 
However, the testimonies of the detainees themselves did not match the policemen’s 
affirmation. Time spent in confinement can be lengthy. Rosalita, a young Nicaraguan 
woman whose trip to Madrid was interrupted at CDG, contended that she had spent 
12 hours in terminal 2E’s holding cell upon her arrival from Nicaragua. As for 
Alfredo, a Cuban national who had departed from Bamako with the intent of reaching 
Sweden, he claimed having spent 12 to 13 hours per day in terminal 2E for the past 
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week. Inspectors of places of liberty also noted that time spent in confinement in 
terminals was extremely variable: from five minutes to 14 hours (CGLPL, 2013, 47-
48) in terminal 2F. They arrived at this conclusion after studying terminal 2F’s police 
registries from December 1 to December 10, 2013. About one third of individuals had 
spent more than four hours at the station. Makaremi (2007) observed that officers at 
CDG had a strategy to curtail detainees’ willingness to resist return; non-citizens were 
sleep and food-deprived in order to make them more compliant. The non-citizens I 
met in terminal cells had not been subjected to such measures. However, confinement 
in a restricted space with other individuals without easy access to water (distributed 
only during meal times) or sanitary facilities is in itself trying. Detaining those who 
are to be returned in the airport’s terminals for lengthy periods of time may be a 
strategy to discourage them from staying. Luc, a legal counsel, deplores the lack of 
transparency that surrounds the time of transfer from terminals to ZAPI 3. He points 
out that exercising rights in terminals is much more challenging:  
You are told that the person in question or the non-citizen is in a position to 
exercise his or her rights from the first minutes. The issue that we run into 
today and that I lament is there is no transparency regarding the transfer of 
people from the terminal to the accommodation zone (zone d’hébergement). 
Why? Because the person who stays in the terminal from 7:00 am to 5:00 pm 
is not in the same conditions to exercise his or her rights than in the 
accommodation zone where he or she can have access to family, talk, receive 
family members and send a fax through the Red Cross which is on site, or ask 
to meet a doctor anytime if he or she wishes. There is a minimum of 
infrastructure. But in terminal these individuals are put in a room and access is 
closed (Interview, October 2013).  
 
Detention at ZAPI 3 is not devoid of challenges when it comes to exercising rights (cf 
chapter 6). But, at least, detainees can receive the visit of family members, lawyers, 
consulate employees and friends as well as communicate more easily with Anafé and 
the Red Cross. In addition to experiencing isolation and barriers to accessing their 
rights, detainees are also subjected to arbitrariness in airport terminals.  
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V. Arbitrariness and asymmetrical power relations  
As I will demonstrate in this section, generally those confined and their 
visitors are subjected to arbitrary and diverse rules, varying greatly from one authority 
to the next. The treatment an individual receives, therefore, varies significantly from 
one terminal to the next, and even within one terminal under the supervision of the 
very same authority. Not unlike Melville’s characters of Turkey and Nippers, whose 
energy levels and behaviors fluctuate according to the time of day (in the short story 
Bartleby, the Scrivener, 185357), the very same official might display distinct attitudes 
as time unfolds. For example, during the first visit to a terminal at Charles de Gaulle 
airport I witnessed a border officer’s transformation: within the range of an hour 
Philippe went from being very welcoming and eager to please to quiet and aggressive, 
reaching a point where he stopped answering questions. At the end of the visit he 
explained the reason for his anger: his colleagues had not come to relieve him of his 
duties. Having started his shift at 5:00 am, by the time of the lunchtime visit Philippe 
was starving. In a place where people must rely on authorities for everything, every 
change in mood or well-being affects both detainees and researcher’s access to 
information.  
Belcher and Martin (2013, 408) explain that policies of access to detention 
centers in the United States “changed randomly and without notice, or were 
interpreted differently by detention center staff members”. In airport terminals, 
similarly, there is no guarantee that NGO visitors will be able to effectively 
communicate with detainees. On a Saturday in February, I experienced first-hand at 
Charles de Gaulle what Martin had observed in the United States. The police officer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 In this story, the characters Nippers and Turkey are law-copyists, working for a Wall Street lawyer. 
Turkey is a great employee in the morning but becomes too energetic in the afternoon, making 
mistakes at work. As for Nippers, his attitude is inversely proportional to that of Turkey: he is irritable 
and nervous in the morning and calmer in the afternoon.  
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accompanying me attempted to silence both detainees and myself by affirming that I 
could not discuss any “procedures” with the individuals confined in terminal 2E, 
claiming that my mandate was limited to verifying detention conditions. This 
precluded any conversation about rights or administrative or judicial procedures 
pertaining to the detainees’ status. When challenged with the observation that these 
requirements were nowhere to be found in the law, Jérémie replied that they were 
specified in an internal policy note, which I could not see as I was not a civil servant. 
The visit posed a significant ethical dilemma: the officer, standing less than one meter 
apart from myself and detainees, listened closely to the conversations. I attempted to 
bypass the police officer’s illegitimate conditions by first engaging with English and 
Spanish-speaking detainees in their language. When it became apparent that the 
police understood neither English nor Spanish, I could still gather some valuable 
information: I heard about an allegation of mistreatment at the hands of the police of a 
woman named Maria for the second time. This incident probably explained why the 
authority did not want me to speak openly with detainees.  
However, this strategy was limited by the common word origins of French, 
Spanish, and English. Jérémie put an abrupt end to the conversation after hearing the 
word “court”, which is the same in French and Spanish (tribunal). It was particularly 
heart-breaking not to be able to explain asylum procedures to an exhausted and 
obviously traumatized Syrian asylum-seeker (who kept saying: “please, don’t attack 
me”). The officer told me it was forbidden to discuss “political asylum”. When it was 
time to speak to Francophone detainees, I asked the only question I could think of that 
would not endanger them: Had they eaten? The answer to this question was evident as 
garbage and picnic leftovers were scattered all over the room. Fearing that detainees 
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could be the targets of retaliation if they complained, I chose to ask the minimum 
amount of information possible.  
Ironically, this uncomfortable situation repeated itself shortly afterwards. 
After exiting terminal 2E, I took a small break before heading towards terminal 2A. 
During the previous visits, I had learned that different police officers were in charge 
of the different terminal clusters (terminals 2E, 2F and 2G constitute one such cluster: 
every morning the 300 policemen assigned to this cluster are distributed across the 
three terminals). According to what I had observed, the police officer in charge of 
terminal 2E was different from the policeman in charge of terminal 2A. However, 
when I presented myself at the entrance of terminal 2A, asking to visit the detention 
cell there, the same policeman greeted me. Apparently, on Saturdays, the same officer 
covered multiple terminals. Unfortunately, the two individuals held in terminal 2A 
were both Francophone. I quickly left. Ultimately, it is the researcher’s ethical duty to 
decide when to stop asking questions and leave, however frustrating the situation.  
Officers also referred to detainees’ possible dangerousness to oppose private 
conversations. Arnaud, border officer in terminal 1, contended that he could not leave 
me alone with the detainees, as “we do not know who these people are”. This 
measure, justified by reference to my own safety, prevented me from talking privately 
to the detainees. As Agier (2008) points out, by isolating migrants, states convey the 
message that there is something wrong with them: they must be isolated for a reason. 
Arnaud displayed a friendly attitude and probably meant well, frequently interrupting 
my conversation with detainees to provide extra information (“I am helping you a 
little”). Arnaud used the third person to refer to the non-citizens sitting next to us, 
explaining the procedures applicable to detainees in general. Not only was this 
situation ethically problematic, it also confused my position in the eyes of detainees 
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who associated me with the authorities and felt I was not to be trusted. Establishing 
rapport with both policemen and detainees at the same time constituted an impossible 
task. Although NGO workers possess more power and freedom than detainees, they 
too are subjected to the arbitrary power of authorities. Noémie notes the fundamental 
power gap between officers and NGO affiliates:   
I know that we try to be diplomatic with the border police. We know very well 
that otherwise they can shut all doors; they make the decisions. When we visit 
terminals, we chat with officers as if we were friends and afterwards we are 
astonished (by their answers). But we should never forget that it is them who 
have the power to open the waiting zone for us, it is a constant negotiation and 
we have to play along (Interview, September 2013).  
 
Power differential, isolation and barriers to accessing rights combine to create an 
environment conducive to psychological and physical mistreatment.  	  
VI. Psychological and physical violence  
Terminals are the waiting zone’s spaces where detainees are more likely to 
experience the highest levels of psychological and physical violence. Mistreatment is 
particularly prevalent prior to or upon placement in the waiting zone, when officers 
try to assess the individual’s travel motives over interviews of varying duration. It is 
also very likely to happen during attempts to return the individual, especially against 
his or her will. Different detainees confided having been subject to instances of abuse. 
Rosalita, a young Nicaraguan national who landed in terminal 2E in February 2014 
told me that her final destination was initially Madrid, a city that she wished to visit as 
a tourist. The border police thought otherwise, and tried to force her to admit that her 
intent was to work in Madrid. Officers told her that if she did not tell the truth, they 
would make her clean the airport. She was certain she had understood correctly, as 
her interpreter had conveyed the officers’ words. Several detainees complained that 
officers made fun of them and applied pressure. For example, Carmen, another 
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Central-American national, explained to the police that she was a masseur; but she 
was ridiculed and called a prostitute.  
During the challenging visit aforementioned (February 22) when I was 
forbidden to discuss any “procedures” with detainees, I heard about an allegation of 
mistreatment for the second time. Alfredo, a Cuban national, recounted that 
policemen had beaten Maria, a Central American woman on the morning of the 
previous day (February 21). Maria had been seated just outside of the holding cell 
when he himself was brought to detention. Although Alfredo had not personally 
witnessed the event, when he arrived she was crying and had many bruises on her 
stomach. His testimony concurred with that of a group of Central American women I 
had met in the afternoon of the 21st at the detention center. In the morning, they had 
been held at the terminal in a room close to that of Maria and had heard the incident. 
They had heard officers telling Maria that she was going to be put “in a dark room 
alone”.  
Because the group of Central American citizens in ZAPI3 had told me that 
Maria was now confined in terminal 2F, I decided to visit this terminal’s holding 
room. After waiting for a fairly long time, I was finally invited to observe the end of 
the interview of a non-admitted Nicaraguan national. Philippe, the officer, insisted 
that this constituted a favor: usually it was forbidden for visitors to witness 
interviews, but he was making an exception for me. Was this an attempt to distract me 
from the case of Maria? It is impossible to know, but when I finally got to see the 
holding cell, there was no trace of her. Philippe was very tense and inquired when I 
left: “Could you see everything that you wanted to see?” I shared Maria’s case with 
Anafé employee Lise, who explained that Anafé had never managed to get the border 
police convicted for violence on detainees. Usually, such cases are riddled with 
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issues: eyewitnesses are lacking, and the alleged victim has left the country and 
cannot testify. The case of Maria was no different: she had been returned and nobody 
had witnessed directly her abuse. Nothing could be done.  
Lise explained that she had attended a meeting with the Ministry of the 
Interior during which she had mentioned instances of violence. The Ministry refused 
to take the allegations of mistreatment into account, challenging her instead to present 
proofs and to state what criminal procedure had been launched (Interview, December 
2013). Yet, France is a party to regional and international conventions prohibiting 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.58 As such, 
France has an obligation to prevent and repress torture and other acts of ill treatment. 
But the Ministry of the Interior is not pro-active in terms of safeguarding human 
rights when it comes to the waiting zone. This case is representative of the 
government’s approach to the waiting zone in general: the Ministry of the Interior will 
not take steps to address alleged rights violations unless forced to do so by legal 
proceedings. To unveil the mechanisms behind abuse, it is important to study how 
authorities perceive detainees.  
 
 
VII. Authorities’ perception of detainees  
In order to determine who should come in or not, border agents screen 
passengers and their stories, on the lookout for suspicious elements. Some traveling 
rationales trigger red flags. Salter (2007, 59) observes: 
Border guards build up a common stock of acceptable travel narratives and 
traveler characteristics…In addition to being from a refugee-prone country or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58Amongst other Conventions, France ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1986 and the Council of Europe’s European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1994. 
Furthermore, the prohibition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment is an established jus cogens 
norm. Cf Weissbrodt and Heilman, 2011.  
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region, guards are attendant to other risk factors: buying a plane ticket in cash, 
having another person purchase the ticket, purchasing a ticket close to 
departure time, traveling a long distance for a short time…Travelers are 
reduced from citizens, foreigners, and refugees, with complex identities and 
claims to home into objects of danger or benefit, which perhaps afford entry or 
exit into the national population.  
 
At CDG, after this screening, those denied entry or seeking asylum are placed in 
waiting zones59, carrying the category that has been assigned to them at the border. 
They are either to be returned or to be heard by the refugee agency. In either case, 
those placed in waiting zones are suspect and not to be trusted. In fact, some agents 
are so convinced that detainees are liars, resorting to any possible method to deceive 
them, that they dismiss everything they say as unreliable. During one March visit to 
terminal 2A, I met Laurent from Senegal, whose journey to Portugal had stopped at 
CDG. Laurent recounted that he had previously been refused entry into Schengen 
territory at Lille (a city in the North of France). As I was not aware of Lille having an 
airport, I asked Laurent to confirm that I had understood him correctly. Laurent 
explained that he had flown from Senegal to Algeria and then to Lille, where he was 
turned away. After this visit, Henri, the agent accompanying me, was concerned that I 
might be too gullible. He asserted: “There is no airport in Lille. I hope you do not 
believe everything that they tell you! ” He went on: “These people do not have money 
for tourism; it is impossible to come from the other end of the world for just three 
days.” When I left Henri, he reiterated his point: “Whatever you do, do not go to the 
airport in Lille!” Yet, Lille does have an airport, serving flights to and from Algeria as 
well as Portugal60. In the eyes of some authorities, people lose their individuality once 
in the waiting zone: they join the ranks of faceless “Inads” whose word is necessarily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Unless immediately returned, in which case they will never reach the waiting zone status (cf chapter 
3). 	  
60According to the brochure edited by Lille Airport for the Fall and Winter 2013. The brochure was no 
longer available from the Internet at the time of writing.  
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untrustworthy. The term “Inad” comes from the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) and is used by French border agents. It designates an 
“inadmissible person”, defined as “a person who is or will be refused admission to a 
State by its authorities” (IATA, October 15, 2014, 4). As anthropologist Agier (2008) 
observes, what makes a foreigner (étranger) is not an identity but a place (from a 
material and symbolic standpoint) and a context. The waiting zone is one of several 
places creating the foreigner. To some authorities, the waiting zone embodies an 
outside as well as a supposedly natural inequality and difference (Agier, 2008). 
Detainees are lumped together based on their administrative status; they have not 
been admitted to the country.  
 Henri envisioned his border-enforcement job as necessary to protect his own 
welfare as well as that of the country. Sociologist Bauman contends that modernity 
produces “wasted humans”, i.e. “redundant” or “excessive” beings (5). As new ways 
of making a living emerge, previous ways are degraded and devalued, thereby 
stripping individuals of their livelihood. Present times are also characterized by the 
fullness of our planet: there are no territories left to colonize, “no man’s lands” have 
disappeared. Bauman demonstrates how, in the past, such territories were used as 
“dumping grounds” for the wasted humans who had been rendered undesirable by the 
processes of modernization. The conjunction of these two phenomena (i.e. the 
production of human waste and the fullness of our planet) results in “an acute crisis of 
the human waste disposal industry” (Bauman, 6). Bauman equips us with conceptual 
tools to understand the perspective of some border agents towards both their jobs and 
individuals placed in the waiting zone. Henri insisted that we (French people) should 
help ourselves first, our family and our neighbors, otherwise we would be committing 
suicide (“hara kiri” were his precise words). He noted that from a humanistic 
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perspective, everyone should be able to come in. However it was not possible, due to 
current (unfavorable) economic conditions. Henri therefore conceived his job as a 
shield against social redundancy: “excessive beings” had to be kept outside of the 
country for it to thrive. Bauman writes:   
Immigrants, let us note, fit better into such a purpose than any other category 
of genuine or putative villains. There is a sort of ‘elective affinity’ between 
immigrants (that human waste of distant parts of the globe unloaded into ‘our 
own backyard’) and the least bearable of our own, home-grown fears. When 
all places and positions feel shaky and are deemed no longer reliable, the sight 
of immigrants rubs salt into the wound. Immigrants, and particularly the fresh 
arrivals among them, exude the faint odour of the waste disposal tip which in 
its many disguises haunts the nights of the prospective casualties of rising 
vulnerability. For their detractors and haters, immigrants embody-visibly, 
tangibly, in the flesh- the inarticulate yet hurtful and painful presentiment of 
their own disposability. One is tempted to say that were there no immigrants 
knocking at the doors, they would have to be invented (56).  
 
Financial matters occupied a central place in my conversation with Henri, who 
was disgruntled by a recent talk he had had with an inspector of places of deprivation 
of liberty. According to Henri, the inspector used to work for an NGO “whose role 
was to annoy the government”. Now retired, the inspector worked in such a position 
five days a month and allegedly complained to Henri that his salary was low. Henri 
remarked that “the inspector did not realize that some people did not make as much”, 
especially since this money was supplementing his retirement pension. As for asylum-
seekers, Henri told me they were receiving a lot of state subsidies. I remarked that 
French law prohibited asylum-seekers to work during the assessment of their claim. 
To my observation, Henri replied: “I do not say that they live well, but my wife works 
in the department in charge of allocating subsidies, and they do receive some!” He 
continued: “People who live in poverty at home will always be better off in France, 
because here there are NGOs distributing meals and helping out”. Henri also admitted 
that he was not in favor of people receiving benefits from the state, but preferred 
when people made their own money through entrepreneurship.  
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 Henri was not the only agent to resent non-citizens. Valentin, whom I met at a 
terminal’s reception desk, confided that he was about to leave the force, as he was 
terribly disappointed with the way he and his colleagues were treated by their 
superiors. He explained that work conditions were disastrous, with superiors refusing 
to permit breaks to be taken or to take into account doctor’s notes. According to this 
young policeman, four colleagues had committed suicide over the course of a year 
and a half and their superiors could not care less. He expressed resentment: he 
deplored the fact that foreign nationals received more attention and care than 
themselves. No NGO was interested in checking how policemen were treated.  
Importantly, authorities are not a monolith and should not be essentialized: 
agents do have different stances on both their work and non-citizens placed in the 
waiting zone. On a different day, Simon, a policeman at one of the terminal’s 
reception desks looked at my access card. When he saw the name Human Rights 
Watch, his interest was piqued. He asked: “It [the NGO] is well-known, right”? He 
said he regretted his career choice and confided the torments that his job entailed. He 
lamented that some of his colleagues were racists and that detainees were just “Inads” 
to them. He explained that some colleagues did their job without asking themselves 
any questions: “They come here, do their job and go home. They are happy with 
themselves at the end of the day”. Simon recalled: “One of my superiors told me, ‘you 
are like me, you would prefer borders to be closed’. But it is not my wish at all, I have 
never asked for anything like that”. He reminded me that, historically speaking, we all 
came from Africa and confessed that there were things he was pressured into doing. 
Simon was visibly tense and scared. He told me he had a lot more to say and wanted 
to meet again but outside of his workplace. He explained that he would call from a 
public phone and use a pseudonym to set a meeting. Unfortunately, Simon was never 
	   153	  
interviewed, as he did not call. I do not claim to have depicted comprehensively the 
viewpoints of representative of all of the border agents at CDG. Instead I have merely 
attempted here to present some of the perspectives of some of the agents I met during 
my terminal visits.  
 
 
Conclusion 
While the law treats the waiting zone as a homogenous space, exercising 
rights in airport terminals is particularly challenging. Individuals may spend lengthy 
periods of time in holding cells where they experience a high level of isolation. 
Despite the existence of formal agreements between NGOs and the Ministry of the 
Interior, access to detainees is subject to the border officers’ goodwill. Conditions of 
access are highly variable, reminding the researcher and NGO worker of the 
pronounced power differential at play in this part of the waiting zone. When HRW 
retrieved visitor’s cards, the civil servant working for the Ministry of the Interior 
explained that we could visit whenever and as much as we wanted. However, HRW’s 
office soon received a call (after two visits) from the Ministry of the Interior 
explaining that it would be appreciated if we could inform authorities of visiting plans 
in advance. I had planned to carry out more visits of CDG’s terminals but stopped 
after eight visits61, as I was starting to feel really unwelcome. Officers ridiculed me 
with remarks such as “you must really like it here to come back so often” or “she has 
taken a subscription: 10 entries with one free!” Some were rather threatening, telling 
me that I was very well known on the airport platform or that I should stop coming. I 
also realized that I was taking a significant amount of agents’ time, diverting them 
from their work.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 I carried out one visit in January, five visits in February and two visits in March 2014. Terminal 1, 
2A, 2C, 2D and 2E were all visited three times. Terminal 2F was visited twice. 
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Some authorities’ mindsets towards non-citizens and their border enforcement 
jobs may be conducive to ill treatment. Those placed in waiting zones are seen as 
being impoverished and as undifferentiated masses to be kept at bay for the economic 
sake of the country. Once categorized as “non-admitted” or “asylum-seekers”, 
individuals disappear. As Bauman (2004, 78) argues: “All waste, including wasted 
humans, tends to be piled up indiscriminately on the same refuse tip. The act of 
assigning to waste puts an end to differences, individualities, idiosyncrasies.” The 
very structure of the waiting zone is also conducive to abuse: individuals who are 
wronged are usually returned and do not testify. In this chapter, I have unveiled 
practices and discourses that occur in airport terminals, spaces where third parties 
rarely venture. I will dedicate the following chapter to an exploration of the second 
part of CDG’s waiting zone: the detention center.  
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Chapter 6. ZAPI 3: a place of deprivation of liberty where access to 
rights remains challenging  
  
Introduction  
In chapter 5, I explained that non-citizens accrued certain rights when placed 
under the waiting zone regime. But rights that exist on paper do not necessarily 
translate into protection on the ground. In airport terminals, some rejected travellers 
and asylum seekers never reach the waiting zone status. As for those who do, they 
face many barriers to accessing their rights. Airport terminals constitute the less 
visible part of CDG’s waiting zone. As I discussed in the previous chapter, third 
parties are rarely present; non-citizens are alone with the border police most of the 
time. I would now like to study the other part of CDG’s waiting zone: “ZAPI 3”. 
ZAPI 3 is the detention center located in CDG’s waiting zone. ZAPI 3 stands for zone 
d’attente pour personnes en instance, which can be roughly translated as “waiting 
zone for persons whose case is pending” in English. ZAPI 3 is the most visible and 
accessible part of CDG’s waiting zone. Anne, an employee from Anafé explains: 
“(…) It (CDG) is the most visible of waiting zones, taking into account the fact that 
waiting zones are not very visible” (Interview, December 2013).  
Since 2004, Anafé noticed that the situation of non-citizens significantly 
improved inside the detention facility, which became a “showcase” (vitrine). Police 
officers are used to showing ZAPI 3 to visitors. The officer accompanying HRW 
researchers and myself during a visit in January 2014 told us that ZAPI 3 was a “very 
sensitive” place (“c’est très sensible”) as they received the visits of MPs, UNHCR, 
NGOs, embassies and lawyers. Previously, in September 2013 Dominique, the high-
ranking officer who gave me a tour of the detention center, had insisted that I had 
	   156	  
seen ZAPI 3 as it always was. Nothing had been modified for me: “It has been said 
that it is a place where people are tortured, but you can see, they were not told about 
our visit, it is always like that. We do not embellish anything for visitors.” 
(Observations). NGO presence in ZAPI 3 is unique: Anafé volunteers are present at 
the detention center two (or three) days a week62. As for the Red Cross, its employees 
work in ZAPI 3 seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day. I observed that liberty 
and custody judges at Bobigny often told non-citizens that they could find Anafé and 
the Red Cross at ZAPI 3, as if NGO presence made confinement acceptable and 
guaranteed the respect of rights.  
Yet, as I will demonstrate, the presence of visitors or third parties does not 
guarantee satisfactory access to rights in ZAPI 3. In this space, the issues are not so 
much the material conditions of detention but rather the issue of confinement as well 
as access to rights. ZAPI 3 very much remains a place of deprivation of liberty 
characterized by limited visibility and police omnipresence. ZAPI 3 is a place where 
abuse and tension transpire, in contradiction with euphemistic discourses presenting it 
as a hotel or a place of recreation. NGOs and their individual members face multiple 
challenges in the daily exercise of their mission, forcing them to reflect on and 
negotiate their positioning. To contextualize my findings, I begin by offering some 
background on ZAPI 3 in general and on my research methodology within this space. 
 
I. Background information on ZAPI 3  
ZAPI 3 was built specifically to confine individuals spending the night in 
CDG’s waiting zone. In 2010 and 2011, detainees spent an average of 3.10 days and 
3.5 days at CDG respectively (Anafé, January 2013, 67). ZAPI 3 is unique in terms of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  The French term “association” is translated as “NGO”. 	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its capacity: 163 detainees in the adult area and six in the minor zone. On the ground 
level the following spaces can be found: the offices of the border police unit in charge 
of analysis and follow up of immigration affairs (GASAI), the refugee agency office 
and three rooms for visitors (such as family, friends, lawyers, embassy or consulate 
representative and others). CDG is the only waiting zone where OFPRA, the refugee 
agency, has an office. Detainees are kept away from these spaces by a set of closed 
doors. However they can circulate in the rest of the ground level and access phones, 
two TV rooms, the dining room and the medical facility as well as a small outside 
yard. The “minor zone” (zone mineurs), specifically dedicated to unaccompanied 
minors, is also located on the ground level but only opens from inside. The detainees’ 
bedrooms and showers are located on the first floor, as well as Anafé’s and the Red 
Cross’ offices and a small children playroom. I will now briefly describe how these 
two organizations secured access to ZAPI 3 as well as their mission.  
The Red Cross has been offering humanitarian support to detainees in CDG’s 
waiting zone since 2003, after signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Ministry of the Interior on October 6, 2003. This memorandum outlines the mandate 
of the Red Cross, which consists of psychological support and provision of “any 
useful information” to those detained in the waiting zone. The organization also 
commits to supplying first-necessity goods and in serving as mediator between non-
citizens and civil servants working in the waiting zone (Cf Convention in De Loisy, 
2005, 181). The term “mediator” (médiateur), which designates a Red Cross 
employee working in the waiting zone, seems to derive from this mission statement. 
As of 2012, twenty-three mediators worked in small teams in rotating shifts, enabling 
the Red Cross to be present in ZAPI3 twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 
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The 2003 memorandum was initially signed for six months but other agreements were 
signed afterwards.  
I could not access the memorandum covering the period from January 1, 2011 
to December 31, 2013 or the subsequent one. But the mission of the Red Cross 
seemed to have remained the same according to the organization’s internal report for 
2012, which details the tasks performed by employees (Red Cross, 2013). The tasks 
include providing detainees with psychological as well as material support through 
the distribution of phone cards, childcare products, hot drinks, and clothes. The report 
also states that: “The Red Cross facilitates in general the relations between the police 
and the persons who are held (personnes maintenues), as well as with all the other 
stakeholders in the waiting zone” (Red Cross, 2013, 11). According to the report, the 
Red Cross intervenes on behalf of non-citizens, requesting information from the 
border police regarding their individual cases. Employees also forward to the police 
any specific request a non-citizen may have, for example to be sent to another country 
other than the country of his or her departure. The report goes on to explain that 
employees can help the asylum-seeker “to structure his or her asylum story and 
encourage him or her to be specific by asking questions”. This assistance has to take 
place “while respecting the Red Cross’s neutrality principle” (Red Cross, 2013, 11).  
Anafé’s mission differs from that of the Red Cross. On March 5, 2004, Anafé 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Ministry of the Interior whereby 
the organization secured the permission to access ZAPI 3 permanently, that is at any 
point in time and without any time limits. Anafé employees explained that the NGO 
decided to use this privileged access to offer legal aid to those placed in waiting zones 
to compensate for the lack thereof. In practice, Anafé is present in ZAPI two or three 
days a week (Interview, December 2013). Employees, Lise and Anne described the 
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organization’s mission: Anafé strives to ensure the respect of existing laws applicable 
to individuals arriving at the border, but also tries to modify laws and practices by 
either legal action or negotiation, although the latter is more complicated. In addition, 
Anafé also aims to inform the public about practices and proceedings at the border 
and to assist those placed in waiting zones (Interview, December 2013) 
 During the course of my research, I visited ZAPI 3 five times. I was lucky to 
have Dominique, a high-ranking border police officer, accompany me for my first 
visit, which occurred after I interviewed him in my capacity as doctoral researcher. I 
carried out the four other visits as a Human Rights Watch volunteer; half of these 
visits took place with HRW researchers, and half were conducted alone. 
Formally interviewing Red Cross employees working in the waiting zone 
proved impossible. I had secured an interview with a Red Cross mediator. We were to 
meet outside of the waiting zone at the airport but at the last minute she cancelled. 
She explained that her supervisor, the director of the waiting zone, had forbidden her 
to answer any questions until I specifically obtained permission from the 
headquarters’ Department of Communication. After numerous emails and phone calls, 
the contact person at the communication’s department announced that I would receive 
permission, provided I signed a confidentiality agreement. However, I never received 
the said agreement and was always told to continue waiting. Hence the data comes 
from conversations with mediators during participant-observation in the waiting zone 
or from interviews with former Red Cross mediators. In general, the Red Cross’ 
mission in the waiting zone appears to be shrouded in secrecy. Previous researchers 
also failed to obtain detailed material on the Red Cross’ activities. Bacon, who 
explored the relationships between ZAPI 3 actors in her masters’ thesis, explained 
that she could not carry out any interviews with mediators or with the Red Cross’ 
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director in ZAPI 3. The director told her that he had forwarded her request to the 
communication’s department but had never received any answer (Bacon, 2013)63. 
Some mediators are aware of this culture of secrecy. During one visit of the minor 
zone, one mediator told me: “The less we talk, the better it is at the Red Cross”.  
Now that I have given an overview of ZAPI 3 and of some of the actors 
working in this space, I will show that some discourses present ZAPI 3 as a “hotel”.  
 
II. Euphemistic discourses: ZAPI 3 as a “hotel” 
In the early 1990s, some discourses minimized the issue of confinement, 
obscuring what was at stake for those detained in the international zone or in what 
was construed as its extension. Some actors expressed the idea that those confined in 
the waiting zone were hosted in desirable hotel-like conditions. Before 
parliamentarians, Marchand, the Minister of the Interior who introduced the 1991 
amendment that later became the waiting zone legislation, insisted that non-citizens in 
transit zones were not detained: they were not on French territory (cf chapter 2). 
Contrary to non-citizens detained on French territory, those in waiting zones were free 
to move and therefore did not need as many legal safeguards. Marchand introduced a 
new legal term to distinguish between the two categories of non-citizens: those who 
are to be removed because they are residing illegally in the country are called retenus 
(a term that can roughly be translated as “detained”), whereas those who are placed in 
waiting zones are called maintenus (“held” in English). This different vocabulary 
conveys the idea that those in waiting zones experience a greater degree of freedom, 
the term maintenu not expressing as strong a constraint as retenu. The Constitutional 
Council legitimized this distinction manufactured by the government, which made its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Lucie Bacon, Jeux d’acteurs en zone d’attente, 2012-2013.  
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way into the final law. It has no legitimate basis and I therefore use the English term 
“detention” to refer to the deprivation of liberty to which people are subject when 
placed under the legal regime of the waiting zone.  
In turn, parliamentarians embraced the government’s discourse and legal 
language. In June 1992, just before the National Assembly adopted the law that 
established the waiting zone (cf chapter 1), Pezet told the MPs of his recent visit to 
the hotel Arcade at CDG airport, where non-admitted citizens were confined. As the 
rapporteur of the law commission of the National Assembly, Pezet’s discourse carried 
a certain weight: he was addressing the MPs as a person who had examined the 
proposed bill scrupulously and who therefore had a better understanding of it.64 This 
is how he describes his visit: 
I had the opportunity of going to Roissy very early in the morning, 
accompanied by an administrator from the National Assembly. We could 
observe what was going on. We saw the Arcade hotel of which so much has 
been said. A hotel just like any other! We go to the first floor: the doors are 
just like all the others. Of course, the police are there, there is a register with 
the name of the people staying on this floor and their room number. We 
visited these rooms. They brought back old memories. They look like youth 
hostels-three beds per room-but they are quite decent (correct) and each one 
has a shower. There are no bars to the windows (French National Assembly 
debates, June 24 1992, 2696).  
 
I previously traced how, in the 1980s and early 1990s, non-citizen populations were 
detained in a legal vacuum. Asylum-seekers were particularly at risk of refoulement 
(cf chapters 1 and 2). Pezet compared the situation of those detained indefinitely after 
fleeing their countries to that of young travellers staying willingly in a youth hostel. 
This comparison negated the plight of the former.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 According to the website of the National Assembly, permanent commissions have a double function: 
preparing the legislative debate as well as informing MPs and controlling the government. The law 
commission (commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale 
de la République) is a permanent commission. Cf: Summary sheet n°24: permanent commissions 
(Fiches de synthèse n°24: les commissions permanentes), available at: http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/decouvrir-l-assemblee/role-et-pouvoirs-de-l-assemblee-nationale/les-organes-de-l-
assemblee-nationale/les-commissions-permanentes. Accessed January 22, 2016. See also the 
Regulation manual of the National Assembly (Règlement de l’Assemblée Nationale), Chapter IX.  
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The government’s willingness to understate the deprivation of liberty also 
transpires in the legal terminology still in use to refer to the waiting zones’ physical 
spaces of confinement. The Law on the Waiting Zone reads that the waiting zone may 
comprise “one or several hotel-like accommodations” located in or nearby the train 
station, port or airport (CESEDA, article L221-2, December 2015) 65. Charles de 
Gaulle’s waiting zone is equipped with the biggest of such “hotel-like 
accommodation”: ZAPI 3. It is the only structure that was built specifically to detain 
non-admitted travelers. The number “three” is attached to the place’s name as other 
structures previously served to detain those placed under the waiting zone framework 
at CDG. ZAPI 3 opened in January 2001. Before this date, non-admitted non-citizens 
and asylum-seekers were confined in nearby hotels (such as Arcade and Ibis, called 
“ZAPI 1”) and then in a part of the Mesnil-Amelot detention center (ZAPI 2), whose 
initial purpose was and still is to detain non-citizens who are to be deported after 
residing illegally in the country. Overnight detention in ZAPI 2 and in airport 
terminals endured for a period of time after ZAPI 3 opened, due to the high number of 
individuals in CDG’s waiting zone at the time (Médecins du Monde, March 2003).  
 Fieldwork revealed that some people currently working in Charles de 
Gaulle’s waiting zone also adopted the legal language. During a terminal visit in 
February 2014, I saw a young and dynamic interpreter explain to Isabela, a distressed 
Nicaraguan national whose final destination was Madrid, that she would be taken to 
the “police hotel” (hotel de la policía). Inspectors of places of deprivation of liberty 
(cf chapter 3) also witnessed an officer explain to a rejected traveller that “ZAPI is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 “Elle peut inclure, sur l'emprise, ou à proximité, de la gare, du port ou de l'aéroport ou à proximité du 
lieu de débarquement, un ou plusieurs lieux d'hébergement assurant aux étrangers concernés des 
prestations de type hôtelier.” CESEDA, L221-2, December 2015.  
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hotel managed by the police” (CGLPL, 2013, 64). Interestingly, several detainees I 
met referred to ZAPI 3 as a “hotel”.  
Some actors still consider CDG’s detention center as a place of recreation, 
particularly for young people. Pierre, one of the doctors working at ZAPI 3, depicts 
the detention center as a sort of summer camp: “When you are 25, it is nice here; they 
make noise, they prevent the others from sleeping” (observations). With regard to 
unaccompanied minors in the minor zone, he remarks that they have access to toys. 
The Red Cross manages the minor zone in ZAPI 3. The organization’s internal report 
(2013) presents the typical daily schedule for children in the minor zone. 
Interestingly, this schedule curiously resembles one that could be found in a summer 
camp or in day care:  
7:45 am: waking up, shower 
8:30 am: breakfast 
9:00 am: minors do their laundry if necessary 
9:30 am: writing down the date, seasons, holidays: in order to be able to 
situate themselves in time alphabetization is offered to those willing to learn 
French language 
10:30 am: several activities are offered to minors in the morning: dancing, 
singing, soccer, etc… 
12:30 pm: lunch at the cafeteria 
1:00 pm: free time: reading, watching TV, napping 
3:00pm: collective activities: artistic activities, board games, etc… 
4:00 pm: snack preparation with the minors’ participation 
4:30 pm: snack at the cafeteria 
5:00 pm: return in minor zone 
5:30 pm: collective activities: dancing, music, wii, etc… 
6:30 pm: dinner 
7:00 pm: return in minor zone 
Activities: reading, stories, board games, TV… 
10:30: bedtime  
 
However, in spite of these discourses portraying ZAPI 3 as a hotel or place of 
recreation, it remains a detention center where individuals are deprived of liberty and 
face forced return.  
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III. A place of deprivation of liberty where tension transpires 
Even google maps, google’s mapping application, designates ZAPI 3 as a “hotel” 
(but places the expression “holding area” in brackets next to it). Yet, when exploring 
Charles de Gaulle airport’s compounds with google maps, it is impossible to get too 
close to ZAPI3, no doubt for security reasons. Surrounded by a high fence topped up 
with barbed wire, ZAPI 3 hardly resembles a hotel. Figure 6. ZAPI 3. Source: 
google maps, August 2016 
 
According to an internal report from the Red Cross (2013), about 15 video 
surveillance cameras are posted both within and outside the building. Windows 
cannot open and the furniture is attached to the floor for security reasons. Border 
officers frequently police the corridors, 24 hours a day. They call detainees through 
speakers between 7:00 am and 9:00 pm (Red Cross, 2013 and observations). Raoul, 
an Anafé volunteer with three years of experience, describes ZAPI 3 as a place 
“where the level of stress is unbelievable” (Interview, October 2013). Furthermore, 
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detainees routinely experience psychological mistreatment and humiliation at ZAPI 3. 
Raoul witnessed countless racist jokes on the part of the border police. For example, 
he heard the police call a Chinese national through speakers with a strong Chinese 
accent: “M. Chang is called downstairs with his luggage”. He narrates another 
incident that took place during a summer. In response to a detainee’s request to lower 
the blinds to block out the sunlight, an agent replied, “Kirikou, you are not used to 
sunshine over there?” (Interview, October 2013). Kirikou is the name of a small 
African boy in the eponym-animated film. 
Red Cross and Anafé employees and volunteers explain that working at ZAPI 3 
takes a toll. Being in ZAPI 3, as a detainee or as a worker, is physically and 
emotionally draining. Laura, a former Red Cross mediator, explains that she had to 
leave her job after two years because it was a “very tough and tiring job” (Interview, 
August 2013). As for Raoul, the Anafé volunteer, he explains that he regularly needs 
breaks from the waiting zone, as assisting individuals there is too trying:  
Humanly it is not always easy. I went a lot to the waiting zone, and it true that 
since three years I am there a lot, but there are times where I stop going to the 
waiting zone. Because I go there a lot and after going there three times a week 
for three months I stop, I cannot do it anymore, I have a knot in the stomach 
before going” (Interview, October 2013).  
 
In the past, tension used to reach even higher levels in ZAPI 3. Paul, former Red 
Cross mediator, explains that over the course of the eight years he spent in ZAPI 3 the 
Red Cross managed to secure some progress:  
It was very difficult at first for everybody. When we arrived the waiting zone 
(ZAPI 3) was packed with a capacity of 164, anyway I do not recall. Tension 
was tangible, officers were waking up people at 4:00 am in order to present 
them to the court of first instance at 10:00 am, they make them go downstairs, 
with calls through speakers at any time of the day and night, with a (very loud) 
volume. Persons and their sleep were not respected, which meant that tension 
was more tangible (Interview with Paul, August 2013).  
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The Red Cross managed to reduce tension, by waking up people individually by 
knocking gently on their bedroom doors, instead of the police calling individuals 
through speakers or knocking on their door violently with their guns. Paul also credits 
the Red Cross for stopping overnight calls through speakers. When ZAPI 3 first 
opened, there were barely enough beds and detainees had to be returned promptly to 
make room for the next wave of arrivals. Paul recalls: “Policemen were under 
pressure, some people had to leave to be replaced, otherwise, if you do not have 60 
individuals leave and today there are 60 individuals, there will be no more space and 
as the result ZAPI will be full, overloaded (Interview, August 2013).” Tension 
diminished over the years as fewer individuals were placed in the waiting zone.  
ZAPI 3 is a place of confinement where detainees are subject to rules and 
constraints and have limited agency. People who are strangers to one another are 
assigned to the same bedroom, provided they are of the same sex. Women, men and 
families are all detained in the same facility. Women and men are detained together 
but do not share rooms, unless they are family members. Individuals are infantilized 
in ZAPI 3 and lose control over the simplest actions, like choice of TV channel. 
Detainees do not have direct access to the remote controlling of the television and 
need to ask the Red Cross to change channels (observations). Frequently, those 
confined in ZAPI 3 do not have access to their checked luggage, and have no choice 
but to spend the entire duration of their stay in the same set of clothes. There are no 
washing machines on site (observations and 2013 Red Cross report). A Bulgarian 
national I met in terminal 2C’s holding room asked me to speak to the police on his 
behalf, explaining that he had spent 15 days in waiting zone without access to his 
luggage.  
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Raoul, an Anafé volunteer, believes that confinement in the waiting zone 
constitutes in itself a form of violence: “So violence is already here. It is inherent to 
the waiting zone. It is detention, presence of cameras, presence of policemen, lack of 
information, lack of interpreters, disgusting food that does not respect your religious 
convictions. Violence is inherent to the waiting zone” (Interview, October 2013). 
Some detainees find comfort in the presence of compatriots at ZAPI 3, while others 
experience their confinement as trauma. Amine, a young Algerian man I met in a 
terminal’s holding cell in March confided: “At the hotel you are panicked in your 
room. At the hotel you do not understand anything”. Lea, a liberty and custody judge 
at Bobigny, laments that some individuals are locked up in spite of them fulfilling all 
the criteria to be able to enter France. The border police could release them but prefer 
them to be taken to court after four days of being placed under the waiting zone 
regime. Léa worries about the consequences:  
The administration forwards to us (liberty and custody judges) all the 
documents that we need to support our decision but does not release them 
before. It waits for us to take this decision. And it is a bit unfortunate because 
we have individuals who are shattered, who miss their connection, who miss 
their stay, who are traumatized. And it is unfortunate. Let us say that there are 
mistakes that are very unfortunate. And it happens quite often (Interview, 
November 2013).  
 
Even detainees who explain that the conditions of detention are good in ZAPI 
3 confide the difficulties of detention per se. Cherif, an Algerian national I met in 
February in terminal 2A’s holding room explained: “In ZAPI the accommodation 
conditions are acceptable, but we can feel that we are locked. There is a fence, you are 
not free”. Detainees usually compared the entry policies at home and in the Schengen 
area. During a March visit, a woman from Burkina Faso told me it was the first time 
she was locked up, which was “humiliating”: “When you are locked up at home it is 
because you committed a very serious offence. At the airport in Burkina Faso if you 
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do not have a visa it is possible to buy one on site at the airport. It costs the double: 
you pay 100 euro instead of 50. In Burkina Faso you can enter the territory without 
passport and visa. We give you the slip and you come back two days afterwards”. 
Many detainees do not understand why they are deprived of liberty and feel that they 
are being treated like criminals. This feeling may be compounded by police 
omnipresence in ZAPI 3.  
 
IV. Limited visibility and police omnipresence  
ZAPI 3 is more open to NGOs than other waiting zones. Nevertheless it 
remains a structure with very limited visibility. ZAPI 3 is located in the freight area of 
the airport, close to the runway: detainees can watch planes take off and land from the 
small, enclosed yard where they are allowed to smoke. It is possible to reach ZAPI 3 
using public transportation: a bus serving the airport compounds can be taken from 
the train station “Charles de Gaulle 1”. However, ZAPI 3 visitors may well get lost on 
the way for lack of directions. The detention center is not featured on the bus map at 
the train station “Charles de Gaulle 1”. Similarly, the bus stop’s name (Rue des 
Vignes, Vineyard street) does not give any hint regarding the location of ZAPI 3 and 
there are no indications between the bus stop and ZAPI 3. Drivers will be facing the 
same issues, as there are no road signs indicating the center. ZAPI 3 itself does not 
have any identification sign.  
The general public knows nothing or very little of ZAPI 3; publicity is kept to 
a minimum. For example, documentaries about CDG airport simply omit the presence 
of ZAPI 3. Public TV channel “France 3” (December 12, 2013) produced an 
extensive report (duration: 1h50) on the airport in December 2013, called “Roissy 
Charles de Gaulle, immediate boarding” (Roissy Charles de Gaulle, embarquement 
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immediat). Explaining that Roissy was “a possible entry point for illegal immigrants”, 
the report did talk about the work of the border police and showed a gangway control 
of passengers arriving from Istanbul. The voice over explained that several passengers 
were brought to the airport police station and returned to their countries of origin. 
However, the report failed to mention the confinement of these young women, 
eluding the existence of both terminals’ holding cells and of ZAPI 3 entirely.  
In general, ZAPI 3 is a place where detainees are highly reliant on the police. 
Phones with cameras are confiscated, as it is forbidden to take pictures on airport 
compounds. As a result, detainees have to request permission from the police in order 
to access their phone book (observations at the Bobigny court). Furthermore, as 
Dominique explains, the police are in charge of the entire “administrative 
proceedings” in ZAPI 3 (Interview, September 2013). This means that asylum-seekers 
first have to see the police in order to lodge a request to enter France on asylum 
grounds. The police then issue and forward a document (procès-verbal de demande 
d’asile) to the refugee agency (OFPRA) in ZAPI 3. This document “mentions the 
identity of the individual, the date of his or her entry to France, the documents he or 
she possesses, and policemen also explain to the individual the proceedings as well as 
his or her rights in the waiting zone. And we cannot hear anybody without this 
document” (Interview with Miriam, OFPRA agent in ZAPI 3, November 2013).  
Likewise, the police notify claimants of the Ministry of the Interior’s decision. 
Miriam explains: “We (OFPRA agents) send our opinion to the Ministry which 
forwards its decision to the border police which inform non-citizens.” (Interview, 
November 2013). During the hearing, OFPRA agents write down the declarations of 
the claimants. It is the claimant’s right to receive a copy of this document, which is of 
particular use should they decide to appeal the Ministry of the Interior’s decision. 
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Again, asylum-seekers receive their declarations from authorities in ZAPI 3. While 
officers insist that they do not read the declarations, Anafé finds these practices 
problematic, and insists that it is not a practical question but rather a question of 
principle: the police should not have access to these documents (Interview with 
Raoul, October 2013) 66.  
Georges, an ad hoc administrator, observes that the detention center is a 
continuous space, making it a complicated structure to navigate, especially for 
asylum-seekers. ZAPI 3 is not legible to detainees, as establishing the distinction 
between the police unit and the rest of the center is challenging: 
The waiting zone is not necessarily the best place to make an asylum-claim, 
this is certain. What I reproach is that it is always the same premises. In the 
same place we have the dormitory, the cafeteria, the TV, we go through a door 
and were are at OFPRA, we go through another door and we are at the GASAI 
(i.e. police unit in charge of following the administrative cases of those placed 
in the waiting zone), the lawyers, the visits it is almost the same rooms, we are 
at the same place, it is the same spatial unity. It is really unpleasant because I 
am convinced that one is not at ease other there. Even for myself, with my 
years of experience I do not go to the GASAI light-heartedly. To me it is a 
place of deprivation of liberty and at the GASAI I am not in my element, I am 
not home because it is a place… I know it is not a prison, but we are in a place 
that is not neutral (Interview, October 2013).  
 
 As George’s observation shows, ZAPI 3 is a place where asymmetrical power 
relations prevail, and manifest geographically. NGO members have to be constantly 
aware of the power relations at play in ZAPI 3. Otherwise they run the risk of putting 
at further risk the individuals whom they are trying to assist. One day at ZAPI 3, I was 
confronted with instances of mistreatment. While I was conversing with Anafé’s 
volunteers in the small room allocated to the organization, a group of six women from 
Central America burst into the office showing signs of great distress. Veronica, Joyce, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Anafé and OFPRA gave me inconsistent information. According to OFPRA, agents print off the 
declarations and forward them to the police in a sealed envelope (Interview with Stéphanie, Miriam 
and Charline, November 2013). However, according to Raoul, OFPRA faxes the declaration to border 
officers, who then put the document in a sealed envelope (Interview, October 2013). 	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Amanda, Jazmin, Gabriela and Lola recounted mistreatment by police during the 
attempt to force them on the plane. They showed the multiple contusions that covered 
their bodies. Jazmin had a certificate from the facility’s doctor documenting the 
wounds.  
Anafé’s employees (contacted at the headquarters over the phone) told the 
volunteers that the women could file a complaint if they so wished. The Central 
American nationals agreed. As none of the volunteers spoke Spanish, I was the only 
one who could collect their testimonies. Anafé’s employees warned us that we had to 
be careful and act with the highest discretion when preparing the complaints for the 
public prosecutor. The mistreated detainees could be returned overnight should the 
officers in ZAPI 3 realize they were launching complaints against their colleagues. 
We did manage to send the complaints to the state prosecutor without attracting the 
immediate attention of the police in ZAPI 3. But the state prosecutor did not 
investigate the allegations of abuse. Gabriela and Amanda were returned shortly 
afterwards while Veronica, Joyce, Jazmin and Lola were sentenced to a few months in 
prison by a criminal court for remaining illegally on French territory (cf section VI). 
In general, detainees experience multiple barriers to accessing remedies in case of 
mistreatment.  
 
V. Barriers to accessing remedies in case of mistreatment  
As the case of the Central American women shows, ZAPI 3 is the place where 
abuse that occurred in other spaces of the waiting zone becomes visible. Red Cross 
and Anafé workers do not necessarily witness first-hand the alleged facts (especially 
when it comes to physical violence) but hear of them upon the individual’s return to 
the detention center. As I will demonstrate in this section, the presence of Anafé and 
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of the Red Cross in ZAPI 3 does not guarantee that individuals who experience 
mistreatment will be able to obtain remedy. Red Cross workers have been constrained 
by their organization’s mandate and positioning. The Red Cross has been reluctant to 
engage in any action that could damage its relation with border authorities. Anafé 
workers have not faced the same issues, as their organization chose to be vocal in the 
denunciation of abuse. However, launching a complaint for allegations of 
mistreatment is a challenging process. Furthermore, state prosecutors rarely 
investigate such allegations in the waiting zone. This leaves those who experienced 
abuse with very limited (or no) recourses. I begin with describing further the issue of 
police violence at CDG’s waiting zone.  
Police violence in this space was documented by regional human rights 
monitoring bodies such as the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (2003, paragraphs 10-15 and 2007, 
paragraphs 54-56). Detainees have long complained of mistreatment taking place 
outside of ZAPI 3. Noémie, who worked in ZAPI 3 as an Anafé volunteer for ten 
months, attempts to analyze the causes of police violence:  
There is a police violence that is legal. The boundary is not very clear; a return 
with escort is a return where officers have the right to tie you and there is an 
entire set of movements that are authorized, techniques, and therefore when 
you possess legitimate violence, the point where it becomes illegitimate it not 
really clear in your head. For me it is rather clear! And also there are orders 
from above, superiors that tell you “this person has to be returned” for 
example. It also has to do with the fact that in waiting zone non-citizens are 
considered a migratory risk, often liars, they are completely humiliated, they 
are nobody, their word is not worth anything if they do not have official 
documents they are nobody, and therefore it is part of the same process of 
infantilization, humiliation, the fact of being violent even verbally, there is a 
lot of verbal abuse, more than physical abuse…(Interview with Noémie, 
September 2013).  
 
As Noémie mentions, instances of mistreatment have been particularly 
prevalent during attempts to force detainees on planes or during transfer from planes 
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to ZAPI 3 after the attempts have failed. Those placed in waiting zones can be sent 
back with or without escort. The decision to escort is made by the border police on a 
case-by-case basis, and depends on the individual’s willingness to comply. Makaremi 
(2009 b) has analyzed violence during return attempts with escort. As she explains, 
the French government created a police unit specifically dedicated to forced returns 
and deportations in January 1999: UNESI or National escort, support and intervention 
unit (Unité nationale d’escorte, de soutien et d’intervention). UNESI was created 
following the death of a Sri-Lankan asylum-seeker. UNESI officers receive specific 
training; they learn technical professional gestures (gestes techniques professionnels). 
These gestures were developed with the assistance of doctors. Escorting techniques 
are rationalized and the use of force is reduced to managing life and bodies: violence 
is denied. Makaremi (2009 b) remarks that during the flight, the use of force is 
extremely codified. Moreover, flight crew and passengers watch officers. However, 
before or after the codified procedure (i.e. before boarding or after disembarking the 
plane), brutal mistreatment occurs, in places far away from the public gaze: airport 
corridors, the van bringing the individual back to ZAPI, or police stations in 
terminals. 
Red Cross workers wishing to address the issue of violence have been 
constrained by their organization’s mandate and positioning. When ZAPI 3 first 
opened, allegations of mistreatment were particularly numerous. Several Red Cross 
mediators tried to address the issue but their efforts were to no avail. Paul, a former 
Red Cross mediator, describes the procedure that had to be followed by mediators in 
such instances. Mediators were instructed to collect the person’s testimony and to 
forward it to their superior who would then raise the issue with the border police 
director at a weekly meeting (Interview, August 2013).  
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Journalist De Loisy spent six months in ZAPI 3 from October 2003 to April 
2004. She conducted an undercover investigation, taking on the role of a mediator. 
She was a colleague of Paul. She wrote that, at some point, mediators received 
testimonies of abuse every day (De Loisy, 2005, p.143-159). Testimonies strongly 
resembled one another and were often backed by medical certificates issued by the 
medical service in ZAPI 3. De Loisy and her colleagues felt powerless when 
confronting police violence. Different teams of mediators raised the issue to their 
superior, who routinely answered: “The issue will be addressed at the next meeting 
with the border police. Meanwhile, remain NEUTRAL.” Their superior insisted: “We 
do not judge the work carried out by the border police, in any circumstance. We ask 
you, in the respect of the Red Cross neutrality principle, to stop writing sarcastic 
comments in the correspondence notebook” (used for communication between Red 
Cross mediators and their superiors) (De Loisy, 157-158).  
While allegations of violence greatly diminished over time, Paul regrets the 
police’s attitude towards the issue: “It is true that the police ask us not to talk about it 
anymore. If the person arrives with traces of handcuffs these are not mistreatments, it 
is procedure. If we say, this is how it happened, they say (the police): ‘It is absolutely 
normal, it is the law that enables it when people are escorted’. For them it is not 
mistreatment.” (Interview, August 2013). Paul no longer works in ZAPI 3, but 
follows events occurring in the waiting zone in his current capacity at the Red Cross. 
The Red Cross report (2013) also laments that the border police stopped the dialogue 
with the Red Cross regarding allegations of mistreatment. 
Contrary to the Red Cross, Anafé chose to be vocal in the denunciation of 
these issues, releasing reports documenting violence at the hands of the police (see for 
example Anafé April 2001, March 2003, November 2015) as well as supporting the 
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alleged victims’ claims to relevant bodies. However, more than ten years after De 
Loisy’s experience, Anafé employee Lise is as disheartened and frustrated as De 
Loisy. Lise explains that officers involved in mistreatment are never punished for 
their actions (Interview, December 2013). The aforementioned case (cf section IV) of 
the six Central American nationals illustrates her statement: two women were 
returned shortly afterwards while four were sentenced to a few months in prison by a 
criminal court for remaining illegally on French territory. Their complaints never 
went through; the state prosecutor never contacted them, and thus the police were not 
held accountable for their actions. Anafé 2015’s report documents the obstacles faced 
by those who experienced mistreatment at the hands of authorities. Lodging a 
complaint is itself a challenging process. As detainees cannot complain to the police, 
their only recourse is to file a claim with the state prosecutor, for which they need to 
be assisted. In many cases individuals cannot be heard, as they are returned shortly 
after lodging the complaint. Moreover, state prosecutors seldom launch an inquiry for 
these types of events. As for liberty and custody judges, they usually consider such 
allegations outside of their mandate, therefore not allowing them to impact the 
decision to extend the duration of detention after four days (Anafé, November 2015).  
The presence of NGOs in ZAPI 3 does not guarantee that detainees will access 
(effective) remedies in case of mistreatment. Neither does it guarantee the 
implementation of the rights set out in the Law on the Waiting Zone.  
 
VI. Barriers to accessing legal aid  
In this section, I will show that detainees in ZAPI 3 experience barriers to 
accessing legal aid, in spite of the NGO Anafé providing such assistance a few days a 
week. Absence of accessible and sufficient legal aid leaves the door open to 
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fraudulent practices: detainees may fall prey to unethical legal counsel. I begin by 
explaining that, although detainees are entitled to certain rights under the Law on the 
Waiting Zone, the implementation of these rights is challenging. Accessing legal aid 
is more difficult for detainees in the waiting zones than for those deemed on the 
territory.  
Legal assistance and the possibility to communicate in one’s language are 
crucial to accessing rights. According to the law, any person placed under the waiting 
zone status must be informed of his or her right to contact a lawyer and seek the 
assistance of an interpreter (CESEDA, article L221-4). But in practice, hiring a 
lawyer or an interpreter may prove challenging. Indeed, the detainees themselves 
must incur these expenses. Non-citizens can benefit from free legal counsel and 
interpreter only when presented to judges (CESEDA, articles L222-3 and L222-7). 
Apart from the actual hearing at the court, detainees are left without state-paid legal or 
interpretation assistance67. Barriers to legal assistance are many: detainees must know 
whom to contact and must be able to afford such assistance. Allophone detainees may 
also need an interpreter to communicate with their legal counsel, which entails an 
additional cost.  
Anafé mitigates this situation by providing free legal aid in ZAPI 3 a few days 
a week (two to three days). But this assistance is insufficient and cannot guarantee 
access to rights for all detainees. Only a fraction of those detained in ZAPI 3 benefit 
from this service: about one tenth go through Anafé’s office, an ordinary bedroom 
that was turned into a legal aid clinic (Interview, December 2013). Trained Anafé 
volunteers also rely on volunteers to provide interpretation services. The availability 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Border officers must also notify the placement in the waiting zone as well as the attached rights to 
the individual in a language that he or she understands, cf chapter 5.  
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of these interpreters is limited and may affect the ability of Anafé volunteers to assist 
Allophone detainees.  
In France, NGOs are paid by the state to provide legal aid to non-citizens who 
are detained for illegal residence in the country prior to their deportation (i.e. to those 
considered already on the territory, not in waiting zones). NGOs compete to get this 
market in a public tender; the government then funds the activities of the tender 
winners. The government therefore allocates funds for legal assistance when detainees 
are considered on the territory, but not before. Once again, those placed in waiting 
zones are disadvantaged compared to those in rétention.  
Anafé employees insist that the organization cannot and does not aspire to 
legally assist all detainees in Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone. Anafé advocates for a 
legal aid clinic financed by the state and staffed with lawyers. Lise from Anafé 
explained:  
The law does not provide for lawyers in the waiting zone. There is nothing. So 
it is us who supply a part of this legal aid, knowing that it is out of the 
question for us to replace a service that should be financed and organized by 
the state. We do not, and we will never guarantee that non-citizens’ rights are 
respected in the waiting zone. We are first of all an observer and we use the 
law to support our demands and observations (Interview, December 2013). 
 
Anafé decided to use its privileged access to ZAPI 3 to provide legal aid to some 
detainees but as explained in section I, the organization’s mission is much broader.  
Anafé and its member organizations have long pondered the NGO’s 
involvement at the detention center. As early as 2004, Amnesty International feared 
that Anafé’s presence might be counterproductive and contribute to legitimization and 
reinforcement of the system rather than its denunciation (Amnesty International, 
2004).68 I asked Raoul whether this debate was over. At the time of our interview 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  At the early research stage, I had the opportunity to meet with scholar Makaremi who had researched 
Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone as an anthropologist, taking on the role of an Anafé volunteer. She 
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(October 2013), Raoul had been volunteering with Anafé for almost three years and 
was a member of the administrative council of the organization. He answered: “It is a 
question that we still ask ourselves nowadays.” At my invitation to expand discussion 
of the issue of legal aid, Raoul confessed: “There is a crisis at the moment at Anafé. I 
will not go into details but the legal aid clinic is currently called into question; each 
organization (composing Anafé) has its own vision of non-citizens’ rights, of its realm 
of action, of its own mandate too ” (Interview, October 2013).  
Anafé functions mainly with private donations and, as already explained, does 
not receive money from the state to offer legal aid. Anne and Lise lament that many 
people fail to understand Anafé’s objective. Many stakeholders think that it is Anafé’s 
duty to offer legal aid to all ZAPI 3 detainees. Lise said: “There are false assertions 
regarding the mission of Anafé. Sometimes in court the administration lawyer affirms 
‘Anafé is very well paid to do what it does’. No, we are not publicly funded to do 
what we do.” (Interview, December 2013). On different instances I indeed heard 
stakeholders complain about Anafé not fulfilling its mission well. For example, at the 
Appeals court in October 2013 the administration’s lawyer asserted: “Anafé is never 
here (in ZAPI 3), does not do its work in spite of receiving subsidies”.  
Fraudulent practices thrive in the absence of accessible and sufficient legal 
aid. In France, lawyers do not have the right to approach potential clients first. This is 
explicitly forbidden by article 10.2 of the lawyers’ internal regulations manual (2007). 
However, there is evidence that lawyers contravene this rule regularly. At CDG’s 
detention center I met José, a Nicaraguan national who introduced himself as a 
professor of literature in Nicaragua. His initial goal had been to visit a friend in Spain. 
He explained that he had been standing on the first floor of the detention center, near 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
gave me access to materials produced by either Anafé itself or its member organizations. The document 
to which I hereby refer was an internal document produced by Amnesty International. 	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the phone booths. All of the sudden the phones started to ring “like magic”. He picked 
up and was surprised to hear the voice of a Spanish-speaking lawyer offering her 
services in his language. He hired her. Paul, a former Red Cross mediator, confirmed 
that these practices were indeed frequent in spite of the Red Cross tirelessly 
denouncing them. He explained that it was lawyers’ practice to offer a discount to 
clients bringing other clients (Interview, August 2013).  
When Anafé is not here, rejected asylum claimants are left to their own 
devices. Upon expiry of the time allocated to appeal, they move from the category of 
“asylum seeker” to that of “inadmissible person”. Once assigned to the latter, they can 
be sent back at anytime69. As I will show in chapter 8, barriers to accessing legal aid 
at CDG’s detention center are a serious issue for asylum seekers. Due to 
unsatisfactory access to legal recourse, rejected claimants risk refoulement to 
countries where their lives or freedom are at risk. For some detainees, having access 
to legal assistance may literally be a matter of life or death.  
 
Conclusion 
ZAPI 3 is not a spotless space; in the adult area the floor felt sticky below my 
feet, bathrooms were smelly and the family room I visited with Dominique was a bit 
run-down. However, overall detention conditions are quite good in ZAPI 3, especially 
compared to other administrative places of confinement or accommodation for non-
citizens.70 In ZAPI 3 the issues are not so much material conditions of detention but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 According to Anafé, in some instances the border police may also attempt to send back claimants 
before the expiry of the legal time allocated to appeal to the administrative court. This is a serious 
violation of domestic and international law. It was the case at Orly around 2011 (Interview with Lise 
and Anne, December 2013). Cf also Anafé’s December 2013 report, p. 25.  
70 For example, Agnès, Cimade employee, describes the administrative detention center of the Mesnil-
Amelot, nearby Charles de Gaulle, where non-citizens are confined prior to their deportation after 
residing illegally in the country:  
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rather confinement in and of itself as well as access to rights. NGO workers try to 
remedy these issues but are constrained by their organizations’ mandates and 
asymmetrical power relations. In spite of discourses portraying ZAPI 3 as a hotel or 
place of recreation it remains a detention center where individuals are deprived of 
liberty and face forced return.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
And after three years it is almost insalubrious in many areas because there are water 
infiltrations, the paint is completely flaked…There are no more locks on toilets’ doors, there 
are no more tables, the bedrooms had small tables, there were water fountains, nothing is 
working anymore, there are water drainage issues so water flows back including in the toilets, 
so there are unsanitary water inundations, it stinks, it is disgusting…(Interview with Agnès, 
March 2014). 
 
Likewise, George the ad hoc administrator explains that some group homes for unaccompanied minors 
on the territory are incredibly filthy (Interview, October 2013). 	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Chapter 7. The symbiotic relations between carrier sanctions and the 
waiting zone  	  
Introduction  
The number of individuals seeking international protection at French borders 
has dwindled over the years. While in 2001 OFPRA’s border division heard 7018 
claimants, this number had shrunk to 1093 in 2014 (OFPRA, April 10, 2015, 64). The 
refugee agency’s border team was comprised of 14 agents in the early 2000s, but only 
three were needed at the time of interview (Interview with Stéphanie, Miriam and 
Charline, November 2013). This dramatic drop in claimants is to be explained by the 
numerous (literal and figurative) fences that have been erected between refugees and 
France, or desired destination countries in general (Anafé, January 2013; Rodier, 
2012). Hathaway first referred to such fences as “non-entrée” practices in 1992. They 
take extremely varied forms and present various degrees of formality. They include 
extra-territorial airport international zones (cf chapter 1) or excision of zones of 
arrival in general, airport transit visas, carrier sanctions, maritime interception on the 
high seas, immigration liaison officers at departure points, safe third country 
agreements such as the 2004 Canada-US agreement. Recent non-entrée mechanisms 
rely heavily on cooperation with states of departure or transit. For example, they 
encompass “reliance on diplomatic relations; the offering of financial incentives; the 
provision of equipment, machinery, or training; deployment of officials of the 
sponsoring state; joint or shared enforcement; assumption of a direct migration 
control role; and the establishment or assignment of international agencies to effect 
interception” (Hathaway and Gammeltoft, 2015, 243). One of the latest of these 
mechanisms includes the EU-Turkish agreement signed on March 18, 2016. Under 
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this agreement, individuals reaching the Greek islands irregularly are to be returned to 
Turkey. EU Member States have pledged to resettle one Syrian refugee for every 
Syrian refugee readmitted to Turkey.71 
In this chapter, I will study one of these tools that may come into play 
thousands of kilometers from French and Schengen territory: carrier sanctions. I will 
unveil the symbiotic relations between carrier sanctions and the institution of the 
waiting zone, showing how the former finance the later, making its very existence 
possible. I will begin by providing a brief history of the emergence of carrier 
sanctions at the international and at the French level, reviewing existing literature on 
them, before demonstrating that they constitute a formidable mechanism to keep 
claimants at bay. I will then situate France within the landscape of carrier sanctions. I 
will also present the perspective of some governmental actors on the impact of carrier 
responsibility on asylum seeking. Finally, I will trace how trade unionists attempted 
to resist to the carrier responsibility framework at CDG.  
 
I. A brief history of carrier sanctions at the international and national level 
Dauvergne (2016, 4) explains that “settler societies” are “nations built through 
extensive migration, and which as a consequence led the world in developing 
migration regulation”. Settler countries like the United States and Australia started to 
impose financial and criminal sanctions on carriers bringing inadmissible passengers 
as early as the 1950s (Feller, 1989). In Europe, these developments occurred over the 
1980s, a key decade in the history of measures designed to keep undesirable migrants, 
and asylum-seekers in their midst, at bay (Feller, 1989). By 1989, the following 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 As many scholars and NGOs have observed, the agreement is in violation of international human 
rights and refugee law. Kenneth Roth, Human Rights Watch Executive Director, remarked 
“resettlement can be a very helpful supplement to asylum but can never be a substitute for the right to 
seek asylum” (Human Rights Watch, March 15, 2016).   
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countries had adopted laws providing for carriers sanctions: Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, Thailand, 
the UK and the US. Many European countries introduced repressive legislation 
against carriers specifically to curb the number of asylum-seekers. For example, the 
German Parliamentary State Secretary for the Ministry of the Interior explained (in 
August 1987) the rationale for introducing legislation imposing penalties in Germany: 
the number of asylum seekers had risen from 35,000 in 1984 to 100,000 in 1986, and 
many of them were running from economic hardship, not political persecution (Feller, 
1989). Therefore, when the Schengen Convention was signed on June 19, 1990, many 
states worldwide had already equipped themselves with repressive legislation against 
carriers bringing undesirable travelers.  
By contrast, the concept of carrier sanctions only made its way into French 
law in 1992, when the country integrated the requirements of the Schengen 
Convention into its domestic legislation (cf chapter 2). In the early 1990s France, like 
any party to the Chicago Convention, was already bound by the standards developed 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization’s (ICAO) executive council72. 
Interestingly, at first, the Facilitation division of the ICAO had considered that the 
carrier’s obligation to transport back inadmissible travelers constituted sufficient 
punishment: in 1986 standard 3.36 specifically stated: “Operators shall not be fined”. 
However this quickly changed: at the 1988 facilitation meeting, the possibility of 
fining carriers was introduced (Feller, 1989). Prior to ratifying the Schengen 
Convention, France was therefore already compelled to consider administering fines 
to carriers bringing rejected passengers. Other Annex 9 standards were also in force: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Pursuant to article 37 of the Chicago Convention of 1944, the executive council of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is responsible for developing standards and recommended 
practices regarding customs and immigration matters. Such standards are listed in Annex 9 to the 
Chicago Convention.  
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carriers had to return passengers lacking proper documents and to cover the cost of 
their stay prior to return. France waited until 1992 to incorporate these requirements 
into its national legislation, via the Law of February 26, 1992. This law imposed 
financial penalties on those carriers bringing an inappropriately documented 
“foreigner who is not a national of a Member State of the European Economic 
Community” (article 3)73. It also obligated companies to transport back non-admitted 
passengers and to pay for their living expenses before return (article 7). 
Importantly, both the Schengen Convention and Annex 9 to the Chicago 
Convention mention the need for state parties to respect their obligations under the 
Refugee Convention. Article 26.1 of the Schengen Convention clearly states: “The 
Contracting Parties undertake, subject to the obligations resulting from their accession 
to the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as 
amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, to incorporate the following 
rules into their national law”. But are carriers’ sanctions and refugee protection 
compatible? Or were contracting parties merely paying lip service to their obligations 
under the Refugee Convention and its additional protocol?  
The French Constitutional Council found that the Schengen Convention was 
compatible with the French Constitution on July 25, 1991. Nevertheless, several 
parliamentarians persisted in questioning the impact of the Schengen Convention on 
the right to seek asylum, a constitutionally protected right. For example, Allouche, a 
Socialist Senator, observed that he preferred “a foreign national staying illegally, but 
alive, in the Schengen area, to a foreign national persecuted or killed in his country 
because he was turned away when he wanted to flee” (French Senate debates, January 
16, 1992, 206). Communist MP Gilbert Millet remarked that this bill proposed to turn 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7310,000 francs per inadmissible passenger.  
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airline companies’ employees into police auxiliaries (French National assembly 
debates, December 19, 1991, 8267). As for Lederman, another Communist Senator, 
he pointed out that the experience of European countries that had undertaken to 
enforce sanctions against carriers revealed that such sanctions were both harmful and 
dangerous. Finally he observed that paving the way of asylum-seekers with obstacles 
could only result in clandestine arrivals, the only option left to those fearing for their 
lives (French Senate debates, January 16, 1992, 215). Marchand, the Minister of the 
Interior, brushed aside parliamentarians’ concern by explaining that the carrier would 
only be responsible when bringing an asylum-seeker whose claim was “manifestly 
unfounded”. He argued that no special knowledge was required to identify such a 
claim; for example an asylum-seeker declaring that his goal was to find work in 
France had a manifestly unfounded claim (French Senate debates, January 16, 1992).  
The law was adopted, notwithstanding these concerns. The Law of February 
26, 1992 exempted companies from the fine of 10,000 francs when the asylum 
claimant was admitted to French territory or when the claim was not “manifestly 
unfounded” (article 3). These legislative provisions have not changed much in 24 
years. I will demonstrate that parliamentarians were rightly concerned: carriers’ 
sanctions and refugee protection are fundamentally at odds. This should not come as a 
surprise, as countries introduced sanctions against carriers precisely to curtail the 
number of claimants arriving at their gates. I will start by examining carriers’ 
obligation to cover the costs of accommodation and return.  
 
II. Carriers’ responsibility (part 1): accommodation and return 
The CESEDA currently provides the domestic legislative basis for carrier 
sanctions. Transport companies bringing a non-EU national to France from a country 
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outside the Schengen area pay a heavy price when the individual in question is found 
inadmissible at French borders. First of all, companies are responsible for returning 
the rejected passenger to the point where he or she started his or her journey with the 
company. When it is impossible, carriers have to return the individual to the State that 
delivered the travel documents or to any other place where the person is admissible 
(CESEDA, article L.213-4, April 2016). Furthermore, carriers are financially 
responsible for the non-EU citizen from the moment he or she is declared 
inadmissible until his or her return (CESEDA, article L.213-6, April 2016). 
The law does not specify whether the company’s financial obligations are 
limited to accommodation costs or if they also encompass medical and other 
expenses74. It proved challenging to gather reliable data regarding the precise 
expenses incurred by companies under article L.213-6. But evidence suggests that 
these costs may be non-negligible at both CDG and Orly airports. In ZAPI 3 I talked 
to Gilles several times, as he accompanied me during my visits to the adult zone. 
Gilles occupies an important function in the police hierarchy. According to him, “the 
stay of an individual in the waiting zone costs 200 Euros per day” at CDG. Gilles 
explained that this amount included the maintenance of the building as well as civil 
servants’ salaries. However, he also said that the building’s maintenance was covered 
by the Ministry of the Interior, therefore suggesting that companies pay less than 200 
Euros per individual per day (observations). I also asked Clotilde, from the Ministry 
of the Interior, about the cost of a non-citizen’s confinement at CDG per day. She 
replied: “It is a matter on which my colleagues are currently working. They are trying 
to put in place a frame of reference, to set a price for a day so that it integrates both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  The precise wording in French is “les frais de prise en charge de l’étranger”, which can be translated 
in English as “the expenses to support the foreigner”.	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accommodation expenses and medical expenses if needed”75 (Interview, December 
2013).  
Those placed in the waiting zone at Orly airport are confined in a rather 
spacious room (about 50 square meters)76 at the airport’s south terminal during the 
day and transferred to the nearby Ibis hotel at night77. I visited both parts of Orly’s 
waiting zone and met with Guillaume, a high-ranking police officer at Orly, and 
Anna, who occupies an important managerial position at Ibis Orly airport. The state 
requisitions 12 rooms at Ibis hotel to detain those placed under the waiting zone 
regime. These rooms are on the fourth floor, all located in the same aisle. According 
to Anna, the allocated rooms are the same as regular ones, except for the fact that 
windows cannot open. Sometimes the hotel even rents the rooms in question to 
“ordinary customers” (clients ordinaires). I asked Guillaume how expensive it was to 
maintain a non-citizen in Orly’s waiting zone. He answered that the cost varied: the 
price of a hotel room at Ibis Orly fluctuates from one day to the next, but averages 
130 euros per night. Guillaume pointed out that there could also be additional costs, 
for example if the person needs an interpreter or a doctor. Guillaume concluded that it 
was impossible to provide a precise number. I lacked time to do so, but it would be 
worth interviewing airline carriers to unveil the precise extent of their financial 
obligations as regards article L.213-6.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 I asked Clotilde in July 2016 whether this frame of reference had been put into place. Clotilde replied 
that she was no longer working at the department in charge of administering fines and encouraged me 
to contact the person that had replaced her. Her colleague said that the department was still working on 
the document establishing accommodation costs. As the document had not been finalized, the 
information could not be shared with me.  
76	  According to Anafé’s 2011 report on Orly’s waiting zone.  
77 According to Anafé’s 2001 report (p.4) non-citizens may also be confined for a significant amount of 
time in police stations before being transferred to the holding room at the South terminal.	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What is certain is that, from a financial standpoint, it is in the state’s interest to 
have undesirable individuals returned before they legally enter the country. According 
to the Senator Pierre Bernard-Reymond, in 2008 the state spent 20,970 Euros per 
individual removed from the French territory (i.e. on deportation of individuals 
already deemed present in France, not in the waiting zone). This estimate included 
detention centers’ running expenses, transport costs (boat, plane or train tickets), costs 
pertaining to legal and medical assistance in detention centers and costs of guarding 
and escorting detainees. Although high, this number did not reflect expenses actually 
incurred: for example, the costs of providing court-appointed lawyers and of 
financially compensating claimants winning their trials against detention and removal 
were left out of the estimate (Lipietz, 2012). I will now investigate the second 
component of the carriers’ responsibility framework: financial penalties.  
 
III. Carriers’ responsibility (part 2): fines  
In addition to costs pertaining to confinement in the waiting zone and return, 
air and sea companies are legally compelled to pay fines to the French state when the 
non-EU traveler is turned away at the French (and therefore Schengen) border for 
reasons pertaining to travel documents; i.e. when the passport and/or visa are at issue 
(article L.625-1).78 Importantly, companies are also responsible for ensuring that a 
non-EU citizen possesses the required documents to reach his or her final destination 
outside of the Schengen area, in cases where transit occurs through France. Likewise, 
failure to comply with this requirement will result in a fine payable to the French state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  Appropriate travel documents are just one of the criteria (listed in article 5 of the Schengen border 
code) that third country nationals need to fulfill to enter the Schengen area. When entry is denied for 
non-documentary reasons such as lack of sufficient financial means, medical insurance or proof of 
accommodation, carriers are not fined. However, transport enterprises still have to pay for the non-
national’s stay and must provide for his or her return.	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(article L.625-1). The website of the Ministry of the Interior (December 2015) 
specifies the circumstances under which a company’s responsibility is triggered: 
when the passport or visa are missing, when the passport is invalid or when either is 
falsified, usurped or forged79. Clotilde, a civil servant working for the Ministry of the 
Interior’s department in charge of administering fines to carriers, gives examples of 
unacceptable passports:  
(…) You also have a very interesting variety, which are fantasy passports. For 
example, if you show a “Groland” passport, you will not be let in. It exists. 
There are also “citizen of the world” passports; it is pure fantasy. There are 
also other cases that are a bit different; it is the passports of the Sioux nation 
for example. You have nations, you have groups like the Sioux who consider 
that the border does not run through the United States and Canada so there is a 
Sioux nation passport, that is not recognized either. There are also passports 
that we do not recognize because we do not recognize the country. The fantasy 
passport is another notion (Interview, December 2013).  
 
Since I interviewed Clotilde, in December 2013, the amount of fines actually 
doubled. Clotilde had explained that fines amounted to 5,000€ per traveler turned 
away at the border. This meant that an airline company paid 30,000€ when a family of 
six was turned away at the border for inappropriate travel documents. The CESEDA 
was modified by law n°2016-274 of March 7, 2016. Since then, companies face fines 
of 10,000€, not 5,000€ per inadmissible traveler. The fine’s amount may be lesser in 
cases where companies co-operate with the French government. As Clotildes 
explains: 
The usual rate is 5,000€ (10,000€ at the time of writing) and we go below 
when the company helped the administration. It is often persons in transit. For 
example the person comes from Ouagadougou, transits through Paris on her 
way to Canada. When she is about to embark for Canada –so she stayed in 
international zone, she did not present herself to the border police, she did not 
have to- Air France realizes that the person does not have a visa for Canada. 
The company has a responsibility problem because it should have noticed it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Europe-et-International/La-circulation-transfrontiere/Les-
conditions-d-entree-dans-l-espace-Schengen. Accessed April 4, 2016.  
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from the start…They (company agents) notice it late but do a favor to the 
French state because had nobody noticed, the person would have been 
returned from Canada, she would have come back to us and we would have 
had to deal with the file. So we consider that the company helped and we issue 
a fine at 3,000€ instead of 5,000€. Objectively it did not fulfill its obligation 
but it rectified the situation. We will issue a smaller fine (Interview, December 
2013).  
 
Both the amount of the fine and the procedure to be followed are different in 
the case of unaccompanied minors (article L.625-4). Carriers may pay up to 20,000€ 
when bringing a child with no legal guardian (previously this amount was capped at 
10,000€). Immediately after the procès-verbal is issued, the company has to place 
10,000€ on an escrow account. This sum could then be partially or totally reimbursed 
to the company at the end of the procedure, after it has had the opportunity to defend 
its practice. If the carrier refuses to disburse the money and its responsibility is indeed 
engaged, the fine will be 20,000€. This is how Clotilde justified this difference of 
treatment:  
Isolated minors are a particular public, no matter which topic we are dealing 
with. There are OACI norms, Community norms, and there is an obligation of 
particular vigilance towards minors…personnel in charge of control have to be 
particularly vigilant regarding the situation of the child, to ensure that he or 
she is accompanied by persons having authority: parents or if it is not the case 
to check the quality of the person accompanying the child (Interview, 
December 2013). 
 
Clotilde explains these specific norms on account of children’s vulnerability: there are 
international kidnappings within family settings but also human trafficking for sexual 
exploitation. But Clotilde, espousing the perspective of the state, also notes that 
unaccompanied minors place a heavy burden on the state when brought in by an 
immigrant trafficking ring (filière)80: “So the kid voluntarily threw away his or her 
passport, he or she was told to throw off the passport. He or she will not utter a word 
and will be placed in group homes managed by regional councils (conseils généraux) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80Cf footnote in chapter 4 on the use of the term “filière” (network).  
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until his or her majority. The arrival of a foreign minor within these frameworks is an 
enormous burden for the state” (Interview, December 2013). Fines do represent a 
significant amount of money for transport companies.  
 
IV. The impact of fines on companies’ budgets 
Fines certainly weigh heavily on carriers’ budgets and can even force carrying 
companies to shut down. Dominique, the high-ranking authority who accompanied 
me during my first visit to ZAPI 3, told me:  
You know, I think in Africa in particular, there are less and less airline 
companies that endure. There are airline companies that appear that do not 
necessarily have the means to focus on control. For us the objective is, rather 
than to have to deal with difficult human cases upon arrival, not to uproot 
these people and to sort (people) it is easier to tell someone “you will not be 
able to enter France”. So some companies do not always have means (to 
control) and we will have populations coming because a company opens. Six 
months later it shut down because initially it faces penalties or has difficulties 
functioning. So if a route stops, a route that existed and was a heavy 
immigration provider, I am thinking for example about the African company 
(inaudible company name): when the company closed it was over. Now there 
is “Camair-Co” that is a bit in the same situation and we tell ourselves: “If it 
closes it will be over, we will have less (unauthorized migration)”. It is not 
necessarily only Cameroonians: sub-Saharan population transit through these 
airports because it is easier, there is a company serving France directly 
(Interview, September 2013).  
 
Only companies that possess sufficient financial resources will be able to train their 
employees and withstand a few fines. Others, particularly in Southern countries, will 
perish.  
Even companies that invest a lot of resources in personnel training are not 
fine-proof. Clotilde explains that, at Air France, entire departments are dedicated to 
training. But Air France is still, in absolute numbers, the company that pays the most 
fines to the French state. This high number of fines derives from volume of traffic: 
Air France gets fined less than other companies, proportionally to its activity 
	   192	  
(Interview, December 2013). According to Clotilde, each year the border police 
forward to the Ministry of the Interior approximately 2000 decisions taken against 
carriers (called procès-verbaux) that transported sea and air passengers unequipped 
with the required travel documents. Interestingly, the Ministry of the Interior seldom 
receives decisions to penalize sea carriers from the border police. Yet Clotilde pointed 
out that many boats from North Africa arrived at the port of Marseille and that, surely, 
not all passengers were in possession of the required travel documents. Clotilde could 
not provide me with an explanation as to why sea carriers were fined less than air 
carriers, proportionally to their activity (Interview, December 2013). What is certain 
is that air carriers bear the brunt of the fines. As Charles de Gaulle is the first airport 
in France, it is safe to assume that most of the fines incurred by airline companies are 
taken to penalize irregular arrivals at Charles de Gaulle.  
Upon receiving the procès-verbal, the Ministry of the Interior informs the 
company of its intention to fine it. The later may then dispatch a representative to the 
Ministry of the Interior to access its file. The carrier has one month to provide a 
written rebuttal to the Ministry of the Interior (CESEDA, L.625-2). This procedure 
allows the company to present its side of the story and may lead to a fine annulment. 
Indeed the law provides for exemption from fines in two cases: when the individual is 
admitted to the territory after his or her asylum claim was declared not manifestly 
unfounded or when the carrier demonstrates that the inadmissible individual was in 
possession of the required documents upon boarding and that these documents were 
not “openly irregular” (CESEDA, L.625-5)81. Dialogue may benefit the company: for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Article L.625-5 of the CESEDA (April 2016) reads: “Les amendes ne sont pas infligées: 1. Lorsque 
l’étranger a été admis sur le territoire français au titre d’une demande d’asile qui n’était pas 
manifestement infondée. 2. Lorsque l’entreprise de transport établit que les documents requis lui ont 
été présentés au moment de l’embarquement et qu’ils ne comportaient pas d’élément d’irrégularité 
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example the company may demonstrate that an impersonation case was impossible to 
detect to the naked eye and thereby be exempted from the fine. In cases where the 
passenger presents a valid passport (and a valid visa if applicable) upon boarding but 
then disposed of his or her travel document before reaching the border, the fine will 
be cancelled if the company can prove (with a photocopy for example) that the 
passenger was indeed in possession of a valid document upon commencing the 
journey (Interview with Clotilde, December 2013).  
Financial issues may be one of the most important rationales behind gangway 
checks: by controlling passengers as they exit the plane, border agents can connect 
passport-less individuals to a specific flight and therefore collect the carrier’s fine. 
They can also make sure that the individual is transported back by the company that 
brought him or her to France.  
Ultimately, the company may contest the fine in court (CESEDA, L. 625-2). 
Clotilde and her colleagues noticed that companies started going to court more when 
the price of airline fuel increased: the number of cases rose from 30 to 70 (at the time 
of interview, according to Clotilde) per year. According to her, the government wins 
in 98 percent of the cases. Importantly, once the final fine has been set, it is 
impossible for the company to waive it. While in some countries companies can 
negotiate with the government, it is not the practice in France. When companies do 
not pay, the government’s budgetary services do not hesitate to take retaliatory 
measures against those having their headquarters in France. Clotilde gave the example 
of a company whose bank account had been recently frozen (Interview, December 
2013).   
For all the aforementioned reasons (price of fines, low odds of winning court 
cases, impossibility of negotiating the fine’s amount) letting undocumented asylum 
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claimants on board is not in carriers’ economic interest to say the least. Feller’s 
observation, although dated (Feller 1989,57), is still relevant: “A high risk-taking and 
profit-oriented transport carrier cannot reasonably be expected to make humanitarian 
decisions based only on a possibility that sanctions will later be waived, particularly 
when the burden of proof is on the carrier”. Refusing improperly documented 
refugees makes sense for carriers, especially since they face fines in many countries.  
 
V.  France within the landscape of carrier sanctions: one country among many  
It is essential to keep in mind that France is only one country among many in 
the carrier sanctions’ landscape. A European Directive (2001/51/EC) on carriers’ 
liability of June 28, 2001 compels EU countries to fine transport companies bringing 
inappropriately documented passengers. This said Directive gives leeway to countries 
to set the fines’ amount but forces them to impose penalties no less than 3000€ or the 
equivalent in the national currency (article 4). The Directive specifically refers to 
Member States’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol, stating that these obligations remain unaffected by the Directive. In 
particular, article 4 reads that the states’ duty to administer fines to carriers is 
“without prejudice to Member States' obligations in cases where a third country 
national seeks international protection”. However such a provision is very vague and, 
unsurprisingly, has been interpreted differently by member states. The criteria to 
fulfill for fines to be waived in case of arrival of inappropriately documented asylum 
seekers vary tremendously from one state to the next. Some EU countries exonerate 
companies only when asylum claimants are subsequently recognized as refugees 
while others also provide for exemptions when claimants receive some form of 
subsidiary protection (EC-EMN, December 2012).  
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For example, the UK belongs to the former group of countries: fines will be 
waived only after the asylum seeker is granted full refugee status (Scholten, 2015). 
Austria is more generous, as stated by its legislation: “The fine will be void in case 
the foreigner in question receives asylum or subsidiary protection or cannot be sent 
back to his country of origin for reasons of non-refoulement” (EC-EMN, December 
2012). Other countries go one step further, waiving penalties in cases where the 
inadmissible person seeks international protection, irrespective of the outcome. This 
seems to be the case of Lithuania, according to the information that the country itself 
provided: “A carrier shall not be imposed any fine where: 1) the alien being carried 
applies for asylum in the Republic of Lithuania in compliance with the Law of the 
Republic of Lithuania on the Legal Status of Aliens” (EC-EMN, December 2012).  
France can be situated somewhere in the middle of this European spectrum: 
fines will be waived if the individual’s request to enter the territory on asylum 
grounds was not found “manifestly unfounded” (Interview with Jeanne, November 
2013). A claim is found to be not “manifestly unfounded” when considered worth 
examining on merits for both refugee status and subsidiary protection (Interview with 
Stéphanie and Miriam from OFPRA, November 2013). In any case, the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles points out that legislation relieving carriers of their 
liability is not applied consistently.82 Discrepancies and unpredictability in 
implementation incite companies to outwardly reject inappropriately documented 
asylum claimants. I would now like to provide the perspective of some governmental 
actors on this “non-entrée” tool.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82Cf ECRE’s website. Available at :	  http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/access-to-europe/7-
carrier-sanctions.html	  .	  Accessed April 6, 2016.  
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VI. Governmental actors’ perspective on fines and asylum seeking  
To some actors working on Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone, measures 
blocking asylum-seekers’ access to sovereign territory do not constitute an issue. My 
conversations with Clotilde and Jeanne, civil servants working for the Ministry of the 
Interior, were particularly enlightening. I told Clotilde that, according to some NGOs, 
the carriers’ responsibility framework was detrimental to asylum-seekers. At first, 
Clotilde acknowledged that my remark was interesting. But she quickly went back to 
her role, refusing to change her perspective and finally justifying measures keeping 
asylum-seekers away from France’s territory, explaining that it was not in the state’s 
interest to handle too many claimants. Clotilde was very welcoming, eager to share 
her experience and knowledge with me. But her tone changed when answering my 
question, betraying exasperation and anger. The issue of asylum was emotionally 
charged for her.  
Researcher: According to NGOs, carriers’ responsibilities hurt asylum-
seekers.  
Clotilde: In what way?  
Researcher: In the sense that asylum-seekers are not able to reach French 
territory to make their claim.  
Clotilde: They can make them at the embassy. And there are other ways of 
applying for asylum, I think. You need to ask, the department in charge of 
asylum would tell you better than myself.  
Researcher: I do not know if it is possible to do it at the embassy anymore.  
Clotilde: It is, objectively, a remark that seems interesting. But my job is to 
prevent people from setting foot in France! But every one has one’s own 
position, like we were previously saying. Everyone is in one’s role. But here 
there is a massive influx, as you know we are in the first ranks in terms of 
asylum claims in Europe and there is saturation. The colleagues from (the 
department of) asylum probably told you, the CADA (accommodation centers 
for asylum seekers) are fully packed, the system is ready to implode because 
the delays of instruction became too long; it is neither in the interest of the 
claimant nor in the interest of state services because people remain on the 
territory, in overloaded structures. People who, once rejected, do not want to 
leave. It is really, really heavy to handle and to find ways out afterwards 
(Interview, December 2013).  
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According to the report published by the Intergovernmental consultations on 
migration, asylum and refugees (ICG) in 2012, it is possible to apply for an asylum 
visa at French embassies83. However, according to the information submitted by the 
French government itself, “There is no provision in French law that governs this 
procedure, which means that asylum applications at diplomatic missions are dealt 
with on an exceptional basis” (IGC, December 2012, 186). Not only is this procedure 
meant to be exceptional, it also erects a number of barriers for the claimant. After the 
individual has described the merits of his or her case, the diplomatic mission will 
decide whether or not to transfer the request to the Ministry of the Interior or to the 
UNHCR. The Ministry of the Interior will then consider the visa request along with 
the interview report (IGC, December 2012). It is important to note that the refugee 
agency may not have a say at this stage of the procedure. As the IGC notes, “The case 
is then examined by the Ministry of Interior, which may include a consultation with 
OFPRA” (December 2012, 186, emphasis added). Once granted an asylum visa, the 
claimant still has to go through the regular procedure on French territory.  
Earlier in our conversation, Clotilde had told me that visas should not be 
granted lightly. She had pointed out that, in the past, some individuals had taken 
advantage of visas, in order to claim asylum once on French territory:  
The Commission initiated with member states a policy of liberalization of 
visas, which means that we explain to third countries currently subject to visas 
that, if they make efforts, especially with regard to the readmission of illegal 
individuals, we can liberalize visas. And we noticed that this liberalization 
could have very negative effects: for example when we liberalized for the 
Balkans we ended up with an exponential increase of asylum claims. Because 
until then, since a visa was needed to come to Europe, I mean to the Schengen 
area, people were blocked at consulates. Now, with a biometrical passport in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The IGC defines itself as “an informal, non-decision making forum for inter-governmental 
information exchange and policy debate on issues of relevance to the management of international 
migratory flows” (ICG, 2012). The IGC 2012 report reads: “The IGC brings together 17 Participating 
States, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), and the European Commission”.  
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general they enter without a visa, so the first thing they do when they arrive is 
rush to the préfecture (i.e. where claims are registered). They are considered 
mostly unwarranted claims but they weigh on everything: on the system, on 
the system’s slowness, financially. It leads to expenses in terms of 
administrative functioning and in terms of accommodation in the CADA (i.e. 
the centers accommodating claimants) (Interview, December 2013).  
 
Clotilde’s statement matched Macklin’s observation that we are witnessing an 
“erosion of the idea that people who seek asylum may actually be refugees” (2005, 1). 
Clotilde did not think that some people may genuinely need international protection, 
and therefore advocated for a non-entrée mechanism: visas. Just like Clotilde, Jeanne 
refused to ponder the implications of carriers’ sanctions on asylum claimants. Clotilde 
and Jeanne both elected to confine themselves to the role that had been attributed to 
them, refusing to consider the issue in its entirety. Both used the sentence “everyone 
is in one’s role” (chacun dans son rôle) that summarized their refusal to adopt a 
holistic perspective. In response to my question “have you noticed some changes 
since you have occupied this position”? Jeanne replied:  
Yes, a significant decrease in asylum claims at the border. When you will 
meet NGOs, you will hear them complain about this. The border police’s 
services have correspondents in states.  
Researcher: Liaison officers? 
Jeanne: Immigration (officers). They already do really important checks in 
airport zones and prevent them from boarding. Every year we meet NGOs 
who deal with asylum at the border. They (NGOs) complain about this 
regularly, saying that we seriously impinge on the right to seek asylum. It is 
their version; we do not think that it is the case. You really have both 
perspectives (Interview, November 2013).  
 
Governmental actors are not the only ones to consider asylum-seekers’ lack of 
access to the territory to be a non-issue. Louise used to be a lawyer representing 
individuals making claims to asylum on the territory and was a Senator at the time of 
interview (January 2014). To my question “do you not think that there are some 
genuine asylum seekers that can never reach the territory?” Louise answered:  
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But of course, we know it very well. Some did not go through, but well… And 
there are others that did not go through. But the worst is not this, the worst is 
those who entered and claimed asylum but were turned down in spite of being 
real political refugees. I met some” (Interview, January 2014).  
 
To Louise, it is not shocking that some claimants will never be able to file a claim, 
blocked by measures taken kilometers away from the waiting zone. However, she 
truly laments the system’s lack of fairness: some true political refugees -who 
managed to cross the border and entered regular procedures- are denied status. In her 
eyes, this is the most blatant injustice, not the extra hurdles created by the waiting 
zone itself and prior non-entrée mechanisms.  
The vocabulary used by Clotilde both reveals and contributes to the 
dehumanization and trivialization of asylum claimants. She explained that the border 
police should refrain from forwarding decisions taken against carriers to the Ministry 
of the Interior when individuals have been admitted to the territory on asylum 
grounds. However, mistakes may occur, forcing the Ministry of the Interior’s 
departments in charge of asylum at the border (i.e. Jeanne’s department) and in charge 
of administering fines (i.e. Clotilde’s department) to exchange information. Clotilde 
explained:  
Normally the DCPAF (border police) should not send me the procedure (i.e. 
when the person was admitted on asylum grounds), they cancel it; it is the 
only case. It happens sometimes that they send it to me anyway because they 
have a problem with organization. When we see files of individuals who 
presented themselves without passports it happens that we check with Jeanne 
to see if she has these names. Because it happens that DCPAF sent us by 
mistake people (‘s names) that have been considered as having a non-
manifestly unfounded claim. In these cases the fine is cancelled (by the court) 
right away. Normally the DCPAF should not send me the file. If they sent it 
and we did not check and we go to court it is an automatic cancellation with 
interests to be paid because we should not have pursued this case. So when we 
have a doubt with my colleague we seize Jeanne’s department. We ask: “We 
have this person arriving from this flight pretending to be x, do you have an 
asylum claim?” Sometimes there is one but the person was not admitted. So 
we can press on with the procedure. We call this expunging (emphasis added, 
purger, a strong term in French) the asylum petition proceedings from the 
	   200	  
record, so we check. Normally we should not have to do it since the DCPAF 
should forbid themselves from sending us the document (procès-verbal) while 
the asylum procedure is not flushed out (Interview, December 2013).  
 
I would like to end this study of carriers’ obligations by examining how trade 
unionists resisted the carrier responsibility framework.  
 
 VII. “We are not border police auxiliaries!” Trade unionists’ resistance to the 
carrier responsibility framework  
Air France trade unionists campaigned against carriers’ sanctions. They 
protested about having to play the role of border agents. At the time of the interview 
(February 2014), Aurélien and Christophe were still affiliated with the airline section 
of the CFDT trade union, while Jean had just left. CFDT stands for Confédération 
française démocratique du travail and can roughly be translated as “Democratic 
French Work Confederation”. CFDT is a trade union of employees that belong to 
different professions and work in different companies, ranging from public to private. 
Aurélien, Christophe and Jean all worked or used to work for Air France in varied 
capacities. All three of them were instrumental in shaping the history of CDG’s 
waiting zone and of French waiting zones in general. They participated in the creation 
of Anafé and were all very active in CFDT, some of them occupying key functions in 
the trade union’s airline section. Christophe recounts:  
It was also an action that we launched around this time (i.e. from 1999-2005). 
It was (about) the role that Air France employees had to play upstream, in 
source countries. We worked a lot on these questions. Furthermore we had 
situations that were a little strange. I remember that I intervened because, in 
Turkey, Air France personnel were Turkish and obviously had a position, 
commonly shared amongst Turks…they were not favorably inclined when it 
came to Kurds. In our personal capacity we told them “wait, you do not have 
to…(discriminate against Kurds)”. Since Air France paid a fine if the person 
did not have (the required documents), there was some pressure on these 
people: “be careful if at the other end we realize that the person does not have 
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the required documents… it is your job to check, you, company employees.” 
So we also worked with the help of ITF 
Researcher: What is ITF?  
Jean: The International Transport Workers’ Federation. It dates back to the 
eighteenth century.  
Christophe: It gathers all trade unions worldwide that work in transports- 
seafarers, bus drivers, as well as those working in road and urban transport, 
(with) the railways and civil aviation.  
Jean: 150 countries, the headquarters are in London, they organize 
conferences in several languages 
Christophe: They had worked at our request: the CFDT had asked (them) to 
work on the Chicago Convention and on the role that airline employees have 
to play; they are asked to check and recheck, to do the job of immigration 
officers. Companies put a lot of pressure because at the other end they had to 
pay so they said: “I am going to train my staff to avoid paying”. So we worked 
on these issues.  
Researcher: Did it pan out?  
Christophe: No, it is still the case.  
Researcher: The same system is still in place. When did this action take place?  
Christophe: Between 1999 and 2005. Around this time. We worked a lot 
during these 5 or 6 years (Interview, February 2014).  
 
Not surprisingly, the trade unionists’ action was not successful. How could it have 
been? The notion of carriers’ sanction was then well enshrined in international, 
regional and domestic laws. In order not to perish, airline companies had to align their 
practices with legal requirements and this directly entailed putting the burden of 
document control on their own personnel.  
Today, airline companies’ personnel have no other option but to receive 
training in document control. This training is achieved in close cooperation with 
government officials. Clotilde’s department at the Ministry of the Interior receives the 
representatives of companies who wish to analyze their fines. Clotilde and her 
colleagues establish a typology of the fines administered and provide tips on how to 
avoid them. Border agents also deliver training in companies’ headquarters 
(Interview, December 2013). As Guiraudon points out, companies’ employees are 
forced to engage in practices that violate human rights. She writes:  
There are reasons to believe that carrier sanctions will result in discriminatory 
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practices. The competition between airlines (and airport authorities) is 
ferocious and they are keen to save time on passenger processing and speed 
transfers. Airline security personnel have therefore spoken in favour of 
‘profiling’, i.e., selecting a few individuals for additional checks rather than 
delaying boarding time by submitting everybody to the same treatment 
(Guiraudon, 2006 b). 
 
Christophe, who had already alluded to Air France’s discriminatory practices against 
Kurds in Turkey, specifically described passenger profiling in this country:  
I saw things in Africa and in Turkey, in these places at the confines of Europe 
where Air France personnel was asked many things; they were told to 
photocopy passports otherwise people afterwards ate them, destroyed them, 
put them down the toilet and then “look, you let this person through without a 
passport”. “But how should we proceed? Do we make photocopies of 
everybody (‘s documents)?” “Oh no, only those that you think…(we will have 
issues with). I remember talking with Turks in Turkey, Air France employees, 
who said “I do not want to make photocopies, how do I do? This one sounds 
dodgy; I make a photocopy. This one will maybe attempt something so I make 
a photocopy (Interview, February 2014).  
 
Aside from advocating against carriers sanctions, trade unionists also resorted 
to artisanal methods to try to stall returns of individuals in danger in their countries of 
origin. Aurélien recalls:  
Monica from Anafé often called us at the last minute: “be careful on this 
flight”. There were really tense situations when it came to returns. I would say 
that we were improvising a little, and we only had one possible interlocutor in 
such emergency, it was the captain. So regularly with Jean we burst into 
cockpits as they were preparing their flight. We were not always received 
well; I remember a strong anecdote. It was the case of Christian Iraqis during 
the war, Barbarin had forwarded the case to Anafé, he was probably the 
archbishop of Lyon84. He had indicated that these persons would meet their 
death if sent back to Iraq. There was a family with children and a general who 
was a deserter. We climbed on the cockpit with you, I think (talks to Jean). 
We had explained (the situation) to the captain who had said “but I really do 
not care”. So the plane went to Amman, because they were not landing in 
Bagdad anymore and they stayed on the plane and came back. We made a lot 
of noise on this case. You see the extreme difficulty (Interview, February 
2014).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  According to the official website of the Catholic Church in Lyon, Philippe Barbarin was transferred 
to the Parish of Lyon on July 16, 2002. On October 21, 2003 Pope Jean-Paul II ordained him Cardinal. 
http://lyon.catholique.fr/?Biographie,1 Accessed May 3, 2016.  
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The trade unionists explain that they are still very sympathetic to Anafé’s 
cause but cannot be as active as in the past. Aurélien explains:  
The issue of blackmail for an (airport) access pass (chantage au titre d’accès) 
impacted employees and mostly activists. We have passes. And now it is a 
really sensitive topic because without it you do not work anymore. There is a 
really important presence of renseignements généraux (RG) on the airport 
compounds, and also possibly of the DST (Direction de la Surveillance du 
Territoire85. Both RG and DST agents specialize in intelligence gathering). 
This is why we do not really expose our activists nowadays, because there are 
interrogations. We do not question our engagement but it is much more 
complicated today.  
Researcher: At first you had less issues with blackmail for the pass?  
Aurélien: It did not appear 
Christophe: It really worsened after 2001, after the New York attacks. In the 
years 2002, 2003 and 2004 there was a huge clampdown. I do not recall the 
figures but 4000 passes were withdrawn at the time on the airport 
compounds… (Interview, February 2014).  
 
Aurélien means that the pass that allows access the airport secure zone could be easily 
withdrawn, depriving activists of their livelihoods. It became more complicated for 
trade unionists to engage in activism after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the institution of the waiting zone is financed by carriers’ 
sanctions. Transport companies pay a steep price for bringing inadmissible travelers. 
In addition to having to cover the costs of confinement and return, they are legally 
compelled to pay fines each time a passenger is refused entry for reasons pertaining to 
travel documents. Carriers’ sanctions and refugee protection have been mutually 
exclusive from the very beginning, in spite of the Schengen Convention and Annex 9 
to the Chicago Convention mentioning the need for state parties to respect their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Now called Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure since April 30, 2014. This department took 
over the missions of the Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur (itself created in 2008 and 
encompassing the missions of the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux and of the 
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire). Cf	   http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Le-ministere/DGSI 
Accessed May 3, 2016.  
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obligations under the Refugee Convention. This outcome was predictable, since 
countries introduced sanctions against carriers in order to reduce the number of 
asylum seekers reaching their borders. Trade unionists at CDG refused to endorse the 
role of border police agents, but their actions against the carrier responsibility 
framework were bound to fail. By this time, the notion of carriers’ sanction had been 
well established in international, regional and domestic laws and airline companies 
had no choice but to abide by the legal requirements in place, transferring the burden 
of document control to their own employees.  
Civil servants working for the Ministry of the Interior do not see carriers’ 
sanctions as problematic for asylum claimants, for they do not think that some people 
may be genuine refugees. These findings support Macklin’s argument that the refugee 
is disappearing discursively (2005). As she writes, “a significant segment of the 
public believes that many asylum-seekers are frauds, that is, migrants with no fear of 
persecution who attempt to use the refugee system to circumvent otherwise restrictive 
entry provisions” (Macklin 2005, 2). After demonstrating that carriers’ sanctions, a 
non-entrée mechanism, are funding the waiting zone, in the next chapter I will argue 
that the waiting zone itself functions as a non-entrée mechanism.  
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Chapter 8. The waiting zone: the last gate to keep asylum seekers 
away 	  
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that carriers’ sanctions and refugee 
protection were fundamentally at odds from the very beginning. I also described 
activists’ attempts to rectify this situation. In this chapter, I will present evidence 
supporting the claim that the waiting zone in itself constitutes the ultimate gate that 
asylum-seekers need to pass before finally reaching the regular refugee status 
determination system. These findings buttress the argument developed throughout this 
dissertation: the waiting zone serves the same purpose as its predecessor, the 
international zone. It is one of many devices crafted by states to keep asylum 
claimants away from their territory. In fact, the waiting zone constitutes the last “non-
entrée” mechanism when all the upstream ones (including carriers’ sanctions) have 
failed.  
I will proceed by demonstrating how interpretation and communication issues, 
along with unsatisfactory access to legal recourses, filter asylum claimants 
dramatically. It is challenging for asylum claimants to appeal against the decision 
refusing them entry to the territory. As I will explain, observation of court hearings, 
statistics and interviews suggest that administrative judges embrace the executive’s 
perspective on and narrative about those seeking international protection at French 
borders. I will highlight how asylum claimants may be returned to countries where 
their lives or freedom are at risk. Finally, following this completion of my overall 
argument, I will offer general conclusions, contributions, and new questions opened 
by the dissertation.  
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I. Interpretation and communication issues  
OFPRA, the refugee agency, has a small unit inside ZAPI 3, at the heart of 
Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone. From there, OFPRA agents hear all claimants 
placed in the waiting zone on the grounds of asylum claims, whether located at 
Charles de Gaulle or in French territories overseas. Interpretation always takes place 
over the phone, a practice which raises complications86. Michaël’s company (cf 
chapter 5) provides interpretation services for OFPRA’s department of asylum at the 
border occasionally. Michäel explains that the conditions in which interpreters work 
are far from ideal:  
Michaël: Work conditions are not good over the phone: being an interpreter 
over the phone does not make sense. 
Researcher: It was one of my questions.  
Michaël: You cannot hear anything. Do you know how they work over there? 
The microphone is on the table.  
Researcher: I saw the desk. 
Michaël: You have the microphone on the table. So the claimant is here, it 
resonates; you do not hear the question from the protection officer (officer de 
protection, i.e. refugee agency agent tasked with hearing asylum 
claimants)…it is impossible (Interview, July 2014). 
 
These difficulties are compounded when both OFPRA agents and interpreters 
carry out the interview over the phone. Poor audio quality and lack of visual contact 
may impede understanding. Furthermore, telephone interviews fail to create a sense of 
safety for the claimant. In response to my question “is there anything that could be 
improved regarding asylum at the border?” Jeanne, from the Ministry of the Interior, 
answered:  
About what can be improved, my opinion is that OFPRA should not confine 
itself to phone interviews; they should at least have the person on 
videoconferencing, so that they see him or her. There are things that you 
cannot hear over a phone; you will not necessarily hear that someone is tense, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86	  At the beginning of the 2000s, interpreters would come on site from time to time. This is no longer 
the case.	  OFPRA agents mentioned only one recent exception: two children aged 12 and 6 had arrived 
accompanied by a smuggler. An interpreter in Filipino was brought in order to “reassure the children” 
(Interview with Stéphanie, Miriam and Charline, November 2013). 	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or maybe you will, but you will see a behavior on videoconferencing. And the 
person will also see to whom he or she is talking to. This is a matter on which 
we (Ministry of the Interior) disagree with OFPRA. But it requires means 
(…). And even when we have an asylum claim in the Reunion Island, it is 
them (OFPRA in CDG), over the phone. I find it problematic. Of course they 
introduce themselves, of course they explain who they are, but the claimant 
does not see who (it is).  
Researcher: Yes it is difficult to trust in these conditions. 
Jeanne: or to feel that you can trust. It is a little complicated (Interview, 
November 2013).   
 
While OFPRA assured me that every individual claiming asylum at the CDG 
border was heard in person (Interview with Stéphanie, Miriam and Charline, 
November 2013), Christian could not agree less with this statement. According to this 
experienced lawyer, many claimants in ZAPI 3 talk to OFPRA agents over the phone:  
Christian: Often, I mean always, the person is interrogated over the phone. 
Researcher: Not at Roissy, it is the only exception. This is what I have been 
told.  
Christian: It is often by phone; for all the files I had, most of the time it was 
over the phone.  
Researcher: Really? Even those at Roissy do their OFPRA interview over the 
phone?  
Christian: Yes, yes, over the phone. OFPRA is not always on site. It is not 
true. The last case I had, it was 10 days ago, it was a homosexual from 
Cameroon. He had been to the infirmary just before his interview; the doctor 
had given him a sedative because he was really unwell. He did his phone 
interview; one answer out of two was off the mark (à côté de la plaque). He 
explained that it was difficult for him to discuss his homosexuality over the 
phone with someone he did not know, who was not necessarily listening 
carefully. It is difficult by phone and the judge reproached him that. To reject 
his claim, his appeal, the judge said: “answers are stereotyped, conventional, 
not personalized, summary; his story is not credible.” 
Researcher: Because the conditions he was in did not allow him to present his 
story. 
Christian: He was rather in extremely unfavorable conditions to narrate an 
intimate story over the phone. So this is an important critique. Try to get 
numbers, information. But as far as I am concerned, each time I get asylum 
seekers it is over the phone. 
Researcher: At Roissy? 
Christian: Yes, at Roissy, I insist . 
Researcher: I am a little … (confused). I met OFPRA; they told me that at 
Roissy … (interviews with refugee agency personnel took place in person) 
Christian: They lied to you; it is not possible. If you want I can give you the 
file of Ambe, the Cameroonian. I have always had phone interviews 
(Interview, December 2013).  
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Claimants interviewed in person at CDG may find it challenging to present 
their stories. Miriam from OFPRA explained that a policeman was always sitting on a 
chair just outside OFPRA’s office in ZAPI 3, “to make sure everything is going well” 
(Interview with Miriam, November 2013). But the presence of authorities may not 
resonate well with someone who experienced persecution at the hands of state agents, 
creating an unsafe environment. Those seeking international protection at Orly airport 
face even more adversarial conditions, having to undergo their phone interview inside 
the police headquarters. It is actually written policy that claimants be heard in such 
conditions. The internal regulations document, posted on the wall of the room serving 
as Orly’s “day” waiting zone, reads: “this confidential interview (with OFPRA 
agents) will be carried out from the premises of Orly border police, by phone” 
(observations, February 2014). Since the European Court of Human Rights 
condemned France in 2007 in the Gebremedhin case, asylum-seekers whose story was 
found “manifestly unfounded” have 48 hours to appeal against this decision. They 
cannot be returned during this period of time. However, while this procedure may be 
satisfactory on paper, in practice it is extremely difficult for claimants to initiate such 
recourse.  
 
II. Unsatisfactory access to legal recourses against refusal to enter territory on 
asylum grounds 
The number of individuals passing the manifestly unfounded test fluctuates 
from year to year. While 38.4 percent of claimants entered France on asylum grounds 
in 2000, it was the case of only 4 percent of claimants in 200387. In recent years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 In 2000, OFPRA agents at the border heard 5262 claimants, of which 2019 were admitted to the 
territory. This admission figure dropped dramatically in 2003 where 5633 claimants were heard, 
resulting in only 229 admissions.  
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admissions to the territory have increased. In 2011, 10.1 percent of asylum seekers 
were admitted to the territory (1857 OFPRA hearings for 188 admissions). This figure 
rose to 13 percent in 2012 (1954 hearings for 255 admissions), 16.9 percent in 2013 
(1263 hearings for 214 admissions) and 28.9 percent in 2014 (OFPRA, April 10, 
2015, 64).88 The law changed after I collected data. Since July 29, 2015, a third party 
may be present at OFPRA interviews. Claimants can elect to be accompanied by a 
representative of an NGO (accredited by the government) or by their counsel 
(CESEDA, article L.231-8-1, April 2016). It would be interesting to study whether, or 
to what extent, this new legislative provision impacted OFPRA’s decisions at the 
border89. But it has to be noted that the law confers a limited role to third parties: the 
accompanying person can only intervene at the end of the interview to make 
observations (CESEDA, art. L.723-6, April 2016).  
 Individuals who had requests for entry on asylum grounds rejected face 
hardships in appealing their cases. Appeals against the Ministry of the Interior’s 
decision have to be launched within 48 hours of receipt of the decision. Appeals need 
to be written in French and be sufficiently well formulated to meet the administrative 
court’s requirements: otherwise they will be automatically rejected without any 
hearing. It is therefore impossible for a non-native French speaker not well-versed in 
French administrative law to write such an appeal.  
The chances of going to court are very slim for those receiving their rejection 
letter during the weekends, as Anafé volunteers do not provide legal aid during this 
time. Dorian, from the UNHCR delegation in Paris, acknowledged that this situation, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 At the time of writing, statistics for 2015 were not publicly available.  
89 Anafé decided to accompany claimants at their OFPRA hearing for 6 months, starting from 
September 21, 2015. Anafé’s conclusions were not yet available at the time of writing. Cf  Anafé’s 
website : http://www.anafe.org/spip.php?article309. Accessed April 25, 2016.  
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albeit satisfactory on paper, was not satisfactory in practice (phone interview, January 
2014). Ségolène, custody and liberty judge, went further in suggesting that the 
European Court of Human Rights may well condemn France for depriving asylum 
claimants of an effective recourse. She explained:  
Sometimes you have in front of you a person who asked to enter France on 
asylum grounds and who is still within the delay to appeal. Therefore you 
explain to him, you say: “Sir, you asked to enter France on asylum grounds 
and it was turned down but you are still within the delay to appeal this 
administrative decision.” Then you tell him: “Sir, my decision is to keep you 
(in the waiting zone) and there you can appeal within 24 hours, starting from 
now, time of notification”. How do you want these poor detainees coming 
from Ghana or Brazil to understand? If they had a lawyers’ clinic they could 
go there with the decisions and the lawyer could say: “here you can do that”. I 
believe that one day we will get condemned because these are not effective 
recourses. 
Researcher: You mean by the European Court of Human Rights?  
Ségolène: Yes, one day someone will say “wait, there are no effective 
recourses” (Interview, November 2013). 
 
Anafé volunteers assisting detainees with their appeals find this task 
challenging on two accounts: it is emotionally draining and it is rarely successful. 
Raoul explains:  
It is always said regarding asylum claims that telling is reliving, and listening 
is reliving with the other person too. So you go home with all these stories. 
When the person lived a year of atrocities, when she takes two hours to tell 
you, you are left with five minutes in your head. One year already condensed 
in two hours; you are left with the horror (Interview, October 2013).  
 
Volunteers are well aware that, from a statistical standpoint, appeals are rarely 
successful. For example, in 2013, out of 1346 individuals seeking authorization to 
enter France on asylum grounds, 1044 were turned down after meeting with 
OFPRA.90 Of the rejected 1044, only 84 entered the territory after the administrative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 222 individuals were granted leave to enter France after meeting with OFPRA, and 80 were not 
heard by OFPRA.	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court heard their appeal (government statistics, Anafé 2015, 161).91 Raoul continued: 
“So you see, it is not always easy; from a humane standpoint what we are told is 
difficult and when you know it is useless…” (Interview, October 2013). I observed a 
few hearings before the administrative judge and will now share these ethnographic 
findings.  
 
III. Administrative court hearings: when the judge embraces the state’s 
perspective 
 I only observed a few hearings before the administrative court and therefore 
do not claim to have enough information to draw general conclusions. I went to the 
Paris administrative court on three different days in September 2013. Claimants were 
appealing the Ministry of the Interior’s decision denying them the possibility of 
entering France on asylum grounds at CDG.92 One case particularly struck me. An 
Afghan unaccompanied minor was appealing the Ministry of the Interior’s decision. 
His court-appointed lawyer did her best to rebut the Ministry of the Interior’s 
arguments. She argued that a legal mistake had been made: OFPRA had gone beyond 
the examination of the manifestly unfounded character of his claim. According to the 
Ministry of the Interior, the minor’s answers were too vague. For example, the 
question “Where is your province located in Afghanistan?” should have elicited a 
precise response, as this information was “common knowledge”. His lawyer urged the 
administrative judge to take into account the environment in which the young man 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Unfortunately, official statistics do not give the number of claimants launching an appeal before the 
administrative court. Of the 1124 claimants who did not enter France through OFPRA (i.e. 1044 
individuals whose claim was found manifestly unfounded + 80 individuals whose claim was not 
assessed by OFPRA), 355 were released from the waiting zone by the liberty and custody judge, and 
36 were released by the Appellate court (i.e. the court that rules over decisions made by the liberty and 
custody judge). Cf official statistics published in Anafé’s 2015 report, p 161.  
92 At the administrative court of Paris, non-waiting zone cases are also heard.  
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had been raised: he had not attended school, had not learned geography and did not 
know how to read or write. Instead he was working in the fields with his father. The 
Ministry of the Interior also reproached him for not giving enough precision regarding 
the Taliban’s mode of recruitment.  
Yet, his lawyer pointed out that the UNHCR had acknowledged in a 2012 
report that intimidations and threats were indeed common in the region. The counsel 
insisted that her young client had received death threats. Referring to recent 
“gruesome events” (événements macabres), she remarked that sending him to a 
province where safety was not guaranteed would violate both article 33 of the Geneva 
Convention and article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ad hoc 
administrator asked for the permission to speak. The judge agreed, provided he had 
“new elements to bring”. Explaining that he had known the young man for a week, he 
said he did not doubt he was telling the truth. He had seen many of his friends 
disappear in the mountains and never come back. As for the Ministry of the Interior’s 
lawyer, she attempted to discredit the minor’s story, pointing out that “it was strange 
for the Taliban to come 15 times to his home, only to leave a threat letter”.  
The interpreter, Mariam, was sitting next to me during the hearing. She told 
me that the minor was “really persecuted” and said she knew what she was talking 
about, being an Afghan national herself. He recounted that he had seen two of his 
friends being murdered. Mariam told me that this judge was “really tough”. 
According to what she had observed on two previous days, the judge had not released 
any of the claimants from the waiting zone. These observations matched those of 
many other actors. Before the audience even started, I heard a chosen lawyer 
complain that the judge had already made her decisions, prior to hearing the 
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claimants: “Anyway, she never releases anybody” 93. This judge was also well known 
to Anafé volunteers and employees. Raoul contributed to the NGO’s December 2013 
report on asylum procedures at the border. He observed many hearings before the 
administrative court in this capacity. Raoul never saw this judge quash a single 
Ministry of the Interior’s decisions (Interview with Raoul, October 2013). My 
interview with Noémie took place before I went to the administrative court. This is 
how Noémie presented her experience at the administrative court:  
Researcher: Have you been to the administrative court? 
Noémie: Just once. It was horrible. I saw a judge in particular, very mean, and 
even border officers with whom I was talking were telling me “anyways she 
never releases anybody, forget about it (“c’est mort”). She did not release 
anyone. And I was told: “There is no chance, even with a chosen lawyer (i.e. 
not a court-appointed lawyer), even someone from Sri Lanka with proofs of 
persecution will not be set free” (Interview, September 2013).  
 
When I observed appeals before the administrative judge, I understood that Noémie 
had been describing the judge whose rulings I witnessed.  
Mariam, the interpreter, explained that she had been instructed by the judge 
not to translate counsels’ sentences because it was inconveniencing the judge. Under 
these conditions it must be difficult for appellants to understand proceedings enough 
to produce articulate answers. Furthermore, the judge instilled fear, allowing 
claimants to talk only if they had “something new to say”, interrupting them (“I told 
you I was not interested in hearing again what your counsel just said”). To a national 
of Togo who had started explaining persecutions at home, the judge replied: “if you 
want to say that you belong to a political party do not bother, I read the OFPRA 
decision”. More research would need to be done regarding the procedure before the 
administrative judge. But statistics, observations and interviews suggest that some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 I use the term “chosen lawyer” to describe a lawyer who has been approached by his client or his 
client’s family.  
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administrative judges embrace the executive’s perspective and narrative when it 
comes to asylum claimants at the border, leaving the latter with only slim chances of 
entering France. The judge rejected all the appeals that I observed and the young 
Afghan’s case was no exception. His request to enter France to seek asylum was 
turned down. I later learned that he had been returned to Afghanistan where his life 
was in danger.  
 
IV. Refoulement of asylum claimants to countries where their lives or freedom 
are at risk 
Both Anafé (Interview with Raoul) and Red Cross representatives informed 
me that the young Afghan national had been returned to Afghanistan, where he 
became victim of the Taliban. I discussed this case with Gérard, an experienced Red 
Cross ad hoc administrator (cf chapter 3):  
Researcher: I saw an Afghan minor who was finally sent back. 
Gérard: Is not it the one we were following? A minor who was then identified 
as an adult?  
Researcher: I am not sure but a Red Cross ad hoc administrator was there. 
Gérard: We had a case. It must be him. This minor was returned because we 
were taken off the case. I think that he would not have been returned had he 
still been considered as an isolated minor… But the police had found 
documents stating he was an adult. We fought the decision to take us off the 
case; we went before the liberty and custody judge, before the public 
prosecutor but it did not work. So we were no longer ad hoc administrator on 
this case. He was sent back and it is true that it did not take place in good 
conditions. We found his trace but it was complicated.  
Researcher: If we are talking about the same person, Anafé told me that he 
was in the hands of the Taliban.  
Gérard: Yes, absolutely, it is him. From the moment he was considered an 
adult, he was returned to his country of transit, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). We contacted human rights organizations in UAE so that they could 
find him but we never got an answer. And Mathieu, who was ad hoc 
administrator, was in touch with the family in Germany as his mother and 
brother were asylum-seekers in Germany…At the end the family told Mathieu 
–we were in contact with Anafé on this case- that they had received news from 
his aunt; he had been returned from Dubai. The aunt said she had found him 
but he was abducted under her eyes by a group of Taliban (emphasis added, 
Interview, December 2013).  
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Individuals whose claim is found manifestly unfounded by OFPRA and whose 
appeal to the administrative court is unsuccessful (or upon expiry of the delay to 
appeal) move from the category of “asylum seeker” to that of “inadmissible person”. 
Once assigned to the latter, they can be sent back at anytime94. Anafé attempts to 
follow individuals once they leave the waiting zone. According to the organization’s 
findings, the case of the young Aghan is not isolated. In fact, the NGO documented 
how a number of failed asylum claimants experienced mistreatment once returned to 
their countries of origin or transit (Anafé, April 2010). Worrisomely, local authorities 
seem to have access to information regarding the asylum claim in some cases. Anafé 
recommended to French border agents to refrain from forwarding information 
pertaining to asylum claims to their counterparts in countries of return (Anafé, April 
2010). Anafé volunteer Noémie recounted:  
Sometimes authorities in the country of origin know that (returned) 
individuals sought asylum in France. 
Researcher: But how can they know that?  
Noémie: We do not know exactly. You were asking me how local authorities 
could know that a person sought asylum. Actually, when someone leaves 
Roissy or the waiting zone, there is a file with all his or her documents that is 
given to the pilot. Or, if there is an escort, the escorting officers have it.  This 
file is not supposed to contain asylum-related documents, but sometimes it 
happens.  
Researcher: Really?  
Noémie: We do not really know but we have testimonies of persons who 
arrived and were imprisoned. Local authorities knew and we think that the 
documents were given to them.  
Researcher: How else could they know? If the person himself or herself does 
not say anything… 
Noémie: Also, at Anafé we visit airport terminals and it is really interesting 
because we have the opportunity to talk to many border officers. Because 
there are four police stations and four holding rooms and each time you talk to 
different agents. We often ask them the following question: “when you return 
someone, are there also documents pertaining to the asylum claim in the file?” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 According to Anafé, in some instances the border police may also attempt to send back claimants 
before the expiry of the legal delay to appeal to the administrative court. This is a serious violation of 
domestic and international law. It was the case at Orly around 2011 (Interview with Lise and Anne, 
December 2013). Cf also Anafé’s December 2013 report, p. 25.  
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And sometimes they tell you “yes of course”. Then they do some research and 
they tell you “no, actually no” (Interview, September 2013).  
 
While the officers interviewed by Noémie may not be the ones directly responsible 
for the return of failed claimants, their answers are nevertheless a matter of concern. 
They indicate a widespread lack of understanding of asylum-related issues within the 
border police force.  
Air France trade unionists shed light on the mechanisms by which local 
authorities may come in possession of a returnee’s travel documents. Christophe and 
Jean told me:  
Christophe: We had problems with passports too, do you remember? (Talking 
to Jean) In countries where they (the police) gave passports to airline 
personnel, including to the pilot, when returns took place.  
Jean: They gave (it) to the pilot who, instead of giving it back to the individual 
gave it to authorities and the person was arrested with all the dangers of 
mistreatment.  
Christophe: People who had accepted to leave were returned. But instead of 
giving the passport back to the person, (the police) handed it to the pilot with 
instructions to give it to the police upon arrival. Some pilots were not doing 
this. During the flight they had the passport given back to the individual. They 
said: “it is none of my business, let him handle it, it is his passport after 
all…(Interview, February 2014).  
 
Their statement shows that returnees’ treatment depends on luck. It is highly variable 
and depends on the pilot’s ethical compass.  
 
Conclusions 
France, like other states, has been resorting to law and geography to keep 
undesirable non-citizens, including asylum claimants, away from its territory and 
from the rights attached to it. More specifically, a part of Charles de Gaulle airport 
has been used since the 1980s to exclude foreign nationals from rights granted by 
domestic and international law. This space has been successively called “international 
	   217	  
zone”, “transit zone” and “waiting zone”, and its scope has been extended 
significantly overtime. The notion of extra-territoriality has sustained exclusion in the 
material form of the waiting zone. My research detailed the legal mechanisms, 
enforcement practices and mental landscapes that have upheld this space at Charles de 
Gaulle airport. Results deconstructed the idea that a parallel and less protective 
system of rights based on the distinction between physical and legal entry was normal 
and necessary in a liberal democracy bound by human rights and refugee conventions 
at the regional and international levels.  
In this dissertation I traced why, despite civil society organizations’ many 
years of activism, people detained at the airport are still subject to a less advantageous 
legal framework. The history of the birth of the waiting zone and its subsequent 
extensions highlights the paradox of legal activism. As I demonstrated, defending 
non-citizens through litigation has resulted in significant extensions of the scope of 
the waiting zone. Each time lawyers and NGOs sued the government for an illegal 
administrative practice, the latter managed to turn this very practice into a law, 
thereby establishing a greater space of lesser rights.  
Contrary to what many stakeholders say, the Law on the Waiting Zone did not 
represent a striking shift from the previous era, when asylum-claimants and rejected 
travelers were excluded from legal guarantees based on their presence in international 
zones construed as extra-territorial. In fact, this less protective legal regime was 
premised precisely on the idea that international zones, renamed “transit zones” and 
then “waiting zones”, were somehow excised locations. The waiting zone is the heir 
of the international zone: the initial construction of the international zone as an extra-
territorial space has endured in contemporary mindsets and practices. Amongst 
individuals working in or on the waiting zone can be found the deeply ingrained idea 
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that the waiting zone is not French territory (at least) for non-citizen populations. This 
argument, just like in the 1980s and early 1990s, has been used to exclude non-
citizens from rights. This is why I take issue with the perspective of some legal 
scholars on excision. As I established, this device does not belong to the past.  
Furthermore, the Law on the Waiting Zone has reinvented exclusion through 
another form of extra-territoriality, premised on the non-citizen’s legal status at the 
border. The waiting zone regime forces an exclusionary framework upon the most 
vulnerable groups at the border: unaccompanied minors and asylum-seekers. The 
waiting zone legislation illustrates the fact that liberal democracies use law as a 
technique of government to take away fundamental rights from certain populations 
(Basaran, 2011). It will be interesting to study how the Law of July 29, 2015 has been 
translated into practice: has a significant number of asylum claimants, including 
unaccompanied minors, been released from the waiting zone on the basis of this new 
legislation? This information was not available yet at the time of writing.  
Policy recommendations regarding unaccompanied minors and asylum-seekers 
Unaccompanied minors should never be assigned the waiting zone regime at 
French borders. Instead, they should all be legally admitted into the territory, in order 
for professionals to assess what constitutes their “best interest”. Domestic law 
presently authorizes the detention of unaccompanied minors in the waiting zone under 
many circumstances. Yet confinement in the waiting zone is, in itself, against 
international law and may result in physical and emotional abuse. Unaccompanied 
children in the waiting zone may be forcibly returned at any time (save during the 
assessment of their application to enter France to seek asylum) to places where their 
safety is not guaranteed. Unaccompanied minors at French borders should be treated 
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first and foremost as children and as such should benefit from all the protections 
afforded to minors under domestic law.  
As far as asylum-seekers are concerned, their hearing with OFPRA agents 
should take place in a closed room, without authorities being present. Like all 
detainees, asylum claimants should have access to a legal aid clinic in ZAPI 3 staffed 
with professional lawyers and financed by the state. This legal aid clinic should be 
open seven days a week. When needed, lawyers should be able to phone professional 
interpreters, also paid by the state. Currently, individuals who had requests for entry 
on asylum grounds rejected lack effective recourse. Due to unsatisfactory access to 
legal aid, rejected claimants risk refoulement to countries where their lives or freedom 
are at risk. Finally, in no circumstances should documents pertaining to the asylum 
claim be included in the file of returnees. Returnees should be given back their 
passports at the start of their journeys.   
While the rights conferred to those placed under the waiting zone regime are 
no panacea, they are nonetheless better than being denied legal existence. Yet, the 
international zone remains a legal vacuum for non-citizens, when authorities refuse to 
register them under the waiting zone status. Some passengers are still deprived of the 
“right to have rights” (Arendt, 1968) in the international zone. This illegal practice 
may have dramatic consequences for people’s lives. As in the era preceding the birth 
of the Law on the Waiting Zone, asylum-seekers may experience refoulement in the 
international zone of Paris airports. The international zone remains a non-entrée 
mechanism (Hathaway, 1992).  
Policy recommendations regarding individuals in the international zone  
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Should individuals located in the international zone fail to fulfill the criteria to enter 
French and Schengen territory or claim asylum at French borders, authorities need to 
register them under the waiting zone status.  
 As for the waiting zone, it serves the same purpose as the international zone. It 
is one of many devices crafted by states to keep asylum claimants away from their 
territory. In fact, the waiting zone constitutes the last “non-entrée” mechanism when 
all the upstream ones have failed. It is the ultimate gate that asylum-seekers need to 
pass before finally reaching the regular refugee status determination system. The 
waiting zone is financed and made possible by another non-entrée mechanism: carrier 
sanctions. The institution of the waiting zone is financially advantageous for the State, 
as the latter transfers to airlines the cost of returning those deemed undesirable. The 
State forgoes financial responsibility when it comes to the waiting zone, refusing to 
pay for legal assistance.  
I showed that the rights conferred by the waiting zone status may not be 
available in practice. Barriers to rights enjoyment are particularly prevalent in airport 
terminals, where detainees are also subjected to isolation and arbitrariness. But the 
presence of visitors and third parties does not guarantee access to rights in ZAPI 3. In 
spite of discourses presenting this space as a hotel or place of recreation, it remains a 
detention center characterized by limited visibility and police omnipresence. Many 
stakeholders working in or on CDG’s waiting zone perceive rights as something that 
can be dispensed with, akin to charity.  
Policy recommendations to improve all detainees’ access to rights 
All interpreters should be professionals and should translate the entire content 
of administrative documents, including the part mentioning rights. All detainees 
should be able to benefit from the jour franc if they so desire. Border authorities 
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should not make this decision on their behalf. Each detention cell in terminals should 
include posters featuring Anafé’s phone number, the list of lawyers accredited by the 
bar office of the Seine Saint Denis department as well as country codes and 
instructions pertaining to the usage of the phone. These posters should be written in 
all six UN languages and in Portuguese.  
 Charles de Gaulle’s waiting zone is in fact a vanishing point (Mountz, 2013). 
Individuals trapped there are perceived and treated as economic migrants, 
undeserving of the guarantees applicable to their counterparts who have crossed the 
legal border. In the eyes of the state, their categorization as illegal migrants trumps 
their status of rights-holders. Even those entrusted with safeguarding the rights of 
detainees can embrace the state’s perspective, according to which border control 
should take precedence over rights. The vocabulary used by actors working on and in 
the waiting zone both reveals and contributes to the dehumanization and trivialization 
of asylum claimants and of detainees in general. Findings support Macklin’s (2005) 
argument that the refugee is disappearing discursively. Furthermore, some authorities’ 
mindsets towards non-citizens and their border enforcement jobs may be conducive to 
ill treatment. Individuals placed in waiting zones are seen as impoverished and 
uniform masses to be kept at bay for the economic sake of the country. Once 
categorized as “non-admitted” or “asylum-seekers”, individuals disappear. The very 
structure of the waiting zone is also conducive to abuse: individuals who are wronged 
are usually returned and do not testify.  
Further lines of inquiry will compare other countries’ laws, policies and 
practices pertaining to airports’ transit zones. It would be interesting to know whether 
individuals in these spaces encounter the same challenges as at Charles de Gaulle 
airport. A genealogy of other transit zones would reveal whether extra-territoriality 
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has been similarly used to exclude people from the rights they are entitled to under 
domestic and international law.  
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Appendix 
Pseudonyms are used except when consent was explicitly given to disclose identity 
and when it could not be foreseen that such disclosure would be detrimental to the 
interviewee.  
 
Appendix 1. Table of research participants: experts 	  
Pseudonym/name 
(first and last name) 
Organization Role  Sex 
Agnès Cimade Employee Female (F) 
Anna Hotel “Ibis” at Orly Managerial position F 
Anne Anafé Employee F 
Arnaud Border police Agent at CDG Male (M) 
Aurélien CFDT-Air France Trade unionist M 
Cédric Chaplaincy at CDG Priest M 
Charline OFPRA Employee F 
Christophe CFDT (trade union)-
Air France 
Trade unionist M 
Christian Legal firm Legal counsel M 
Clémence Legal firm Legal counsel F 
Clotilde Ministry of the 
Interior 
Employee-
department 
administering fines 
to carriers 
F 
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Pseudonym/name 
(first and last name) 
Organization Role Sex 
Danièle Lochak University of Paris-
Ouest-Nanterre la 
Défense 
Professor Emeritus 
of public law 
F 
Dominique Border police High-ranking agent 
at CDG 
M 
Dominique Monget-
Sarrail 
Legal firm Legal counsel in the 
Amuur case 
F 
Dorian UNHCR Employee M 
Frédéric Legal firm Legal counsel M 
Georges Red Cross or 
Famille Assistance 
Ad hoc 
administrator 
M 
Gérard Red Cross or 
Famille Assistance 
Ad hoc 
administrator 
M 
Gilles Border police High-ranking agent 
at CDG 
M 
Guillaume Border police High-ranking agent 
at Orly 
M 
Henri Border police Agent at CDG M 
Jacques General Inspector of 
places of deprivation 
of liberty 
Inspector M 
Jean CFDT-Air France Former trade 
unionist 
M 
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Pseudonym/name 
(first and last name) 
Organization Role Sex 
Jeanne Ministry of the 
Interior 
Employee-
department 
reviewing asylum-
seekers’ requests at 
the border 
F 
Jérémie Border police Agent at CDG M 
Joël Translation 
company 
Interpreter M 
Laura Red Cross Former mediator F 
Léa Ministry of Justice Judge F 
Lise Anafé Employee F 
Louise Senate Senator and former 
lawyer 
F 
Luc Legal firm Legal counsel M 
Lydia Anafé Volunteer F 
Mathieu Red Cross or 
Famille Assistance 
Ad hoc 
administrator 
M 
Mariam Paris administrative 
court 
Interpreter F 
Michaël Translation 
company 
Company’s director M 
Miriam OFPRA Employee F 
Noémie Anafé Former volunteer F 
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Pseudonym/name 
(first and last name) 
Organization Role Sex 
Paul Red Cross Former mediator M 
Philippe Border police Agent at CDG M 
Pierre Medical center at 
ZAPI 3 
Doctor M 
Raphaël Chaplaincy at CDG Priest M 
Raoul Anafé Volunteer M 
Rémi Rouquette Legal firm Legal counsel and 
former lecturer in 
public law 
M 
Ségolène Ministry of Justice Judge F 
Serge Slama University of Paris 
Ouest-Nanterre la 
Défense 
Professor of public 
law 
M 
Simon Border police Agent at CDG M 
Stéphanie OFPRA Employee F 
Sylvie  Red Cross Mediator-minor 
zone 
F 
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Pseudonym/name 
(first and last name) 
Organization Role Sex 
Valentin Border police Agent at CDG M 
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Appendix 2. Table of research participants: individuals placed under the waiting 
zone regime  	  
Pseudonym Geographic origin Sex 
Ajitabh  Sri Lanka  M 
Alfredo Cuba M 
Amanda Central America F 
Amine Algeria M 
André Central African Republic M 
Arthur Democratic Republic of 
Congo-living in France 
M 
Carmen Central America F 
Cherif Algeria M 
Françoise Senegal F 
Gabriela Central America F 
Hassan Syria-born in Kuwait-
descendant of Palestine 
refugees 
M 
Isabela Nicaragua F 
Jazmin Central America F 
José Nicaragua M 
Joyce Central America F 
Laurent Senegal M 
Leïla Morocco F 
Lola Central America F 
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Pseudonym Geographic origin Sex 
Rosalita  Nicaragua F 
Veronica Central America F 
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